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Abstract  
Project alliancing not only presents an alternative to traditional contracting methods in 
procuring infrastructure projects, but also conveys a complex transaction relationship. 
Over the past decade, alliancing has attracted wide research interest. However, 
previous research has neglected the impacts of transaction attributes of alliances, and 
the cost and competence of alliancing in dealing with contracting problems. Also less 
considered are the control mechanisms and the use of interorganizational cost 
management practices in alliances. The research intends to address the shortcomings 
and knowledge gaps in the existing literature and provide an economics insight for 
alliancing, and therefore establishes its aims as studying the economics of alliancing 
and exploring interorganizational management controls in alliances.  
Transaction Cost Economics and interorganizational management control theories 
provide basic theoretical insights for the research. To translate relevant conceptions 
and propositions of Transaction Cost Economics into operational definitions, the 
research conceptualizes and breaks down transaction costs of alliances into three cost 
elements, i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. Transaction 
attributes in alliances are also operationalized. Building on interorganizational 
management control theories, the research categorises the control mechanisms in 
alliances as outcome, behaviour and social controls. In addition, cost management in 
alliances is defined as contracting parties’ coordinated efforts to reduce shared costs. It 
is adopted to control alliance operations and improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of alliances. 
The research adopts a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to seek solutions 
towards the research problems. Through factor analysis and multiple regression 
analysis on a sample of 88 Australian alliances collected by means of a questionnaire 
survey, the research tests the impacts of uncertainty, frequency and various dimensions 
of asset specificity on the three individual transaction cost elements. The reducing 
effect of alliancing on transaction costs is also examined. At the same time, paired-
sample T tests are performed to rank and group the control mechanisms of alliances 
that contribute to reducing transaction costs. To explore interorganizational cost 
management practices in alliances, interviews with alliance managers, supplemented 
 xiii 
by the above-mentioned questionnaire survey, are used for gathering the required 
information. The collected data is analysed qualitatively.  
The results indicate that the impact of transaction attributes on transaction costs varies 
according to the particular attributes dimension examined. Uncertainty has a positive 
impact on all the three transaction cost elements. Frequency and some dimensions of 
asset specificity are positively associated with set-up costs and monitoring costs. 
However, such a positive effect on enforcement costs does not exist. The findings 
support the predictions of Transaction Cost Economics regarding the influence of 
transaction attributes on transaction costs, and thereby provide Transaction Cost 
Economics with empirical evidence in the construction industry. It was found that 
alliancing is more effective in reducing transaction costs under conditions of high asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency than under conditions of low asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency, suggesting that the governance efficiency of alliancing 
becomes stronger as contracting parties’ investments in specific assets, uncertainty and 
frequency increase. The findings demonstrate that the real strength of alliancing lies in 
it being an effective approach to reduce transaction costs where there is high asset 
specificity, high uncertainty and high frequency. Among the control mechanisms of 
alliances that may contribute to reducing transaction costs, some social controls were 
found to have the greatest effectiveness on reducing both set-up costs and monitoring 
costs. Behaviour controls are the most effective mechanisms to reduce enforcement 
costs. In comparison, outcome controls are less effective on reducing all the three 
forms of transaction costs. The results suggest that social controls and behaviour 
controls are particular relevant mechanisms when projects are complex and the outputs 
are difficult to be measured. In addition, each mechanism presents differential type and 
strength of effectiveness on different transaction cost elements. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of one particular control mechanism varies in different alliance process. 
Regarding the cost management in alliances, it was found that alliances employ the 
value-based target costing process to planning and designing projects, and setting cost 
and non-cost targets, and adopt continuous improvement as the primary costing 
methodology to undertake cost management activities in a collaborative manner. The 
commercial incentive drives alliance participants to devote to cost-reduction activities. 
It was also found that cost management in alliances leads to added value to the clients 
since the improved functionality and non-cost performance is achieved without 
increasing costs, or costs are reduced without compromising the functionality or 
 xiv 
performance requirements. An interorganizational cost management framework is 
developed based on the findings.  
This research not only has well addressed the shortcomings and knowledge gaps in the 
extant alliancing research but also extends Transaction Cost Economics and 
interorganizational management control perspective to construction management. As 
the research suggested, appropriate governance and control mechanisms can facilitate 
transactions and economize transaction costs under given conditions. From 
management point of view, the research provides practitioners with Transaction Cost 
Economics perspectives and efficiency considerations to choose organizational 
arrangement and craft appropriate control mechanisms when engage in construction 
transaction relationships. In addition, the measurement methods of transaction 
attributes and transaction costs presented have profound implications for future 
research.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Recent decades have witnessed the popularity of project alliancing and the increasing 
importance of interorganizational cooperation and collaboration in the construction 
industry. Alliancing refers to a project procurement method in which “the owner 
collaborates with one or more service providers to share the risks and responsibilities 
in delivering the capital phase of a project” (DTF Victoria 2006, p. 2). Key features of 
alliancing include such arrangements as risk and opportunity sharing, commitment to 
‘no disputes’, acting in good faith, unanimous decision making, joint management 
structure, and open-book in terms of documentation and reporting (DTF Victoria 
2010a). Many scholars and practitioners view alliancing as an alternative contracting 
method to deal with fragmentation and lack of integration, to improve efficiency and 
performance of the construction industry (Barlow 2000; Bresnen and Marshall 2000a; 
Hauck et al. 2004; Ross 2003).  
Because it offers an attractive alternative to traditional contracting methods, alliancing 
has attracted wide research interest. The extant alliancing research has contributed to 
our understanding of this interorganizational cooperative relationship in terms of its 
emergence, features and principles, applications, benefits, success factors and incentive 
systems etc. The alliancing practice is also becoming more mature and sophisticated 
over time (Wood and Duffield 2009). Despite these contributions, the economics of 
alliancing have less been considered in previous studies. Further, the blurring 
organizational boundaries and integration of construction activities in project alliances 
entails the changes to management practices.  
1.1.1 Economics of Project Alliancing 
Previous studies have well advocated for alliancing, and identified a number of 
advantages and benefits of alliancing such as capital cost reduction, improved project 
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performance (in terms of time, quality, safety etc.), avoiding disputes, commencing 
projects earlier than by traditional methods, flexibility, economizing resources, source 
of learning, enhancing the partners’ reputation and improving competitive advantage 
(e.g. AAA 2008a; Barlow 2000; Halman and Braks 1999; Hauck et al. 2004). However, 
some controversial views still remain. For example, cost effectiveness is often 
questioned in alliancing projects due to its lack of price competition in selecting 
alliancing participants (Currie & Brown 2004; Henneveld 2006; Langfield-Smith 
2008). Bresnen and Marshall (2000c) even argue that traditional contracting methods 
may also result in similar benefits and alliancing does not guarantee them. The reason 
for the debate is that previous alliancing research has not considered the impacts of 
transaction characteristics of alliancing, and the cost and competence of alliancing in 
dealing with contracting problems. Choosing a contracting method for procuring a 
construction project could actually be viewed as a transaction. From this point, 
alliancing is not only a project procurement strategy and contracting method, but also a 
complex transaction relationship between the owner and one or more service providers 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). From Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)’s perspective 
(Williamson 1985), transactions are often obsessed with the problems of contracting 
due to the presence of ‘imperfect’ human natures such as bounded rationality and 
opportunism. The degree of bounded rationality and opportunism varies according to 
the transaction attributes including asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction 
frequency. Transactions can be organized in a given form and controlled through 
appropriate mechanisms to protect transactors against the hazards of contracting 
problems. However, such protections cannot be realized without a certain costs since 
the governance of transaction relationships between parties is costly. Such costs are 
termed as transaction costs. Transaction attributes can influence transaction costs 
directly and determine the governance forms of transactions. Meanwhile, TCE holds 
that “an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of 
organizations” (Williamson 1981, p. 548). Transaction cost economizing depends on 
the alignment between transaction attributes and the mode that the transaction is 
organized and governed because governance forms differ in their costs and ability to 
govern the transaction relationships and solve problems, whilst transactions differ in 
respect of the underlying transaction attributes, so that alignment between the two does 
promote governance performance and economize transaction costs (Williamson 1991a). 
Thus, TCE submits that the major concern of transaction parties is that organizing 
transactions in a more efficient way while simultaneously economizing the associated 
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transaction costs. Two significant gaps are most relevant in alliancing research area 
when viewed through TCE lens. Firstly, prior alliancing research have neglected the 
costs and efforts associated with setting-up alliances, managing alliance process and 
deal with problems that might arise during alliance relationships, and more importantly, 
the impact of transaction attributes of alliances on those costs. Secondly, current 
research has made little effort to examine whether alliancing is an efficient method to 
improve governance performance and reduce transaction costs in delivering projects 
with given characteristics (see Section 2.5 and 3.5).  
1.1.2 Management Controls in Project Alliances 
Actually, project alliance is a kind of interorganizational relationship in which the 
contracting parties commit their resources and knowledge into a joint team, work 
together in a collaborative and cooperative way to pursue common goals and realize 
respective benefits (Axelsson et al. 2002; Crowley and Karim 1995). Obviously, the 
organizational boundaries between parties become blurred under alliancing 
arrangements since alliance places all parties’ activities and resources as objects for 
management and control. Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) argue that the 
interorganizational relationship between firms leads to the development of cost 
management techniques that go across organizational boundaries. The overall 
efficiency of alliance relies on the way to manage activities and resources of all the 
contracting parties, instead of one party’s own competence. Thus, the alliance 
relationship creates new demands on cost management to manage the transaction value 
creation process while simultaneously economizing transaction costs. From the 
perspective of interorganizational management control, interorganizational 
relationships such as project alliance, strategic alliance and joint venture are usually 
confronted with two primary control problems: namely, appropriation concerns which 
arise from the interaction of transaction attributes and the presence of human natures, 
and coordination requirements which are resulted from the interdependence between 
parties and uncertainty (Dekker 2004). The increased monitoring and control between 
contracting parties is required to deal with the emerging problems that are impossible 
to be encountered in transactions organized by traditional contracting methods. In 
interorganizational relationships, cost management provides management controls with 
supports to enable the achievement of the objectives of collaborating companies and to 
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solve control problems. They are not only the essential elements of management 
controls, but also more specific and detailed management control tools and techniques 
(Dekker 2004). To date, the control mechanisms and the use of interorganizational cost 
management (IOCM) practices have been largely unexplored in the context of 
alliancing. Knowledge about how contracting parties direct their collaborative efforts 
towards the improvement of the interorganizational coordination and the entire 
efficiency of the value chain is limited (see Section 2.5 and 3.5). This unknown area is 
worthy of exploration. 
In summary, there are two important gaps in the literature on alliancing. Firstly, it 
neglects the economic implications of alliancing in general, and the roles of transaction 
attributes in affecting transaction costs in alliances and the effectiveness of alliancing 
in improving governance performance and economizing transaction costs in particular. 
Secondly, extant studies have largely ignored what control mechanisms (especially 
cost-based management and controls) are adopted in alliances to create transaction 
value and to solve control problems. Therefore, a more inclusive and cogent approach 
is needed to address the knowledge gaps existing in extant alliancing literature. 
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
This research intends to address the shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature 
and contribute more insights that may advance our understanding of the intricacies of 
alliancing, and therefore establishes its aims as studying the economics of alliancing 
and exploring interorganizational management controls in alliances by drawing upon 
TCE and interorganizational management control theories respectively. More 
specifically, the objectives of this research are 1) to examine the impact of transaction 
attributes of alliances on the transaction costs, 2) to test the governance performance 
and efficiency of alliancing in delivering projects with given characteristics, 3) to 
investigate the effects of control mechanisms of alliancing on transaction costs, and 4) 
to explore the IOCM practices in alliances. To achieve these research objectives, the 
following questions will be investigated and addressed in this research. 
Research Question 1 – How do the transaction attributes of alliances significantly 
influence the transaction costs?  
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Research Question 2 - Does alliancing serve as an effective approach to facilitate 
transactions and economize transaction costs in delivering projects with given 
characteristics? 
Research Question 3 - How do the control mechanisms of alliances influence 
transaction costs?  
Research Question 4 - What IOCM practices are applied in the context of alliancing? 
The above four research questions are interrelated. The alliance relationship lies at the 
centre of this research. Transaction attributes of alliances and transaction costs in 
alliances are the major points of interest in studying alliancing. Transaction attributes, 
by interaction with human behaviours, give rise to transaction costs. The increased 
transaction costs encourage contracting parties to devise a specialised governance form 
in order to organize transactions. The efficiency of the specialised governance form 
lies in its capability to economize transaction costs. A governance form is underpinned 
by a set of control mechanisms, which are considered to be useful in mitigating 
transaction risks and economizing transaction costs by influencing contracting parties’ 
behaviours. Since project alliance is a kind of interorganizational relationship, IOCM 
becomes highly relevant because it has a strong positive effect on the development of 
relationships, and directs contracting parties’ collaborative efforts towards the 
improvement of the interorganizational coordination and the entire efficiency of the 
relationship. From studying the economics implications of project alliancing to 
exploring the detailed control mechanisms in project alliances, the four research 
questions create smooth transitions and connections between different disciplines and 
different facets of project alliancing. 
1.3 Overview of the Research 
The research begins with reviewing and analysing alliancing literature published over 
the past decade. The reviewed alliancing literature is organized and synthesized 
following a “five-stage knowledge progression framework” proposed by Ansari et al. 
(2006a), through which the evolution of alliancing practice is clearly presented and the 
achievements of previous studies are evaluated critically. The knowledge gaps in 
extant alliancing research and changes in alliancing practice provide rich research 
opportunities in this area.  
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The research builds up its theoretical framework by drawing upon TCE and 
interorganizational control theories. By its very nature, alliancing contains both 
bilateral and unified governance elements, and is an intermediate governance mode 
between the two. Since this research focuses on the implications of transaction costs, 
transaction costs in alliances are defined and conceptualized as set-up costs, 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs. Following the conceptualization, the 
discussion turns to transaction attributes in alliances, particularly the impacts of 
transaction attributes on three individual transaction cost elements in the context of 
alliancing, and the governance performance/reducing effect of alliancing on 
transaction costs in transactions that are characterized by given attributes. The 
discussion leads to four groups of hypotheses which propose that transaction costs will 
increase with the increased asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency in project 
alliances, and project alliancing is more effective at reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency than under conditions of 
low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. Project alliancing is underpinned and 
controlled by a set of control mechanisms. The control mechanisms in alliances are 
grouped into three categories, namely: outcome controls, behaviour controls and social 
controls. It is argued that control mechanisms in alliances are useful in mitigating 
transaction risks and economizing transaction costs. The final part of the theoretical 
framework deals with the more detailed control mechanisms: IOCM in alliances. Joint 
project proposal development, joint delivery of projects, and project variation are 
identified as three alliance processes where IOCM practices might be relevant.  
The research was conducted by following the process composed of five major 
activities: research task establishment, theoretical framework development, data 
collection, data analysis and results reporting. Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches were adopted to seek solutions towards the research problems. The 
quantitative approach was used for studying the implications of economics of 
alliancing, i.e. the first three research questions. Since the involved variables for 
testing hypotheses such as transaction attributes and transaction costs in alliances are 
multi constructs and exist on the basis of indirect evidence, they were operationalized 
in a measurable way. Adopting a questionnaire survey, the data was collected from the 
high-profile alliancing professionals in the Australian construction industry. The 
survey was conducted following on a key-informant approach. The major statistical 
techniques applied for analysing the data collected from the questionnaire survey 
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include descriptive statistics, homogeneity of variables (two-independent-sample T 
test), factor analysis, multiple regression analysis and paired-samples T test. The 
qualitative approach is employed to explore IOCM practices used in alliances. 
Interviews with alliancing professionals, supplemented by the above mentioned 
questionnaire survey, is used for gathering the required information.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the motivations and reasons 
for this research. It also provides an overview of the research. The research tasks were 
established based on the knowledge gaps identified in extant alliancing research. Key 
research objectives and questions of the research are indicated. The remainder of this 
section explains how the thesis has been structured. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review and analysis of the current research and practice 
of alliancing, presents the state of the art for the existing studies on alliancing. The 
literature review also highlights limitations of previous studies and knowledge gaps, 
and identifies the significant changes associated with alliancing. Two pertinent 
directions for alliancing research are outlined: 1) analysing and examining the 
efficiency of alliancing in the construction industry, and 2) exploring the cost 
management practices and control mechanisms used in alliances. 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant conceptions, propositions and some previous empirical 
research of TCE and interorganizational management control theories in a manner that 
facilitates their applications in this research. Unlike Chapter 2, which only outlines two 
broad research directions, Chapter 3 elaborates and articulates specific research 
objectives and relevant research questions based on TCE and interorganizational 
management control theories. In addition, the applications of the two theories in the 
construction management discipline are critically reviewed.  
Chapter 4 builds up the theoretical framework for the research. In this chapter, the 
variables and relationships, the points of issue and those of substantiation are discussed 
and proposed by drawing upon TCE and interorganizational management control 
theories. The theoretical framework provides structural support for the research. 
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Chapter 5 presents the whole research process, and describes the methods by which the 
research questions are identified and answered. More importantly, this chapter 
discusses in detail the data required for the research. The research employs a 
questionnaire survey and interviews to collect data from the Australian construction 
industry. All the variables that are introduced to be tested are operationalized in a 
measurable way within the context of alliancing. Further, this chapter discusses 
methodological issues inherent in the questionnaire survey. Key steps in the design and 
development of the questionnaire survey are clearly presented, which enables the 
survey to be replicated. 
Chapter 6 analyses the data collected through the questionnaire survey by applying 
statistical techniques and presents the data analysis results. The overall data analysis 
process is presented in a step-by-step manner to ensure the veracious of the data 
analysis. The requirements for each statistical technique such as sample requirements, 
threshold levels and assumption requirements are clearly demonstrated, enabling the 
rigour of results. Further, the underlying reasons for the adopted statistical techniques 
are discussed and justified.  
Chapter 7 interprets the data analysis results, reports and discusses the empirical 
findings. This chapter begins with presenting some general findings resulted from the 
questionnaire survey with a view to provide a basic idea regarding transaction 
attributes and transaction costs in project alliances. The findings presented in this 
chapter provide solutions to research questions 1, 2 and 3 completely, and research 
question 4 partly. In addition, this chapter discusses some issues that need to be further 
investigated to fully answer research question 4.  
Chapter 8 is focused solely on research question 4. Interviews are chosen as the data 
collection method to further explore the IOCM in project alliances as well as validate 
the findings regarding cost management in alliances from the questionnaire survey. 
The results of the interviews are presented and analysed. A discussion follows and the 
IOCM techniques and practices used in project alliances are summarized and presented.  
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Chapter 9 describes the achievement of the research objectives through the conclusions, 
contributions and implications of the research. This chapter also addresses the 
limitations of the research and proposes future research directions.  
A series of appendices display supporting evidence associated with this research. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Alliancing Research and Practice 
in the Construction Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
Alliancing is a broad conception that emphasizes interorganizational cooperation and 
collaboration. Specific to the construction industry, alliancing not only presents an 
interorganizational cooperative relationship between organizations in the supply chain, 
but also evolves into a project delivery method normally known as project alliancing. 
Since its emergence in the North Sea offshore industry in the early 1990s (Knott 1996), 
and followed by considerable successful applications in the construction industry, 
alliancing has drawn increasing attention and interest from researchers, practitioners 
and government agencies. This has led to a number of studies in recent years. 
Consequently, a large number of articles have been published. In addition, several 
comprehensive studies on project alliancing have been undertaken in the Australian 
public sector. Given that more than one decade has lapsed since the emergence of 
alliancing in the construction industry, it is time to present the state of the art for the 
existing studies on alliancing, identify research gap and opportunity and provide 
suggestion for future research. Hence, this chapter launches a review and analysis of 
the current research and practice of alliancing.  
A multi-step literature searching approach was adopted for retrieving alliancing 
literature. The reviewed alliancing literature includes journal articles, conference 
papers, research reports and government policy guidelines to alliancing contracting 
that produced in the last decade. In this chapter, the “five-stage knowledge progression 
framework” proposed by Ansari et al. (2006a) is used for organizing and synthesizing 
alliancing literature. In this way, the limitations of previous studies and knowledge 
gaps can be easily identified in the area of alliancing. It also provides a way to 
understand the evolution process of alliancing practice and assess what has been 
accomplished already in alliancing.  In addition, economics and management control 
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theories are drawn upon to facilitate the identification of limitations of current 
alliancing research and the development of future research directions on alliancing. 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion on alliancing definitions. The purpose of 
this discussion is to define the context in which this study takes place by differentiating 
between alliancing and other collaborating approaches used in the construction 
industry. Then, the methodology for retrieving alliancing literature from various 
sources is presented. This followed by a review and analysis of more than seventy 
alliancing literatures. Finally, the limitations on current alliancing research are 
presented. The significant changes associated with alliancing are identified. 
Accordingly, future research directions are outlined and highlighted. 
2.2 Definitions of Alliancing  
Alliances have emerged for several decades in other industries (Langfield-Smith 2008). 
Depending on the duration of relationship, alliances usually range from one-off project 
alliances to long-term supplier outsourcing relationships (Chew 2004). Some scholars 
classified alliances into two main types, that is, strategic alliances and project alliances 
depending on the duration of relationship (Rowlinson et al. 2006). Despite a broad 
agreement on the general philosophy of alliancing, it appears that consensus has not 
been reached on a generally agreed alliance definition (Yeung et al. 2007). This review 
does not attempt to define alliancing precisely and comprehensively, but intends to 
provide a starting point for further discussion. 
2.2.1 Alliances in the Construction Industry 
It is argued that the long-existing problems (such as cost overrun, delay, adversarial 
relationships, disputation, customer dissatisfaction and low productivity, all of which 
primarily stem from the traditional “risk transfer” approaches, fragmentation and 
inadequate cooperation in the construction industry) have led to the poor performance 
of construction projects (e.g. Barlow 2000; Hauck et al. 2004; Kumaraswamy 1997; 
Ross 1999; Walker and Hampson 2003). Since 1990, a number of initiatives have been 
launched around the world with aims to curing these so called endemics entrenched in 
the construction industry (DTF Victoria 2006). Consequently, many new methods have 
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emerged for delivering various types of construction or infrastructure projects, among 
which alliancing is one of the most attractive forms for pursuing efficiency in terms of 
cost, time, quality and other objectives (Van den Berg and Kamminga 2006). Many 
scholars and practitioners view alliancing as an alternative project delivery method to 
deal with fragmentation and lack of integration, to improve efficiency and performance 
of the construction industry (Ross 1999; Barlow 2000; Bresnen and Marshall 2000b; 
Hauck et al. 2004).  
In the construction industry, alliances present a unique project delivery form known as 
project alliancing, in which “the owner collaborates with one or more service 
providers to share the risks and responsibilities in delivering the capital phase of a 
project” (DTF Victoria 2006, p. 2). Generally, project alliances in the construction 
industry belong to one type of vertical (Nooteboom 1999), non-equity alliance formed 
between clients and service providers through contracts (Das and Teng 2001a). In the 
last decade, many researchers have given their own definitions to project alliancing 
(e.g. Abrahams and Cullen 1998; Kwok and Hampson 1996). Despite the differences, 
alliancing commonly contains two necessary hard (contractual) elements – formal 
contract and real gain-share/pain-share arrangement, and three essential soft 
(relationship-based) elements – trust, long-term commitment, and cooperation and 
communication (Yeung et al. 2007). Just as the name implies, a project alliance is 
formed under interorganizational cooperative arrangements for delivering a specific 
project or outcome and has a defined end (Hauck et al. 2004), whereas a strategic 
alliance is established with the aim of achieving the strategic objectives of parties (Das 
and Teng 1998a) and normally not limited to a specific project (Hauck et al. 2004). 
2.2.2 Alliancing and Partnering 
Partnering as another collaborative approach is often mixed up with alliancing in the 
construction industry (Rowlinson and Cheung 2004). More often, alliancing was 
generally regarded as a type of partnering approach or used interchangeably with 
partnering in some partnering literature (e.g. Bresnen and Marshall 2000a; Li et al. 
2000). Sometimes, partnering was perceived as a long-term commitment (NEDO 
1991), whereas alliancing referred to the application of partnering on a single project 
(Green 1995). Partnering and alliancing resemble each other in terms of mutual trust, 
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the ways they promote partners’ cooperation, and partners’ commitment to common 
goals; nevertheless, they are two different conceptions in many ways. To this point, 
some researchers have presented clear distinctions between them (Ross 1999; Walker 
et al. 2002; Hauck et al. 2004; Rowlinson et al. 2005). First of all, alliancing is a legal 
enforceable contract (Hauck et al. 2004). This is not the case for a partnering 
arrangement which is based only on soft elements (Clayton 1998), and is developed to 
guide and promote interorganizational cooperation (Lenard et al. 1996). Also, 
alliancing creates a win-win or lose-lose situation through a risk/reward regime 
(Walker et al. 2002). It is the alliance’s responsibility to deliver the project. The client 
is also a participant of an alliance and cannot dominate the alliance (Langfield-Smith 
2008). Under partnering arrangements, however, partners still remain independent and 
may win or lose from the relationship (Walker et al. 2002). In comparison, alliancing 
is a contractual mechanism (or governance structure) to govern the procurement of a 
specific project or a series of projects (also known as program alliancing). Partnering 
should be deemed as a management approach (Rowlinson and Cheung 2004). By 
adopting Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of family-resemblance approach, Nyström 
(2005) and Yeung et al. (2007) defined the necessary elements of partnering and 
alliancing, respectively, as listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Comparison of Concepts between Partnering and Alliancing 
Partnering (Nyström 2005) Alliancing (Yeung et al. 2007) 
• Trust  
• Mutual understanding 
• Two hard elements:  
 formal contract 
 real gain-share/pain-share arrangement 
• Three soft elements:  
 trust 
 long-term commitment 
 cooperation and communication 
2.3 Methodology for Retrieving Alliancing Literature 
In practice, several forms of alliances have been devised to achieve the strategic 
objectives or deliver specific projects. Examples include vertical alliances between 
purchasers and suppliers, horizontal alliances between competitors, and diagonal 
alliances between organizations in different industries (Nooteboom 1999). The variety 
of alliances diversified previous studies in objects and directions. Moreover, alliancing 
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was often used interchangeably with partnering in some construction management-
related literature. The diversified views on alliancing conceptions not only confuse the 
understanding of what an alliancing project is, but also have the potential to mislead 
alliancing practice. Therefore, the review and discussion take place in the context of 
the definitions discussed in Section 2.2.  
To minimize the possibility of omission, a multi-step literature searching approach was 
adopted. In total, 79 journal articles, conference papers or research reports with content 
relevant to alliancing were selected for review. The procedures for retrieving alliancing 
literature are described below: 
− In five major databases (Emerald Current, EBSCOhost Business Source Premier, 
Engineering Village (Compendex) and ScienceDirect), articles were searched on 
topic, abstract and keywords by using terms such as “alliance or alliancing” and 
“construction”. 568 articles were found in total. A review of abstracts and 
conclusions of these articles helped filter out the irrelevant and duplicate ones (e.g. 
many articles deal with horizontal alliances or alliances in other industries). After 
filtering, 35 articles with content relevant to project alliancing were selected for 
review. 
− Four research reports were retrieved from the websites of Alliancing Association of 
Australasia (AAA), Victorian Government and other sources. 
− Other articles and conference papers were mainly retrieved from popular 
construction management journals or identified from the cross-referencing of cited 
studies. As a result, 40 articles or conference papers were added.  
2.4 Alliancing Research and Practice: From Emergence to Flourish 
The increasing attention to alliancing paid by scholars and practitioners has led to a 
number of studies in many countries, with various focuses and from diverse 
perspectives. Figure 2.1 shows that more and more studies have been conducted over 
the past years. The countries or regions where these studies have been conducted 
include Australia, the UK, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and USA, etc. As Table 2.2 
illustrates, more than half of existing research was conducted in the UK and Australia. 
This conforms to the actual situation as alliancing originated from the UK and is now 
booming in Australia (AAA 2008b). Nine types of research methods were used in 
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previous studies. Table 2.3 summarizes the alliancing literature, classified by research 
methods. Case studies and surveys were the two most frequently used methods. In 
addition, a couple of studies employed more than one method. 71% previous studies 
are qualitative. The others are quantitative research.  
Figure 2.1 Classification of Literature by Year of Publication 
Table 2.2 Classification of Literature by Research Country 
Country or Region Percentage (%) 
Australia 39 
UK 23 
HK, China 19 
the Netherlands 6 
USA 6 
Sweden 4 
China 1 
Norway 1 
Total 100 
The evolution of alliancing has experienced emergence, improvement, refinement, 
institutionalization and diffusion. In the academic sector, research on alliancing 
followed closely behind practice. Ansari et al. (2006a) introduced a five-stage 
knowledge progression framework which represents five stages in the life cycle of new 
knowledge or practice. According to the framework, these five stages are (1) 
development and advocacy, (2) technical refinement, (3) situating the practice in its 
organizational context, (4) linkage to other processes and tools, and (5) 
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institutionalization and diffusion. The evolution process of alliancing practice is 
consistent with the framework. Therefore, the existing literature is organised and 
synthesized by drawing upon the framework. Also, Ansari et al. (2006a) suggested that 
a more mature research topic could arise at the early development stages of a practice. 
Thus, the reviewed literature in this chapter is not arranged strictly in a chronological 
order.  
Table 2.3 Classification of Literature by Research Methods Used 
Research Method* Percentage (%) 
Single case study 32 
Multi-case study 10 
Survey 27 
Theoretical or conceptual arguments 13 
Modelling or framework 10 
Description based on secondary data 6 
Review 4 
Archival 1 
Action research 1 
*A couple of studies employed more than one research method 
2.4.1 Alliancing - Introduction and Advocacy  
In the early stage of the development of alliancing, most literature focused on 
introducing the original motivations for using alliancing, the alliancing practices, and 
the benefits which alliancing could deliver based on empirical evidences or 
practitioners’ experience. In general, this literature deals with three major themes: (1) 
motivations to use alliancing, (2) alliancing features and principles, and (3) alliancing 
benefits.  
− Motivations to use alliancing 
Alliancing was first introduced for delivering complex offshore oil and gas projects in 
the early 1990s (Knott 1996). Most early literature presented the context that the 
alliancing method was conceived and introduced based on real case projects. 
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Cost reduction is the most salient and direct impetus for the introduction of alliancing. 
Scott (1995) reported the background in the North Sea oil and gas industry in the early 
1990s and pointed out that cost pressure had affected the sustainable development and 
survival of the industry. A number of factors that led to high costs were identified, 
such as disregard of contractors’ competence, inappropriate risk allocation, conflicting 
business goals, and adversarial relationships. Neither technological advances nor 
traditional project delivery methods alone could contribute significantly to cost 
reduction. Thus, British Petroleum (BP), as the client, introduced alliancing to redress 
these entrenched problems. For the same reason, an eight-participant alliance was 
established to deliver BP’s Andrew Field project which remained a marginal field after 
the evaluation of various development schemes (Bakshi 1995). In Australia, the first 
alliancing project, Wandoo Oilfield, was also confronted with tight cost control due to 
the technical challenges at the time (Campbell and Minns 1996).  
Tight time constraint is another significant reason for using alliancing. One typical 
example is the first alliancing project in the Australian public sector - Sydney Water 
Northside Storage Tunnel Project (Henderson and Cuttler 1999). The first alliancing 
building project - National Museum of Australia Project - was alike faced with time 
pressure, thus the traditional contracting methods were excluded (Walker et al. 2002).  
Other motivations include flexibility to vary development concepts while maintaining 
schedule and cost (Campbell and Minns 1996), project risk (DTF Victoria 2006; 
2010a), high quality and innovation requirement (Walker et al. 2002), and earlier 
commencement of a project through early involvement of alliance partners (Wood and 
Duffield 2009).  
Although the aforementioned discussion appears to be based largely on anecdotal 
evidences, it reflects the major underlying forces that spurred the emergence of 
alliancing in the construction industry originally. The alliancing method was initiated 
by clients and the construction collaborative relationships were customer driven 
without exception. These have been confirmed by Akintoye and Main (2007). 
− Alliancing features and principles 
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It is important to understand the practice boundaries of alliancing, the key features 
distinguishing alliancing from existing practices, and the principles embedded in 
alliancing. Some practitioners and scholars have well addressed these questions. For 
example, Scott (1995), and Halman and Braks (1999) introduced the alliancing 
experiences of the North Sea offshore industry. Bakshi (1995) focused on BP Andrew 
Alliance’s practice. Campbell and Minns (1996) reported East Spar and Wandoo 
Alliances’ practices. Walker et al. (2002) and Hauck et al. (2004) synthesized the 
National Museum of Australia Project’s practices, while Ross (1999) focused on 
alliancing practices in Australia. Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria issued 
two versions of guidelines for alliancing in the public sector (DTF Victoria 2006; 
2010a). Wood and Duffield (2009) briefly reviewed the evolutionary process of 
alliancing principles. Synthesized from the above literatures, the established features 
and principles of alliancing are presented in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4 Established Principles and Features of Alliancing 
Principles Features of Alliancing 
Team 
selection 
- Focus on partners’ competence, reputation and attitude 
- Select personnel on a “best for project” basis 
Project 
proposal 
development 
- Develop the project proposal by alliance participants with the owner's 
cooperation and involvement 
- Determine the performance targets and commercial arrangements on a 
negotiation basis or on a competition basis, as the case may be 
Risk and 
reward 
allocation 
 
- Share risks and opportunities collectively 
- Create win-win or lose-lose situation through a risk/reward regime 
- Align the achievement of project objectives with parties' commercial 
interests 
Governance 
and 
management 
- Make project decisions collectively and unanimously 
- Deliver projects by one integrated, no duplication of functions and roles team 
- Perform variations only under very limited circumstances 
- Establish a peer relationship where each partner has an equal say in decisions 
- Commit to "open-book" in terms of cost data, documentation and reporting 
- Share information and knowledge 
Principles of 
conduct 
- Make decisions and act in a ‘best for project’ manner  
- Open, straight and honest communication among all partners  
- Commit to cooperation and collaboration in achieving the objectives 
- Act fairly and reasonably instead of reaping self interests at the expense of 
other partners 
Dispute 
resolution 
- Commit to ‘no fault-no blame’ in relation to mistakes or poor performance 
- Resolve conflicts and disputes internally 
- Agree not to litigation or arbitration 
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The fact that many publications simply referred to “alliancing” as “partnering” may 
not be a helpful solution. The features and principles listed in Table 2.4 are not only 
meant to establish a boundary for alliancing but are also intended to distinguish 
alliancing from other cooperative or collaborative approaches.  
− Alliancing benefits 
A major theme in the advocacy literature on alliancing is based on either empirical 
evidences or practitioners’ experience to document the benefits which alliancing may 
deliver. For example, the first alliancing project (Andrew Field Development) not only 
resulted in 21% reduction in capital costs (Bakshi 1995; Halman and Braks 1999), but 
also achieved some other performance benefits at the project level, and innovation and 
learning benefits at the organizational level (Barlow 2000). Bresnen and Marshall 
(2000c)’s study supports the general perspectives that clients can benefit more from 
collaborative approaches in terms of project processes and outcomes. Bower and 
Merna (2002), through a number of case studies, concluded that closer collaboration 
between project participants will lead to real time and cost saving. In the Netherlands, 
Halman and Braks (1999) discussed the potential of alliancing to reduce costs and 
improve profits both for clients and their partners in offshore projects. In Australia, the 
National Museum of Australia Project was often used as the case project by 
researchers. Hauck et al. (2004) demonstrated that alliancing delivered innovations and 
significant added value (in terms of cost, time, safety, relationship etc.) in the National 
Museum of Australia Project. In addition, a responsible and responsive workplace 
environment, and enthusiasm and commitment of team members could also be 
achieved through alliancing (Walker 2002; Walker et al. 2001). The alliancing 
approach provides an ideal platform for the implementation of employees’ work-life 
balance initiatives which in turn help to create high-performance work systems in the 
construction sector (Lingard et al. 2007). 
Apart from case studies, a large alliances performance survey on 30 public 
infrastructure projects across Australia indicates that most of the projects investigated 
achieved outstanding performance in terms of cost, time and other key result areas 
(AAA 2008a). Also, alliancing has demonstrated its ability to avoid disputes, improve 
non-cost outcomes, commence projects earlier than by traditional methods, and 
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enhance value for money (VfM) (Wood and Duffield 2009). Other benefits include 
flexibility, economizing resource, source of learning, enhancing the partners’ 
reputation and improving competitive advantage (AAA 2008a; DTF Victoria 2006; 
Henneveld 2006).  
2.4.2 Improvement of Alliancing Practice 
Followed by many successful applications and the reported benefits of alliancing, 
studies have been conducted with aims to provide guiding theories on alliancing and to 
refine alliancing practice. These studies primarily focused on six subjects including 
success factors (SFs) for alliancing, cooperative relationships and the use of incentives 
in alliancing, the conceptual model of alliancing, its applicability, its measurement, 
and contractual issues with regard to alliancing. 
− Success factors for alliancing 
Ross (2007) suggests that the practitioners should fully understand the driving factors 
for success in alliancing. The scholars who studied alliancing and the practitioners who 
engaged in alliancing projects have both addressed the question: what factors drive 
alliancing projects to success? As a similar topic, SFs for partnering has been well 
synthesized by Cheng and Li (2001; 2002) and Tang et al. (2006). However, studies on 
alliancing SFs were largely conducted in Australia. In general, the major SFs identified 
included ( Abrahams and Cullen 1998; Hauck et al. 2004; Henneveld 2006; Jefferies et 
al. 2006; Love et al. 2010; Ross 1999; Rowlinson and Cheung 2008; Rowlinson and 
Cheung 2005):  
• Best project attitude; 
• Past working relationships; 
• Senior management’s commitment and support;  
• Careful team selection and high performance team building;  
• Best personnel for project;  
• Trust and equity between partners’ education on alliancing philosophy;  
• Extending alliancing philosophy downwards;  
• Virtual team and integrated alliance office; 
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• Use of web-based management program and electronic information exchange; 
• Open & honest communication; 
• Open-book arrangement and knowledge sharing;  
• Clear goal alignment;  
• Project-specific performance measurements;  
• Staging of project and stretch targets;  
• Benchmarking & continuous performance monitoring;  
• Continuous improvement;  
• Appropriate dispute resolution;  
• Joint problem solving;  
• Adequate resources;  
• Coordination creativity; and  
• Learning climate. 
Among those identified SFs, trust, adequate resources, open communication, 
coordination, top management support, creativity and goal alignment are the most 
common factors that affect the whole alliancing process (Love et al. 2010). 
The intentions of identifying various SFs and commonly used tools or techniques in 
alliancing projects are to create and maintain cooperative relationships, to enhance 
trust between partners and to build a high-performance team. These SFs and 
approaches can be categorized into two groups, namely formal mechanisms (including 
team selection procedures, incentive systems, dispute resolutions, the use of facilitators 
and formal contracts etc.), and informal mechanisms, such as team dynamics, 
management strategies and information systems (Bresnen and Marshall 2000a). 
Bresnen and Marshall (2000c) suggest that some limitations for formal mechanisms 
exist in developing alliancing, and informal systems need to be highlighted. In later 
research, Bresnen and Marshall (2002) explored both formal and informal mechanisms 
and concluded that cooperation relationship relies on the combination and interaction 
of the formal and informal mechanisms, and the panacea for successful alliancing does 
not exist. 
− Incentive systems in alliancing  
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The purpose of incentive systems such as risk/reward mechanisms is to align the 
owner’s project objectives with alliance members’ commercial objectives (DTF 
Victoria 2006). However, the efficacy of incentive systems on project performance, 
enhancing collaboration and developing commitment and trust was challenged by 
Bresnen and Marshall (2000b). They suggest that relationship development should 
concentrate on the supporting internal policies, systems and practices rather than 
merely depending on incentive mechanisms. On the contrary, some scholars argued 
that incentive systems can create high interdependencies among alliance members 
(Langfield-Smith 2008), and impact on cooperative philosophy significantly (Tang et 
al. 2006). In this regard, the research conducted by Love et al. (2011) provided 
valuable empirical evidence on the impact of risk/reward mechanisms on the 
behaviour of project participants. According to Love et al. (2011), risk/reward 
mechanisms in alliancing projects include five elements: (i) sharing risk/reward among 
NOPs stipulates the shared percentages of win-lose in terms of cost and non-cost 
performance between contractors and designers; (ii) cost risk/reward mainly deals with 
the sharing of profit/loss among alliance participants according to the pre-agreed 
percentage ratio; (iii) non-cost area risk/reward is designed for linking alliance 
participants’ financial pain/gain with non-cost areas performance; (iv) risk cap means 
that NOPs’ financial risks are capped and limited to a certain level; and (v) 
achievability of performance targets refers to the performance targets should not only 
reflect the levels of current best practice, but also be achievable. Risk/reward systems 
can engender collaborative and cooperative behaviour and ensure engagement of 
partners. Furthermore, both the designers and contractors view financial incentives and 
risk cap as the most effective mechanisms to produce innovative design solutions. Also, 
the risk/reward sharing plays a very important role in achieving positive outcomes for 
alliancing projects. 
− Conceptual model of alliancing  
Several alliancing models have been developed by drawing upon previous literature, 
theoretical analysis, empirical evidence or practical observations, and supplemented 
with the contributors’ own synthesis and perspectives. The extant alliancing models 
mainly deal with (1) alliancing organization, (2) alliancing process, and (3) alliance 
governance and management. 
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The partnering model developed by Crowley and Karim (1995) also has direct 
significance for alliancing. Their model suggests that a new alliance boundary is 
established when partners commit their resources and abilities towards common goals. 
Meantime, the interaction between open communication, trust and problem-solving 
mechanisms within an alliance implies the modification of interface boundaries 
between different partners. This model provides deep insights for changes to the 
project participants’ organizational boundaries in alliance teams. The formation of 
alliances makes the organizational boundaries between the customer (owner) and the 
supplier (contractor or designer) become blurred.  However, this model does not focus 
on approaches to establish a high performance alliance team. Li et al. (2001) make a 
further effort and develop an eight-stage co-operative benchmarking process model to 
improve the performance of an alliance team. Li et al. (2001)’s model pays more 
attention to continuous improvement. For practitioners and organizations involved in 
alliancing, this model can be served as a management tool to improve performance and 
competitiveness.  
Long-term cooperative alliances can create an ideal environment for mutual learning 
which in turn improves a construction organization's learning capacity and competitive 
advantage (Holt et al. 2000; Love et al. 2002a). Bearing this in mind, Holt et al. (2000) 
developed a learning framework for cooperative strategic alliances in construction 
aiming to nurture long-term alliance. Based on the principles of total quality 
management, Love et al. (2002a) propose a model for construction alliances to support 
learning and improve construction organizations’ competitive advantage. The model 
incorporates essential elements such as learning culture, knowledge and 
communication, changing mental modes, joint learning structure/processes, and 
development of learning relationships. Similarly, both Holt et al. (2000) and Love et al. 
(2002a)’s models concentrate on continuous improvement through cultivating learning 
culture in alliances. 
Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2007), starting from a construction industry context, 
propose a model to provide a guiding theory on the elements and processes of 
alliancing. In this model, the prevailing industry conditions are considered as the 
original cause for the emergence of alliancing. The key elements of alliancing include 
workshops and champions’ meetings, alliance agreements and decision-making 
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procedures, incentives, and periodic performance evaluation, which together create a 
sound environment for optimal contact between project participants. The essential 
factors induced under alliancing arrangements such as equal status, cooperative 
interaction, common goals, and management support, catalyse the creation of a high 
performance team, which in turn contributes to the benefits and other outcomes of 
alliancing. Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2007)’s model not only provides a panorama 
of alliancing in concept, but also can direct alliancing practitioners’ attention towards 
high cooperation and performance. 
The model proposed by Langfield-Smith (2008) depicts the relationship between the 
transaction attributions, risk and trust, and their impacts on the selection of governance 
structure and management control mechanisms in alliances. On the one hand, the 
transactional attributions (asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency), 
trust (goodwill trust and competence trust) in partners, and risk of the alliance 
(relational risk and performance risk) influence the selection of the alliance control 
mechanisms. On the other hand, partners’ commitments will strengthen trust and 
reduce risk, which—together with the choice of governance structure and control 
mechanisms—will improve the performance of the alliance (Langfield-Smith 2008).  
Besides the abovementioned, the following models (DTF Victoria 2006; Ross 1999; 
2003; 2008) are primarily based on Australian practices. These include:  
• Alliancing project delivery phase model - illustrates the typical procedures in the 
delivery of a project through the alliancing approach and is generally adopted in the 
Australian public sector. 
• Project alliances governance and management model - outlines the characteristics of 
virtual organizations, the nature of double accountabilities of alliance members, and 
the governance and management structure under alliancing arrangements. 
• 3-limb compensation model – depicts the compensation mechanisms to non-owner 
alliance members and the pain/gain share regime. 
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• Non-price competitive and price competitive alliances models – portray the 
procedures and components of two alternative approaches in the selection of 
alliance members and the development of project targets (cost and non-cost targets). 
− The applicability of alliancing 
Despite many convincing and successful alliancing projects in the construction 
industry, alliancing should be used appropriately and reasonably (Bresnen and 
Marshall 2000c; Purcell and Ross 2005). As has been pointed out in policy guidelines 
in the Australian public sector, “Perhaps, the most critical decision in the lifecycle of a 
project alliance is the owner’s decision to use project alliancing as the procurement 
method in the first place” (DTF Victoria 2006, p. 19). Thus, it is necessary to assess 
the applicability of alliancing before choosing alliancing as the preferred procurement 
method. Several studies provide valuable references in this regard. 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002a) argue that the nature of the project determines the 
contracting method and the contract document. Turner and Simister (2001) attempted 
to explain the selection of contract type by drawing upon the theories from TCE, and 
argue that the appropriate type of contract depends on the uncertainty (includes the 
process uncertainty and product uncertainty) of the project. They also suggest that 
alliancing is a favourable choice when both process uncertainty and product 
uncertainty of the project are high, so that risk and uncertainty can be shared and 
managed by project participants. Lu and Yan (2007) made a further contribution and 
developed a model to support the evaluation of the applicability of partnering or 
alliancing. According to Lu and Yan (2007), the success of alliancing is affected by 
alliancing management mechanisms and project characteristics. Moreover, sufficient 
resources, competitive participants and effective management mechanisms are 
prerequisites for achieving project targets. Thus, factors in relation to management 
mechanism, competence of involved organizations and project characteristics are 
determinants for whether or not to use alliancing. Some exogenous factors, such as the 
maturity of the industry, the economic situation (Lacey 2007) and the capital markets 
situation (2011), should also be considered when using alliancing. Currently, the 
mainstream view is that alliancing is generally suitable for the delivering projects with 
certain characteristics, such as complexity, high risks, very tight timeframe, complex 
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stakeholder issues and complex external threats (Currie & Brown 2004; DTF Victoria 
2006; Ross 1999). Moreover, the availability of project participants’ resources should 
not be neglected when determining the use of alliancing, as ‘commitment of best in 
class resource’ is one of the most important principles of alliancing which requires 
alliance participants to assign sufficient and high-quality physical and immaterial 
resources (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a). In addition, small and simple projects are 
inappropriate for alliancing (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
− Alliancing measurement 
Continuous performance monitoring and measurements are crucial to the success of 
alliancing (Hauck et al. 2004; Jefferies et al. 2006). Performance measurements are 
relevant to every party’s interests since all alliance participants have bound their 
interests with the alliance performance under the risk/reward regime. Hence, an 
appropriate measurement system should be developed as an information system rather 
than individual tools. Such a system should also serve as a proactive method rather 
than a simple reporting function to evaluate the relationship, monitor the process and 
ensure the achievement of alliance targets (Crane et al. 1999).  
According to Crane et al. (1999), there are three types and three levels of measures.  
The three types are: (i) result measures, which involve measuring the output such as 
cost, time, quality and safety, and are suitable for making strategic adjustments; (ii) 
process measures, which deal with in-progress activities and are used for interim 
corrections; and (iii) relationship measures, which are used to evaluate the inter-
relationship between partners and effectiveness of the project team. As for the levels of 
measures, alliance measures concern the performance of multiple projects at the top 
management level. Project measures focus on the targets for a specific project. 
Discipline measures deal with the lowest levels of a project. A performance 
benchmark and an actual values determination method are two basic elements for an 
effective measurement system. In addition, typical development procedures for a 
measurement system primarily comprise identifying objectives, defining intermediate 
goals, developing strategies and creating measures.   
− Alliancing agreements 
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Differing from traditional contracts, the alliancing agreement (AA) focuses on how the 
parties will agree to deal with events in the future (Mclnnis 2003), instead of 
describing all rights and obligations through as exhaustively as possible predicting and 
setting out eventualities (Lacey 2007; Sakal 2005).  
According to Chew (Chew 2004), an AA generally includes the following key 
elements: (i) alliance governance and management; (ii) obligations to act reasonably 
and in good faith; (iii) waiver of rights to litigation or arbitration except in limited 
situations; (iv) commercial framework; (v) the owner’s right to terminate for its own 
convenience; and (vi) a force majeure clause. Several issues, such as fair and equitable 
risk sharing, common goals, closer relationship, the contract as a management tool and 
pain/gain sharing, should be considered when drafting an AA (Chew 2004). In some 
cases, in addition to the AA, the owner and other participants may maintain works 
contracts that address various matters relevant to individual work (Chew 2004; 
Halman and Braks 1999; Ross 1999). Both Koolwijk (2006) and Van den Berg and 
Kamminga (2006) suggested that a good dispute-resolution method is an essential 
element of the AA. Koolwijk (2006) reviewed the alternative dispute resolution 
methods used in three alliances and verified the efficacy of these methods in 
preventing disputes from resorting to arbitration or litigation. In addition, a “no claims” 
or “no blame/ no dispute clause” can be integrated into the AA (Van den Berg and 
Kamminga 2006). However, a no-claim and no-dispute AA should be backed by 
positive relationship management (Rowlinson et al. 2006).  
Owning to the differences between traditional contracts and AA, the development of 
the AA can face some obstacles, such as demand for more resources, strict rules in the 
public sector, partner selection based on target price, opportunism, and the change of 
lawyer’s role (Van den Berg and Kamminga 2006). 
2.4.3 Alliancing in Different Organizational Context 
Construction projects are usually unique (Masten et al. 1991), and encompass various 
uncertainties. Moreover, the interests of contracting parties vary, and often are 
conflicting. Thus, construction contracts often exhibit very complex. As one type of 
contracting method, alliancing is also a complex transaction (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
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Projects delivered through alliancing are generally characterised by complexity, high-
risks, special requirements and high uncertainty (Currie & Brown 2004; DTF Victoria 
2006; Ross 1999). These uncertainties require contracting parties’ joint responsibilities 
to be dealt with. Therefore, the involved parties in alliancing need to change the mode 
to do business, from the competition-oriented to the collaboration-oriented. One direct 
consequence of the mode change is that the collective responsibilities and joint 
decision-making process under project alliancing arrangements present a number of 
complexities for governance within alliances (DTF Victoria 2010a). Moreover, 
alliance participants will seek self-interest (DTF Victoria 2010a), despite the fact that 
alliancing lays special emphasis on collaboration and cooperation. Bresnen and 
Marshall (2000a) argue that in view of the complexities of organizations, the 
conditions that encourage or inhibit alliancing in practice need to be paid more 
attention. Several studies have been carried out to situate alliancing in different 
organizational contexts in order to explore factors that may support or inhibit 
alliancing and collaboration.  
From the clients’ perspective, the alliancing delivery method has been considered as an 
approach to attract key resources and capabilities of service providers (Wood and 
Duffield 2009). Eriksson et al. (2008) found that cultural and organizational barriers 
were regarded by clients as two most critical barriers to partnering (alliancing), 
however, clients were still in favour of competitive bidding approaches even though 
they wish to increase cooperation. This negative finding might be due to clients’ 
unawareness of procurement strategies’ influence on cooperation and lack of 
incentives to use new procurement methods (Eriksson et al. 2008). Long-term 
perspective might be the most important factor to overcome these critical barriers 
(Eriksson et al. 2009). However, long-term alliance in the construction industry has not 
got rid of the “project based mindset”, and thus inhibits the process of achieving the 
sustainable competitive advantage (Ingirige and Sexton 2006). 
Some clients in the public sector query whether alliancing delivers VfM (Currie & 
Brown 2004; Henneveld 2006). One reason for this debate is the lack of price 
competition within alliancing (DTF Victoria 2006; Henneveld 2006; Ross 2003; Ross 
and Peters 2005). The other reason stems from the nature of the VfM concept and the 
measurability of value (Davies 2008; Henneveld 2006; Wood and Duffield 2009). 
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According to the Australian practice, the contractors and designers are selected based 
on either non-price criteria or price competition in conjunction with non-cost criteria 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). The pros and cons of price competition and non-price 
competition selection approaches still remain controversial (Ross 2008). Both Davies 
(2008) and Wood and Duffield (2009) suggest that improvements must be made at 
both the alliance and government levels to better demonstrate VfM and extract the 
optimum VfM from alliancing, and recommend that the price competition selection 
approach is a good choice for demonstrating VfM. 
From the contractors’ perspective, the major drivers for contractors to enter into 
collaborative relationships are risk sharing, access to innovation and technology, 
response to market, resource efficiency, client requirements and gaining commercial 
benefits (Akintoye and Main 2007), and team dynamics (Wood and Duffield 2009). In 
addition, contractors show enthusiasm for collaboration with the expectation of 
gaining financial benefits (Akintoye and Main 2007). Furthermore, contractors 
consider top management commitment, risk allocation and contract strategy, 
compatible cultures, and objectives alignment as determinants to relational contracting 
(Kumaraswamy et al. 2005). 
From the standpoints of sub-contractors and small construction enterprises, Dainty et 
al. (2001b) and Packham et al. (2003) investigated some prominent factors which may 
inhibit supply chain integration. These factors include poor contractor-subcontractor 
relationships, mistrust, self-interest and lack of mutual-benefit belief. Therefore, small 
construction enterprises benefited little from the relationship, and the contractor–
subcontractor relationship was often undermined (Packham et al. 2003). To deal with 
this issue, clients need to develop the necessary attitudinal changes in order to drive 
the integration and maintain transparent and mutually beneficial processes for all 
parties (Dainty et al. 2001b).  
2.4.4 Alliancing and Other Established Practices 
Alliancing often correlates with other established practices. On the one hand, the 
alliancing processes might rely on the existing practices or tools, or the existing 
practices need to be modified to adapt to alliancing arrangements. On the other hand, 
 Page | 30 
the basic principles of alliancing may be effective solutions for the existing problems 
in the construction industry, and could be incorporated into other practices. Several 
studies have been conducted to bridge them.  
As communication and information sharing are critical to the success of alliances, 
Baldwin et al. (1999) described the effect of information exchange on information 
sharing (e.g. guaranteed delivery of data; improved quality of data; reduced data 
handling; improved communication between the alliance partners; and reduced risk of 
project delay). Baldwin et al. (1999) demonstrated the reciprocity relationship between 
construction alliance and information exchange and argued that alliancing prompts the 
attitude change towards small construction enterprises, and small construction 
enterprises plays an important role in the development of the relationships between 
partners. Cheng et al. (2001) developed a communication supporting mechanism for 
construction alliances, indicating the interorganizational communication linkage 
among alliance members and the intra-organizational communication linkage within 
each alliance member in three levels. They also suggested that diversified approaches 
could be used for enhancing communication such as facial contacts (meetings, 
workshops, visits or small group communication) as well as distant contacts (e-mails, 
telephones or teleconferencing). 
Owing to its project-based nature and the numerous organizations involved, the 
construction supply chain is often extremely complex, especially for a large or 
complex project (Barlow 2000; Dainty et al. 2001a). Despite the fact that the 
importance of supply chain management (SCM) and its benefits have been recognized 
in the construction industry, adversarial relationships still remain, price-competitive 
approaches and rigid contracts are still widely used, and the collaboration relationship 
has not been extended downwards (Saad et al. 2002). Palaneeswaran et al. (2003), by 
incorporating the principles of relational contracting approaches such as partnering and 
alliancing, developed a relationally integrated supply chain model for dealing with the 
long-existing problems in the construction industry. According to Palaneeswaran et al. 
(2003), relational contracting approaches have the potential to improve the overall 
outcomes and enhance the success levels of projects which depend heavily on 
contracting mechanisms, team selection methodologies, risk management, 
performance management, and conflict management approaches. Correspondingly, a 
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number of relational supply chain integration measures are categorized into five 
groups in their proposed model, which are: (1) relational risk management, (2) 
relational selections, (3) relational performance management, (4) relational conflict 
management, and (5) relational innovations. 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002b) found that the contracting parties did express 
interest in implementing joint risk management and proposed that better relationship 
and cooperative teamwork would facilitate joint risk management. relational 
contracting is more conducive for not only reducing transaction costs, but also for 
nurturing better relationships and cooperative teamwork (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
2002a). Based on relational contracting principles, Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2005) 
developed a framework for building an integrated project team so that risks can be 
managed through joint efforts. 
Quality always is a key performance area in construction projects. Walker and Keniger 
(2002) presented a tailored quality management system for the National Museum of 
Australia project. The system contributes significantly not only to the success of the 
project, but also to the design and application of a quality management system in the 
future. The interorganizational relationship in the project alliance underpins the quality 
culture, which contributes to the achievement of high quality.  
Private finance initiatives/public private partnership (PFI/PPP) is another mainstream 
project delivery system. Clifton and Duffield (2006) made an effort to integrate 
alliancing concepts into the management and governance of PFI/PPP projects. Their 
study demonstrated that VfM could be enhanced in PFI/PPP projects in terms of 
innovation and management by incorporating alliancing principles. Clifton and 
Duffield (2006) also indicated that both the procurers and service providers held 
optimistic attitudes towards integrating alliancing practices into PFI/PPP projects, 
whereas the financers were unwilling to accept. A hybrid alliance PFI/PPP model was 
proposed.  
In addition, Asmar et al. (2009), demonstrated through a case study that Monte Carlo 
simulation is a very useful tool to assist clients in selecting an alliance team. Some 
literature has referred briefly to some practices or tools which may be used in alliance 
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projects but lacks further research, for instance, in open-book accounting (Fortune and 
Setiawan 2005), target costing (Langfield-Smith 2008), value engineering and 
concurrent engineering (Halman and Braks 1999). 
2.4.5 The Diffusion of Alliancing 
Currently, the alliancing method has been widely used in several countries, across 
different sectors and in different types of organizations. The origin and application of 
alliancing in the North Sea offshore industry in the UK has been well documented 
(Bakshi 1995; Halman and Braks 1999; Scott 1995). Campbell and Minns (1996) 
reported the first application of alliancing in Australia – the Wandoo and East Spar 
Alliances, which were established based on alliancing practices in the UK. Sydney 
Water used a project alliance to deliver the Northside Storage Tunnel Project in the 
late 1990s (Henderson and Cuttler 1999). This is the first time that project alliancing 
was applied in the Australia public sector. The National Museum of Australia Project 
is the first application of alliancing in a building project and can be regarded as a 
milestone of alliancing (Walker et al. 2002). Statistics indicate that approximately 300 
infrastructure and construction projects with a total value of 90 billion dollars have 
been delivered through alliancing methods in Australia to date (AAA 2009). Scheublin 
(2001) reported project alliancing in the Netherlands. Fortune and Setiawan (2005) 
presented the current practice for the application of partnering (alliancing) to procure 
house building projects in one of the quasi-public sectors in the UK, and revealed that 
Housing Association clients widely adopt long-term partnering arrangements together 
with other tools or procedures through which benefits in terms of cost, time and quality 
are achieved. 
Now, alliancing is a mature contracting method (DTF Victoria 2010a). Having said 
this, the applications of alliancing in different countries vary. For example, the 
Victorian Government of Australia has issued two versions of policy guidelines for 
alliancing (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a), which marked the institutionalization of 
alliancing in Australia. However, Table 2.2 shows that alliancing literature focuses 
mainly on the experiences of a small number of countries. This situation reflects to 
some degree that alliancing has not been widely used across the world. Another 
noteworthy issue is that there is little current research focusing on alliancing in private 
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sector even though the alliancing delivery method was initiated by the private sector 
(Wood and Duffield 2009). In addition, the private sector seldom used alliancing for 
the delivery of capital projects despite the fact that alliancing has been extensively 
applied in the delivery of infrastructure projects in the Australian public sector (Lyons 
2005).  
2.5 Implications for Future Research 
The review presented in this chapter has witnessed the emergence and flourish of 
alliancing research and practice. Previous research on alliancing has contributed to our 
understanding of this interorganizational cooperative relationship and unique project 
delivery method. Meanwhile, the alliancing practice is also becoming more mature and 
sophisticated (Wood and Duffield 2009). However, some limitations and debates still 
remain in alliancing research, awaiting further investigation. In addition, the 
significant changes associated with alliancing provide good research opportunities in 
this area. 
2.5.1 Debates and Limitations in Alliancing Research 
The current studies on alliancing have seldom incorporated economics theories to 
examine and explain the application environment, benefits and efficiency of alliancing. 
This limitation has led to extensive debates and confusion regarding alliancing. For 
example, whether the introduction of alliancing is for dealing with long-existing 
problems in the construction industry or for delivering projects with certain 
characteristics is uncertain. Research suggests that alliancing has the ability to deliver 
various benefits (see Section 2.4.1 Alliancing Benefits). Research also suggests that 
traditional project delivery methods may result in similar benefits, and alliancing does 
not guarantee them (Bresnen and Marshall 2000c). Research shows that alliancing 
contributes to cost reduction (see Section 2.4.1 Alliancing Benefits), while research 
also shows that cost effectiveness is often questioned in alliancing projects (Currie & 
Brown 2004; Henneveld 2006; Langfield-Smith 2008). For example, project alliancing 
lacks the tension of price competition (DTF Victoria 2006; Henneveld 2006; Ross 
2003; Ross and Peters 2005), and can never be as cost-effective as non-alliancing 
projects as they are established on collaborative and negotiated bases (Currie & Brown 
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2004; Henneveld 2006). “Some managers thought that the target cost was not as tight 
as it could be; the absence of ‘competitive tension’…did not lead to the best cost 
estimate (Langfield-Smith 2008)”. Some researchers argued that alliancing might 
reduce transaction costs (Love et al. 2002b; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2002a). 
However, the transaction costs of forming alliances are high (Langfield-Smith 2008). 
Some researchers view trust as an outcome, not as a prerequisite of alliancing (Anvuur 
and Kumaraswamy 2007). Conversely, other researchers identify trust as one of the 
success factors to alliances (see Section 2.4.2, “Success Factors for Alliancing”), and 
argue that both competence trust and goodwill trust may exist at the start of alliances 
(Langfield-Smith 2008). The various direct or indirect benefits of alliancing may be at 
the personnel level, project level, organizational level or even industrial level. 
However, how many benefits can be directly attributed to alliancing? Does project 
alliancing really improve efficiency and performance? Little research has analysed 
how alliancing is governed and managed in the construction industry. The interaction 
between alliancing and existing support management tools and practices remains an 
unchartered area. The state of affairs also raises some problems and controversies. 
Some advocate non-price competition approach to select alliance partners, whereas 
others recommend price competition. For example, Department of Treasury and 
Finance, Victoria issued a “Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide” in 2006 which 
suggests that the non-price competition approach is the preferred method to select 
alliance partners (DTF Victoria 2006).  However, “The Practitioners' Guide to Alliance 
Contracting,” released in 2010, stipulates that the price competition approach is the 
default selection method, and exemption should be sought when using a non-price 
selection approach (DTF Victoria 2010a).  Researchers suggest incentive systems have 
important limitations on enhancing cooperation, commitment and trust (Bresnen and 
Marshall 2000b). However, other researchers deem the use of incentives to be an 
important component of project governance (Pryke and Pearson 2006), and can create 
high interdependencies among partners (Langfield-Smith 2008). Arguably, some SFs 
and other commonly used tools or techniques in alliancing could also fit for traditional 
project delivery approaches, rather than merely being an exclusive application for 
alliancing. The various SFs and tools for alliancing appear to be piecemeal and may 
not solve the problems at source. In addition, it is still unclear whether these so called 
SFs are really critical for alliancing, or the outcomes or integral processes of alliancing. 
For instance, Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2007) argue that some SFs are the outcomes 
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or process benefits of successful alliancing. What alliancing does need and rely on are 
systematic solutions, rather than isolated and fragmented factors or tools.  
2.5.2 Significant Changes Associated with Alliancing 
Despite the fact that the trilateral governance whose basic organizational structure is 
the client-consultant-contractor triad (Reve and Levitt 1984), still dominates the 
organization of construction projects, however, alliancing is becoming more popular, 
and no longer treated as a novel contracting method (DTF Victoria 2010a). The 
emergence of project alliancing represented a change of the project procurement 
philosophy in construction and infrastructure areas, from a competition-oriented 
approach to something more collaboration-oriented. In such circumstances, risks and 
responsibilities are shared and managed collectively. All alliance participants exploit 
the potential of collaboration and pursue outperformance through teamwork and 
combination of resources and knowledge (Axelsson et al. 2002). For example, 
Crowley and Karim (1995) argue that alliancing binds the participants and combines 
their resources into a joint team in order to achieve common goals and benefits. 
Consequently, the organizational boundaries between the customers (i.e. project 
owners) and the suppliers (e.g. contractors or designers) become blurred. This kind of 
inter-organizational relations place all parties’ activities as objects for management and 
control (Mouritsen et al. 2001). In alliancing projects, the customer-supplier 
relationships need to be dealt with in more sophisticate ways, and thus entail bilateral 
governance. Accordingly, the domain of project management is required to extend to 
cover the interorganizational relationships and deal with the blurring organizational 
boundaries in alliancing projects. However, traditional project management practice 
limits its scope to the boundaries of the organization and fits better for single 
organizations, rather than handling differences between organizations (Winch 1989).  
Another significant improvement associated with project alliancing is the integration 
of construction activities. Various engineering phases overlap, which leads to an 
alliancing approach characterized by concurrent engineering (Halman and Braks 1999). 
As a result, the possibility of a reduced lifecycle cost is increased by avoiding costly 
alterations later in the design stage (Rush and Roy 2000). Traditionally, the 
construction industry is characterized by fragmented supply chains (Barlow 2000), in 
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which a group of participants form a temporary project team to execute a specific 
project according to the professional roles of their own organizations and following a 
series of sequential steps that are dissolved after completion (Mohamed and Tucker 
1996). However, this situation has been dramatically changed in project alliancing 
where all participants work concurrently rather than sequentially (Love et al. 1998), 
jointly rather than separately to design and develop the project. Designers and 
constructors’ early involvement and collaboration among all participants at all levels 
and in all construction stages blur the boundaries between construction phases and 
activities.  
2.5.3 Future Research Directions 
The literature review presented in this chapter has identified two major limitations in 
current alliancing research and two significant changes associated with alliancing. 
These limitations and changes in alliancing research and practice, when viewed 
through a TCE lens, provide rich research opportunities in this area. TCE has been a 
popular framework for studying the selection of organization forms (Leiblein 2003). 
By drawing upon TCE, two alliancing research projects that can be carried out in the 
future are outlined below. 
− The efficiency of project alliancing 
One significant research agenda is to analyse and examine the efficiency of project 
alliancing. TCE assumes that the efficiency of a contractual form lies in its ability to 
economize transaction costs. Contractual arrangements are chosen by transactors with 
the expectation for minimizing the costs of governing the transaction relationship 
(Masten et al. 1991); therefore, the incidence of transaction costs should be recognized. 
As Williamson (1979, p. 233) argues: “If transaction costs are negligible, the 
organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of 
organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless 
contracting.” In practice, the construction industry traditionally places too much 
emphasis on the tender price (Walker and Chau 1999), and neglects the effects of 
contracting methods on transaction costs. According to TCE, transaction costs stem 
from the interactions between transaction attributes and human natures (Williamson 
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1985). This argument suggests that transaction attributes can influence transaction 
costs directly. Moreover, asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency represent the core 
dimensions of transactions, which together determine the organizational forms of 
transactions (Williamson 1981), and the alignment between organizational forms and 
transaction attributes does promote governance performance and reduces transaction 
costs (Williamson 1985). Bearing this in mind, the transaction attributes of alliances, 
transaction costs in alliances and the ability of alliancing to reduce transaction costs 
should be investigated and measured for examining the efficiency of alliancing. An 
industry-based survey is a better approach for this purpose. A large sample survey not 
only provides an opportunity for a rich assessment of constructs, but it also contributes 
to statistical testing of the relationships (Grover and Malhotra 2003). Several multiple 
regression models can be built based on data collected from the survey and TCE’s 
arguments. In addition, the control mechanisms that could contribute to reducing 
transaction costs in alliances can also be incorporated in the survey.  
− The influence of project alliancing on management practice 
The other research problem arises from the changes associated with alliancing. The 
two significant changes require us to realize that the efficiency depends not only on 
one organization’s own competence, but also on the way to manage activities and 
resources of the involved organizations, and the strategies to organize project activities. 
Therefore, the central theme in alliancing is how to improve interorganizational 
efficiency, reduce both transaction costs and production costs, and achieve the target 
costs through joint and coordinated efforts, through combination of resources, and 
through process optimizing. However, these missions require cost management and 
control mechanisms that can fit for interorganizational settings in the context of 
alliancing, in order to provide powerful support. In comparison, traditional cost 
management practices fail to accomplish this, as they limit their scope to the 
boundaries of the organization and seem to fit quite well with the competition-oriented 
approach (Axelsson et al. 2002; Kulmala et al. 2002), and are used generally in the 
sequential environment. In construction area, cost management and control 
mechanisms that can fit for interorganizational settings have been largely unexplored 
in the context of alliancing. Thus, this unknown area is worthy to be explored. It is 
expected that an interview approach would be more productive and conducive for 
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exploring the cost management and control practices used in alliancing because face-
to-face communication between the researchers and practitioners allows for in-depth 
discussions of the focal research issues, and thus can help to capture more relevant 
information around the research topic. In addition, interviews can also be used for 
validating the results and findings generated from previous surveys.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter provides a review on the existing project alliancing literature, highlights 
the research gaps, and points out new research directions. Previous studies on project 
alliancing have not only contributed to our understanding of this interorganizational 
cooperative relationship and unique project delivery method, but also guided the 
practitioners to facilitate the project alliancing practices in the construction industry. 
Following a five-stage knowledge progression framework established in a previous 
study, the review identifies some limitations of previous studies and knowledge gaps, 
namely the current studies on alliancing have seldom incorporated economics theories 
to examine and explain the application environment, benefits and efficiency of 
alliancing. Little research has analysed and studied how alliancing is governed and 
managed in a blurring interorganizational context in the construction industry. The 
interaction between alliancing and existing support management tools and practices is 
still a black box. In addition, the review also identifies two significant changes 
associated with alliancing. These limitations and changes in alliancing research and 
practice provide rich research opportunities in this area. Drawing upon TCE and 
management control theories, it is suggested that future research should focus on the 
following two major directions: analysing and examining the efficiency of alliancing 
in the construction industry, and exploring the cost management practices and control 
mechanisms used in alliancing.  
In the next chapter, the existing body of knowledge relating to TCE and 
interorganizational management control will be reviewed. Moreover, the detailed 
research questions will be developed based on these theories and the research 
directions outlined in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Transaction Cost Economics 
and Interorganizational Management Control 
3.1 Introduction 
TCE is a popular and standard framework for studying the selection of contracting 
forms (Leiblein 2003), and an economic approach to the study of organization 
(Williamson 1981). It is concerned with “transactions and the economizing efforts that 
attend the organization thereof” (Williamson 1985, p. 1). Regarding 
interorganizational management control, its central aim is to find a package of 
solutions or specific mechanisms for the control needs of a particular type of 
interorganizational relationship. TCE and interorganizational management control 
theories share a common interest in understanding purposive control, and both are 
committed to the explanation of control structure choice (Speklé 2001). The difference 
between the two is that TCE is more focused on studying organizations from a 
comparative point of view, whereas interorganizational management control pays more 
attention to a specific relationship. Both TCE and interorganizational management 
control theories can inform the alliancing research by providing rich theoretical and 
empirical supports. If these theories can be applied to this research then there would be 
a substantial body of knowledge that would become available not only to alliancing 
but also to construction management discipline. Therefore, this chapter provides a 
review on relevant conceptions, propositions and some previous empirical research of 
TCE and interorganizational management control in a manner that facilitates their 
application in this study.  
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, the major concepts and 
propositions in TCE (such as assumptions on human behaviours, transaction attributes, 
transaction costs and governance) are reviewed. Contracts and governance forms in 
construction transactions are also discussed. In addition, this section provides a critical 
review on TCE-based research in construction management area, and further discusses 
the possibility of transferring the insights of TCE to the domain of construction 
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management discipline. Section 3.3 discusses the interorganizational management 
control including control problems and the types, roles and functions of control 
mechanisms in interorganizational relationships. Section 3.4 provides a review on 
more specific control solutions – IOCM used in interorganizational settings. Drawing 
upon TCE and interorganizational management control theories and coupling with the 
review on alliancing literature presented in Chapter 2, several research questions are 
developed in Section 3.5. This chapter closes with a conclusion remark.  
3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE is a branch of New Institutional Economics. The origin of TCE can be traced 
back to Ronald Coase who explicitly put forward that the firm is a governance form as 
opposed to a production function, and firms and markets are alternative governance 
forms which differ in transaction costs that associated with each (Coase 1937).  A few 
decades later, Coase’s general arguments were strongly advocated and vigorously 
developed by Oliver Williamson (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  Consequently, 
transaction costs theories have evolved into TCE due to Williamson’s contributions 
(Williamson 1975; 1979; 1985; 1991a; b; 1996).  The main purpose of TCE is to 
explain the diversity of governance forms associated with different transactions. More 
specifically, TCE studies why different transactions are organized in different forms. 
The rationale, as Williamson (1991b, p. 79) argues, lies in the fact that economic 
organizations always try to “align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with 
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating 
(mainly, transaction cost economizing) way”. TCE is a set of complex theories that 
assimilates and draws upon economics, law and organization theories. Therefore, it is 
necessary to sort out major assumptions, conceptions and arguments of TCE to 
facilitate its application in this research. 
3.2.1 Two Key Assumptions of Human Behaviours 
TCE submits that human actors in transactions are subject to bounded rationality, 
which means that transactors can hardly predict and plan accurately for future events 
and act without error due to their limited information processing and communication 
capability (Simon 1957). TCE also posits that human actors are given to opportunism, 
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implying that some transactors may conceal deliberately complete or accurate 
information, or commit to lying, cheating, stealing and subtle forms of violation of 
contracts because of a self-interested orientation (Williamson 1985). Given bounded 
rationality, conditions and contingencies cannot be ex-ante specified fully and 
incorporated into contracts. In the presence of opportunism, transactors have to 
elaborate appropriate governance mechanisms to monitor behaviours, safeguard assets, 
and ensure that all parties fulfil their responsibilities. The two behavioural assumptions 
together require transactors to devise costly governance mechanisms to “organize 
transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously 
safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism” (Williamson 1979, p. 246).  
3.2.2 Transaction Attributes  
TCE poses that transactions differ with respect to the underlying transaction attributes 
(Williamson 1985). Asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency together compose the 
transaction attributes, which are the principal dimensions for discriminating different 
transactions. 
− Asset specificity 
Transactors may deploy assets and make investments to deal with a particular 
transaction. These assets and investments may be idiosyncratic or homogeneous in 
nature. Assuming the scenario if the transaction relationship is terminated prematurely, 
general-purpose assets and investments are easy to redeploy for other transactions 
without sacrificing significantly their value because of their homogeneous nature. 
However, this is not the case for idiosyncratic assets. They are the specialized 
investments that are devoted to supporting the particular transaction relationship. The 
value of these assets will decrease significantly if they are redeployed for other 
transactions or the transaction relationship terminated in advance. Such idiosyncratic 
assets are called specific assets (also referred to as “relationship specific investments”). 
Therefore, asset specificity is defined as “the degree to which an asset can be 
redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive 
value” (Williamson 1996, p. 59). The higher the level of asset specificity, the lower the 
value of those specific assets in their alternative use. Asset specificity plays the most 
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important role in TCE. The presence of asset specificity creates inter-dependence 
between transaction parties, and can lead to safeguarding and adaption problems 
(Williamson 1985; 1991b). On the one hand, transaction parties will endeavour to 
sustain the transaction relationship with an aim to preserve the value of specific assets. 
In this circumstance, those specific assets have a lock-in effect for transaction parties 
(Klein et al. 1978). In the absence of specific assets, the transaction relationship can be 
terminated easily and transaction parties would not suffer a lot due to the limited value 
of specialized investments. On the other hand, transaction parties more tend to protect 
their own specialized investments as the degree of asset specificity increases. 
Consequently, the appropriate governance mechanism should be devised in order to 
maintain and monitor the transaction relationship, and safeguard against opportunistic 
behaviours. Asset specificity is of vital importance and plays a central role in TCE. 
− Uncertainty 
Uncertainty refers to the unforeseeable issues associated with a transaction. These 
issues include, on the one hand, the difficulty in specifying circumstances surrounding 
a transaction and planning for future events in a transaction (Macneil 1978), and on the 
other hand, the difficulty in correctly predicting transaction partners’ behaviours, 
actions and intentions (Langfield-Smith 2008). In TCE, the former issues are usually 
known as environmental uncertainty, and the latter as behavioural uncertainty. Due to 
the presence of bounded rationality, environmental uncertainty makes transaction 
parties impossible to fully specify and effectively plan for future events ex-ante. 
Transaction parties have to adapt constantly and renegotiate from time to time in order 
to cope with those unanticipated events that occur during the transaction process. In 
the meantime, activities such as monitoring behaviours and evaluating performance 
become an integral part of the transaction process in order to deal with behavioural 
uncertainty. Uncertainty also plays an important role in TCE. 
− Transaction Frequency 
Frequency of transactions is defined as the volume of transactions processed through a 
specialized governance form (Williamson 1985). High frequency of transaction 
encourages transaction parties to devise specialized governance mechanisms, because 
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“the cost of specialized governance structure will be easier to recover for large 
transactions of a recurring kind” (Williamson 1985 : 60). In this regard, transaction 
frequency plays an important role in justifying the necessity of crafting specialized 
governance mechanisms.   
3.2.3 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are “the costs of running [an] economic system” (Arrow 1969,p. 48), 
and are usually compared to the “friction” in economic systems (Williamson 1985). As 
opposed to neoclassical economics which treats economic systems as “frictionless”, 
TCE gives explicit attention to transaction costs and holds that contractual 
arrangements are chosen by contracting parties with the expectation for economizing 
transaction costs associated with the transaction relationship (Masten et al. 1991). As 
Williamson (1979, p.  233) points out, “if transaction costs are negligible, the 
organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of 
organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless 
contracting”.  
Transaction costs arise from the interaction of transaction attributes (i.e. asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency) and the presence of human natures (i.e. 
bounded rationality and opportunism), and are usually divided into two categories, 
namely ex-ante costs include the costs drafting, negotiating and safeguarding 
agreements, and ex-post costs such as maladaptation costs, haggling costs, setup and 
running costs of the governance structures etc. (Williamson 1985). Dyer (1997) further 
deconstructed transaction costs into four separate cost elements. They are:  
• Search costs - the costs and efforts that were required to search, assess and 
identify the preferred transaction partners;  
• Contracting costs - the costs stemmed from drafting, negotiating and agreeing 
the agreements;  
• Monitoring costs - the costs and efforts associated with monitoring the 
implementation of agreements, and the quality of services and the behaviours 
of transaction partners; and  
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• Enforcement costs - the costs incurred or the efforts made by transaction 
partners to deal with ex-post bargaining, resolving conflicts and disputes, and 
sanctioning non-perform partners.  
Search costs and contracting costs were often combined into development costs (or set-
up costs) (Pilling et al. 1994). 
3.2.4 Governance Forms 
Governance, or  “mode of organizing transactions” (Williamson and Ouchi 1981) is 
defined as “the institutional framework in which contracts are initiated, negotiated, 
monitored, adapted, and terminated” (Palay 1984, p. 265). TCE reveals that the 
governance of transaction relationships between transaction parties is costly, and hold 
that “an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of 
organizations” (Williamson 1981, p. 548). The central propositions of TCE are: firstly, 
governance forms differ in their costs and ability to govern the transaction 
relationships, secondly, the choice of governance forms depend on transaction 
attributes, and thirdly the alignment between transaction attributes and governance 
forms contributes to economizing transaction costs (Williamson 1991b). By 
discriminatingly aligning governance forms with transaction attributes, transaction cost 
economizing is accomplished. 
TCE describes governance forms as a spectrum, and identifies three generic forms of 
economics organization: market, hybrid, and hierarchy (or firm) (Williamson 1979; 
1985; 1991a). The three governance forms not only differ in terms of coordinating and 
control packages, but also vary in their abilities to adapt. One pole of the spectrum is 
the pure market governance, which is suitable for simple and non-specific transactions 
such as basic commodity transactions and stock markets. Under the market governance 
structure, market prices provide transaction parties with necessary information to adapt 
to changing environments, and effective incentives for pursuing profits. In other words, 
market prices determine the final transactions. The other pole of the spectrum is 
hierarchy governance, in which transactions are conducted within single ownership 
entity or the firm. Hierarchy is a continuation of market relationships. The most 
common form of hierarchy governance is organizing production within the firm. For 
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example, project owners design, construct and maintain infrastructure projects using 
internal skills, expertise and capabilities rather than procuring project services outside. 
Hierarchy governance structures are more conducive to protecting specialized assets, 
but offer weaker incentives in comparison to outside procurement and may incur 
bureaucratic distortions. Between the two poles of the spectrum, the vast majority of 
transactions are conducted under various hybrid governance forms such as complex 
contracts, long-term outsourcing, strategic alliances etc. Most construction contracts 
fall under hybrid governance category. Table 3.1 illustrates the differences in terms of 
incentive, control and adaptability, between market, hybrid and hierarchy governance 
forms. 
In theory, TCE predicts that governance forms of transactions follow the order of from 
market, hybrid to hierarchy as the degree of asset specificity increases. This prediction 
has been tested and supported by a number of empirical studies (Leiblein 2003; 
Shelanski and Klein 1995).   
Table 3.1 Comparison between Market, Hybrid and Hierarchy Governance 
 Governance Forms 
Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
F
eatu
res
 
Incentive Strong Semi-strong Weak 
Control Weak Semi-strong Strong 
Autonomy Weak Semi-strong Strong 
Cooperation Weak Semi-strong Strong 
Contract Law 
Strong Semi-strong Weak 
Classical contract law Neoclassical contract law Forbearance contract law 
Source: (Williamson 1991a, p. 281) 
3.2.5 Contracts and Governance Forms in Construction Transactions 
TCE places special emphasis on transaction attributes in explaining the choice of 
governance arrangements of transactions, and posits that organizational forms of 
transactions generally take three forms - market, hybrid and hierarchy - depending on 
the underlying attributes of transactions. In the construction industry, most of the 
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projects are neither procured through pure markets nor conducted internally, but rather 
organized in hybrid form underpinned by complex contracts. For most project owners, 
it would be very uneconomical to develop the skills, expertise and capacities for 
designing and constructing projects in-house due to the infrequency and uniqueness of 
most projects (Reve and Levitt 1984). Outside procurement for construction projects is 
favoured by scope and scale economy considerations. Under this type of organizational 
form, contracting parties, by resorting to appropriate contracts, can adapt better to 
changing environments, complex processes and varies uncertainties (Buvik 2002). In 
practice, contracting methods in the construction industry can also be described as a 
spectrum over which a number of basic contractual forms are distributed.  
Macneil (1974; 1978) classifies contracts as three types: classical, neoclassical and 
relational contracting. Williamson (1985) matched governance forms of transactions 
with contracting types according to the degree of asset specificity and transaction 
frequency. Table 3.2 illustrates the matching between governance forms and 
contracting types. The following discussion mainly draws upon Williamson (1979; 
1985).  
Table 3.2 Mapping of Contracting Types and Governance Forms 
 
 
Investment characteristics 
Nonspecific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
F
req
u
en
cy
 
O
ccasio
n
al
 
Classical contracting Neoclassical contracting Neoclassical contracting 
Market governance Trilateral governance Trilateral governance 
Purchasing standard 
equipment 
Purchasing customized 
equipment Constructing a plant 
R
ecu
rrent
 
Classical contracting Relational contracting Relational contracting 
Market governance Bilateral governance Unified governance 
Purchasing standard material Purchasing customized 
material 
Site-specific transfer of 
intermediate product across 
successive stages 
Source: Williamson (1985. p. 73, 79) 
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In fact, all the contracting types and governance forms listed in Table 3.3 can be found 
in the construction industry. For example, purchasing standard construction equipment 
and material are mostly organized through market and governed by classical contract 
law. In this type of transaction, purchasers can easily find alternative suppliers due to 
the standardized nature of products. The interdependence between contracting parties 
is not great. In addition, the switching costs are not significant. Through consulting 
their own experiences, rating services, or referring to the experiences of other people, 
parties can decide whether to continue the transaction relationship. In this regard, 
market alternatives provide the parties major protection against opportunism. Parties 
settle claims mainly by resorting to litigation because contracts stipulate the 
substantiative contents of transactions. For construction projects procurement, 
neoclassical contracting and relational contracting are most relevant. Neoclassical 
contracting or trilateral governance (one example of a hybrid form) is the preferred 
mode for low frequency transactions with mixed or high specific investments. What 
the mixed or high specific investments mean to contracting parities is that the 
relationship should be sustained, or else values of the investments would decrease 
significantly. However, setting-up a bilateral governance (another hybrid form) 
structure is uneconomical due to the low frequency nature of the transaction. Therefore, 
a third party is introduced to assist in resolving the disputes, evaluating performance 
and completing the transaction. Architects and engineering consultants are typical 
examples for the role of such a third party in the construction industry (Reve and 
Levitt 1984). For dealing with recurrent transactions with mixed or high specific 
investments, relational contracting is the preferred contractual form. The relationship 
between contracting parties is valuable. The costs of specialised governance structures 
can be recovered through recurrent transactions. There are two governance modes for 
this type of transaction. One is unified governance, in which transactions are organized 
within a single ownership entity (vertical integration). The other one is bilateral 
governance, where contracting parties remain independent entities.  Compared with 
unified governance, bilateral governance not only is favoured by scale economy 
considerations, but also maintains strong incentives and limits bureaucratic distortions.  
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3.2.6 The Application of TCE in the Construction Management Discipline 
In the last two decades, there have been a few TCE studies in the construction 
management research area. Table 3.3 briefly summarises the major, though not 
exhaustive, TCE studies in the construction management discipline. However, some of 
the listed studies do not focus on construction management. In these studies, data were 
collected from the construction industry, but served for other purposes. Masten et al. 
(1991) focused on the economics of organization and tested the role of transaction 
costs in integration decisions through investigating a large naval construction project. 
From the perspective of management accounting, Langfield-Smith (2008) examined 
the relations between transaction attributes, trust, risk and the choice of governance 
structure and control mechanisms in strategic alliance by drawing on a case study of a 
construction alliance. In addition, nearly half of the studies resort to theoretical 
arguments and lack empirical evidence. Generally, TCE-based studies in the 
construction management discipline are really sparse. Moreover, little effort has been 
made to examine the arguments of TCE in project-based transactions in the 
construction industry. In particular, none of the studies empirically measure the central 
constructs of TCE, which are transaction costs and transaction attributes.   
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Table 3.3 Major TCE Studies in the Construction Management Research Area 
Author(s) Key Findings Focus Research Methods 
Eccles (1981) 
The author put forward the conception of “quasifirm” in theory for the first time. Drawing 
upon the data collected from home building area to examine the existence of the quasifirm 
governance form in the construction industry.  
Main contractor and 
subcontractor relationship Survey 
Reve and 
Levitt (1984) 
Construction contracts are ways of governing construction transactions. The client-
consultant-contractor triad (a prime trilateral governance form), which formed through 
construction contracts, is the dominant organization form in the construction industry. 
Construction contracts; The 
client-consultant-contractor 
relationship 
Theoretical 
arguments 
Winch (1989) 
In consideration of flexibility and mitigating contracting uncertainty, construction firms 
incline to outsource for construction service. On the other side, institutional pressures of 
bureaucratic inertia and professional autonomy prevent the industry towards the hierarchy 
governance. 
The boundary of firms in the 
construction industry 
Theoretical 
arguments 
Masten et al. 
(1991) 
Organization costs regularly changed with the nature of transactions. Appropriate 
organization arrangements contribute to economizing these costs significantly.  
The role of internal 
organization costs in 
integration decisions 
Survey 
Walker and 
Chau (1999) 
The costs associated with project management activities are entirely transaction costs. The 
function of project management is to economize not only transaction costs but also 
production costs. TCE can be used for explaining the choice of project management system.  
The relation between 
construction project 
management theories and 
TCE 
Theoretical 
arguments 
Winch (2001) A conceptual framework governing the project process was proposed. This framework covers 
the lifecycle of projects, and includes vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
Governance of construction 
project 
Theoretical 
arguments 
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Author(s) Key Findings Focus Research Methods 
Turner and 
Simister 
(2001) 
The product uncertainty and process uncertainty together determine the choice of contract 
type. Contracting parties should be incentivised through goal alignment. 
The choice of contract type 
in construction projects 
Theoretical 
arguments 
Parker and 
Hartley 
(2003) 
Transaction costs associated with PPP are very significant. PPP does not necessarily improve 
the economic efficiency in the UK defence sector.  
The economic efficiency of 
PPP contracting method Case study 
White and 
Lui (2005) 
Cooperation costs have positive relations with joint task complexity and inter-partner 
diversity. Cooperation costs should be distinguished from transaction costs in alliances, and 
applied in the studies on the choice of alliance structures and partners. 
Cooperation costs in 
alliances between architects 
and contractors 
Survey 
Langfield-
Smith (2008) 
Transactional attributes, trust in partners and risk of alliances influence the choice of alliance 
control mechanisms. Alliance partners’ commitments will enhance trust and reduce risk.   
Trust, risks and choice of 
control packages in alliances Case study 
Lee et al. 
(2009) 
Two models, which are corresponding to competitive relationship and partnership 
relationship between main contractors and subcontractors respectively, were developed.  
Main contractor and 
subcontractor relationship Modelling  
Jin (2010) 
Partners’ risk management routine, cooperation history, risk management commitment and 
environmental uncertainty are the major determinants of effective risk allocation in PPP 
projects. 
Determinants of effective 
risk allocation in PPP 
projects 
Survey 
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3.3 Interorganizational Management Controls 
Organizational arrangements such as supplier partnerships, joint ventures, 
subcontracting and outsourcing, and strategic alliances have drawn considerable 
research interests and become an important research topic in economics, strategy, 
organizational and management disciplines (Dekker 2004). Scholars usually term these 
kinds of arrangements as ‘interorganizational relationships’, ‘interfirm settings’, 
‘hybrid organizational forms’ and ‘networks’ (Caglio and Ditillo 2008). Generally, the 
various interorganizational relationship forms belong to the ‘hybrid governance’ 
category. One of the biggest attractions of interorganizational relationships is that 
“planning, budgeting and control processes flow from one organization into others, 
creating, as they do, a more explicit awareness of the interdependency of action and 
the role which joint action can play in organizational success (Hopwood 1996, p. 589)”. 
This change implies “there is increased monitoring and control between organizations” 
(Otley 1994, p. 293), and thereby creates new demands on management control to 
address the emerging problems in interorganizational relationships. Therefore, 
managing interorganizational relationships appears to be a challenging and job of 
paramount importance for the performance and success of the relationships. One of the 
predominant reference theories in studying interorganizational management controls 
has been TCE (Anderson and Sedatole 2003). Based on TCE reasoning, it is argued 
that the major purpose of interorganizational management control has been to find 
suitable control solutions to handling the interorganizational relationships (Håkansson 
et al. 2006). 
3.3.1 Control Problems in Interorganizational Relationships 
Dekker (2004) depicts two primary control problems in interorganizational 
relationships, which are appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. 
Appropriation concerns arise from the interaction of transaction attributes and the 
presence of human natures.  First, companies often deploy assets and make 
investments for the interorganizational relationship, and usually share their assets and 
capabilities with their partners to pursue mutual benefits (Madhok 1998; Teece et al. 
1997). These assets and investments are specialized to support a specific 
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interorganizational relationship and together compose the relationship specific 
investments. According to line of reasoning of TCE, the higher the level of asset 
specificity, the lower the value of those specific assets in their alternative use 
(Williamson 1985; 1991a). This implies that the value of those relationship-specific 
investments will decrease significantly if the interorganizational relationship 
terminates prematurely or fails. Consequently, companies in interorganizational 
relationships need to enable the value of the joint output to be allocated clearly and 
fairly between parties (Jarillo 1988), and ensure that the value of relationship specific 
investments can be recovered from the relationship. Under this circumstance, 
companies are concerned with the sacrifice of valued specific investments. Second, 
due to the imperfection of human nature, companies that engage in interorganizational 
relationships have to safeguard their relationship-specific investments against the 
hazards of their counterparts’ potential opportunistic behaviours. In addition, under 
conditions of uncertainty, bounded rationality makes it impossible for companies to 
fully specify and effectively plan for future events upfront. Companies have to adapt 
constantly and negotiate from time to time in order to cope with unanticipated events 
occurred during the relationship. Further, partners’ performance and behaviour are 
more difficult to be monitored in a high uncertainty situation. These problems may 
induce opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, companies concern with their exposure to 
the risk of opportunistic expropriation. Taken together, appropriation concerns mean 
that companies in interorganizational relationships are concerned with their 
relationship specific investments being misappropriated by their counterparts, and thus 
endeavour to safeguard the value of those relationship specific investments. 
The other problem that companies face is the requirements for coordination when task 
interdependence is fostered in interorganizational relationships. TCE submits that 
adaption is the central problem of economic organization (Williamson 1991a). By its 
very nature, adaption refers to companies need to take the right action to respond to 
changing circumstances (Hayek 1945), and align their goals and actions effectively. 
When companies make specific investments to a particular interorganizational 
relationship, bilateral dependency between companies builds up because those 
investments have little value outside of the relationship (Dekker 2004). Such an 
interdependency between companies is expected to increase as companies’ specific 
investments deepen (Williamson 1991a). In addition, companies have to adapt 
continually, and coordinate activities efficiently to reflect the changing environments 
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under conditions of uncertainty. Thus, coordination requirements become very 
significant in interorganizational relationships that involve substantial investments in 
assets and capabilities and complex uncertainties. Inefficient coordination will incur 
maladaption costs due to disagreement and self-interested bargaining (Williamson 
1991a). Besides the transaction-costs-economizing perspective, some scholars argue 
that interorganizational relationships should also be structured to create and maximise 
transaction value (Dekker 2004; Dyer 1997), since economizing on transaction costs 
may be the major (but not the only) goal of organizing transactions (Osborn and 
Hagedoorn 1997; Williamson 1999). Thus, partners in interorganizational relationships 
need to commit and allocate reciprocal resource, establish division of labour, 
determine activities to be carried out, and decide and align the mutually beneficial 
goals. This leads to interdependencies between subtasks, which in turn require 
effective coordination and alignment of joint actions across organizational boundaries 
to ensure a fit between partners’ interfaces (Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Dekker 2004). 
The increased interdependence and uncertainty of tasks will inevitably increase the 
requirement for coordination and joint decision-making (Dyer 1996; Gulati and Singh 
1998). Combining the above two perspectives, coordination requirements are 
concerned with how joint actions can be aligned across organizational boundaries and 
mutually beneficial outcomes can be achieved between companies in 
interorganizational relationships. 
In summary, according to Dekker (2004), companies are mainly confronted with 
appropriation problems and coordination problems. Appropriation problems are 
associated with asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, whilst coordination 
problems are the effect of interdependence and uncertainty. When companies engage 
in interorganizational relationships, appropriation concerns and coordination 
requirements are raised. As the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
increase, appropriation problems become more significant. Similarly, coordination 
becomes more demanding as interdependence and uncertainty increase. 
3.3.2 Control Mechanisms in Interorganizational Relationships 
Appropriation concerns and coordination requirements are powerful concepts in 
explaining interorganizational relationship management and control, and together 
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require collaborating companies to manage the value creation and to safeguard the 
value of those relationship specific investments (Dekker 2004). In other words, the two 
issues impel companies to devise appropriate mechanisms to manage and control the 
interorganizational relationships. In such circumstances, interorganizational 
management controls come to the forefront to economize transaction costs while 
simultaneously create transaction value. Management control has been defined in 
many ways (Speklé 2001). Generally, management control focuses on the behaviour of 
organizational participants and the effect of this behaviour on organizational outcomes 
(Merchant and Simons 1986). Dekker (2004, p. 29) translated the definitions on 
management control into interorganizational setting and described the purpose of 
control as “creating the conditions that motivate the partners in an interorganizational 
relationship to achieve desirable or predetermined outcomes”.  
In the past decade, a number of studies have been conducted in an effort to explore 
management control solutions in interorganizational settings. The detailed review on 
the achievements in this area can be found in Håkansson et al (2006), and Caglio and 
Ditillo (2008). TCE has often been the reference theory in studying interorganizational 
management controls. Speklé (2001) examined the potential of TCE to inform the 
management control discipline and argued that TCE could provide a more cogent and 
comprehensive perspective to address the issue of control structure variety. TCE 
maintains that economic actors try to adopt appropriate organizational arrangements to 
govern their transactions and considers transactions are organized by three distinct 
modes of governance: (1) market, (2) hybrid and (3) hierarchy. Alternative governance 
forms differ in respect of the control packages to control the needs of transactions, 
which in turn not only offer differential abilities to solve problems and adaption but 
also incur different costs. Market governance resorts to free competition and has 
advantages with regard to incentive, but offers weak coordination abilities. Hierarchy 
realizes control by means of fiat (authority), internal incentive structures and 
monitoring. Compared with the market, hierarchy enjoys superior coordination but 
degrades incentive intensity. Hybrid governance is considered to be an intermediate 
form of governance between market and hierarchy. It preserves superior coordination 
without significantly degrading strong incentive because hybrid governance sacrifices 
some degree of incentive intensity of market governance in favour of superior 
coordination and some cooperation of hierarchy governance in favour of strong 
incentive (Williamson 1991a). Thus, the increased appropriation concerns and 
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coordination requirements lead to increasing use of hierarchical controls. TCE focuses 
on control problems and is concerned with the match between activities to be 
controlled and control structures (Håkansson et al. 2006; Speklé 2001). Such a match 
can be explained in terms of transaction cost economizing and efficiency. As 
mentioned above, interorganizational relationships are labelled as a ‘hybrid 
governance form’. However, TCE treats the hybrid governance form as a 
homogeneous category of organizational structures which actually contain a variety of 
different configurations of control solutions (Dekker 2004; Speklé 2001).  Speklé 
(2001) argues that management control is a functional system or process, and suggests 
that management control should be understood within the organizational context where 
it operates and of which it is part, and therefore need more detailed and a higher level 
of resolution.  
According to Caglio and Ditillo (2008)’s review and assessment, previous 
management control research has well-developed comprehensive patterns of different 
kinds of controls. Typical examples are van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
(2000)’s three management control patterns of interorganizational relationships (i.e. 
market based pattern, bureaucracy based pattern and trust based pattern) and Speklé’s 
(2001) five control archetypes (i.e. market control, arm’s length control, machine 
control, exploratory control and boundary control). Depending on the variety of 
transaction attributes, transaction environment and characteristics of partners, these 
control patterns or archetypes utilize various control devices such as competitive 
biddings, price-like devices, information on partners’ reputations, contracts and 
hostage arrangements, personal consultation and various levels of interaction to 
manage the relationships. Regarding management control mechanisms employed, 
scholars usually classify them as (1) formal controls, and (2) informal controls, also 
referred to as social controls (Smith et al. 1995). Formal controls rely on formal and 
explicitly designed rules, plans, procedures and policies to monitor behaviour and 
performance, and further reward desirable outcome, whereas informal controls resort 
to informal cultures, shared value and organizational norms to encourage desirable 
behaviour and performance (Das and Teng 2001b; Ouchi 1979). Formal control 
mechanisms consist of outcome controls and behaviour controls (Eisenhardt 1985; 
Ouchi 1979). By setting goals, planning and budgetary reporting and control, outcome 
controls monitor and measure the outcomes that achieved by the interorganizational 
relationship and by its partners. Behaviour controls, such as planning, programs, rules, 
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standard operating procedures and dispute resolution procedures, focus on specifying 
and monitoring partners’ behaviour to ensure that the process is appropriate and turn 
appropriate behaviour into desirable outcomes (Das and Teng 2001b). According to 
the development of interorganizational relationships, formal and informal controls can 
also be categorised as ex-ante control and ex-post control mechanisms. Ex-ante 
controls focus on setting goals, aligning partners’ interests, planning, designing rules 
and policies, and establishing primarily organizational culture and norms before 
implementing the interorganizational relationship. Despite the fact that ex-ante control 
mechanisms can mitigate control problems, they are often incomplete, and therefore 
should be supported by ex-post control mechanisms such as performance monitoring 
and rewarding, auditing, reporting etc. to deal with unresolved control problems during 
the relationship (Ittner et al. 1999; Ouchi 1979). Both formal and informal controls are 
argued to be useful mechanisms for managing appropriation concerns and coordinating 
interdependent tasks (Dekker 2004).  
Besides the abovementioned outcome controls, behaviour controls and social controls 
that used effectively in interorganizational relationships, Das and Teng (1998b) argues 
that there are three specific control mechanisms to be particular relevant to alliances. 
They are (1) goal setting, (2) structural specifications, and (3) cultural blending. 
According to Das and Teng (1998b), goal setting is often a challenging and critical 
task in alliances owing to the relatively high degrees of goal incongruence. In alliances, 
an effective goal-setting process not only sets the direction for task performance and 
clarifies alliance partners’ expectations, but also facilitates the establishment of 
specific rules and regulations. More importantly, by interaction between alliance 
partners and joint task planning in the process of goal setting, partners gain better 
understanding of each other, which in turn facilitates the establishment of shared 
norms and values of the alliance. Hence, goal setting is important for both formal and 
informal controls. Structural specifications specify the behaviour boundaries for 
alliance partners and are mainly used for encouraging desirable behaviour and 
discouraging opportunistic behaviour in alliances. Typical structural specifications 
include “reporting and checking devices, written notice of any departure from the 
agreement, accounting examination, cost control, quality control, arbitration clauses, 
and lawsuit provisions” (Das and Teng 1998b, p. 506). Unlike goal setting and 
structural specifications, cultural blending focuses on blending and harmonizing 
different organizational cultures within the alliance, and further establishing shared 
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norms and values of the alliance. Cultural blending is the central element of social 
control and provides an attractive alternative to goal setting and structural 
specifications when the alliance is confronted with relatively high degree of goal 
incongruence and task complexity (Das and Teng 1998b).  
3.4 Cost Management in Interorganizational Relationships 
Dekker (2004) argues that management accounting practices such as financial 
incentive systems, planning and open-book accounting are major elements of 
interorganizational relationships management controls. According to Caglio and 
Ditillo (2008)’s classification of interorganizational management control studies, one 
of the major contributions has focused on the forms and functions of cost and 
accounting controls in interorganizational environment. As an important result of 
many empirical studies conducted in different industries, a number of cost 
management and management accounting techniques and methods used in 
interorganizational relationships have been identified in recent decade (Håkansson et al. 
2006). In general, these cost management methods comprise a range of techniques, 
tools and practices, and can be defined as the customer and supplier’s coordinated 
efforts to reduce costs (Agndal and Nilsson 2009). They are usually termed as 
interorganizational cost management (IOCM). Without purporting to be exhaustive, 
IOCM practices and techniques include target costing (Ansari et al. 1997; Okano and 
Suzuki 2006), trade-off techniques such as functionality-price-quality trade-offs, 
interorganizational cost investigations, and concurrent cost management (Cooper and 
Slagmulder 2004; Cooper and Yoshikawa 1994), open-book accounting (Carr and Ng 
1995; Kajüter and Kulmala 2005; Seal et al. 1999), total cost of ownership (Wouters et 
al. 2005), value chain analysis (Dekker 2003), and some other non-financial, 
qualitative and informal approaches such as cross-functional teams (Carr and Ng 1995; 
Cooper and Slagmulder 2004), regular measurement of quality and cost (van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman 2000), joint task groups, joint alliance boards, drawing up 
plans and policies, and programs of innovation (Dekker 2004). They are mainly used 
for controlling interorganizational operations and improving interorganizational 
efficiency and effectiveness (Håkansson et al. 2006).  
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Target costing, trade-off techniques and open-book accounting are the most popular 
among the identified IOCM tools, techniques and practices. Target costing is a cost 
management technique with aims to minimizing new products’ life-cycle costs while 
meeting consumer requirements through exploring all possible ideas at the early stage 
of new products research and development (Kato 1993). Cooper and Yoshikawa 
(1994) investigated the IOCM techniques developed in the automobile industry in a 
Japanese supply chain, and concluded that these systems, which rely upon the 
customer-supplier cooperation, make the whole supply chain more cost-efficient. Ten 
years later, Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) observed three trade-off techniques 
(functionality-price-quality trade-offs, interorganizational cost investigations, and 
concurrent cost management) and argued that IOCM can help to overcome the 
information asymmetry and enable different parties to coordinate and cooperate 
effectively by investigating the IOCM systems in different relational context. Also, 
they point out that target costing lies at the centre of IOCM. In interorganizational 
settings, information exchange is indispensable. This is the primary function of open-
book accounting. The cost information disclosure may be unidirectional (Carr and Ng 
1995), or bidirectional. 
In comparison with other industries, only limited studies in relation to cost 
management in an interorganizational environment have been conducted to date in the 
construction industry. The action research conducted in the UK in 1997 was mainly to 
examine the applicability of target costing in two pilot projects (Nicolini et al. 2000). 
Jacomit and Granja (2011) investigated into the applicability of target costing on 
Brazilian public social housing projects and critically examined the contextual 
characteristics that may influence its implementation in the product development 
process. Some scholars attempted to introduce and apply the concurrent engineering 
conception into the construction industry as means of improving the supply chain 
integration and project performance (Evbuomwan and Anumba 1998; Love et al. 
1998). However, Nicolini et al. (2000) argue that the main barrier to the adoption of a 
fully-fledged version of target costing in construction derives from the extant 
commercial practices in the construction industry and the application of target costing 
was seriously jeopardized in this context. Jacomit and Granja (2011) also view the 
outsourcing of design and the bidding process as the obstacles for the implementation 
of target costing in the construction industry. Thus, it is unrealistic to apply these cost 
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management practices without the appropriate contractual, relational context and 
specific organizational arrangements. 
Project alliancing provides a platform in terms of contractual mechanism, relational 
context and organizational arrangement to apply these cost management practices. 
Actually, a few studies have been referred briefly to some practices which may be used 
in alliance projects but lack of further research, such as open-book accounting (DTF 
Victoria 2006; Ross 1999), target costing (Langfield-Smith 2008) and concurrent 
engineering (Halman and Braks 1999). In addition, construction industry has its own 
distinctive features. Firstly, the nature of its project-based and organizational dynamics 
and the complexity of its supply chain relationships often lead to difficulty in 
controlling its environment compared to other industries (Barlow 2000). Secondly, the 
large, discrete, and immobile nature of the final product is the most salient feature 
distinguishing construction projects from manufacturing operations (Masten et al. 
1991). Those identified accounting or cost management techniques, methods, and 
control mechanisms fit quite well for other industries. However, it remains unknown 
whether those cost management practices are suitable for the construction industry, or 
whether any improvement has been made to fit them to the industry.  
3.5 The Refinement of Research Questions 
TCE poses that governance forms differ in their costs and ability to govern the 
transaction relationships and solve problems, whilst transactions differ in respect of the 
underlying transaction attributes, so that alignment between the two does promote 
governance performance and economize transaction costs (Williamson 1991a). Thus, 
TCE is concerned with “transactions and the economizing efforts that attend the 
organization thereof” (Williamson 1985, p. 1). Interorganizational management control 
theories outline two basic control problems (i.e. appropriation concerns and 
coordination requirements) and subscribe that output, behaviour and social controls are 
effective mechanisms to solve those problems in interorganizational relationships. 
Therefore, the focus of interorganizational management control theories is on finding a 
package of solutions or specific mechanisms for the control needs of a particular type 
of interorganizational relationship. The insights and relevant propositions of TCE and 
interorganizational management control theories, coupled with the research directions 
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outlined in Chapter 2, can help to develop a robust and significant alliancing research 
project.  
3.5.1 The Antecedents of Transaction Costs in Alliances 
As presented in Chapter 2, extant research on alliancing has well explored its 
emergence, features and principles, applications, benefits, success factors and incentive 
systems. Despite these contributions, the economics of alliancing have less been 
considered in previous studies and remain an untouched area. Choosing a contracting 
method for procuring a construction project could actually be viewed as a transaction. 
From this point, alliancing is not only a project procurement strategy and contracting 
method underpinned by such features as risk and opportunity sharing, commitment to 
‘no disputes’, acting in good faith, unanimous decision-making, joint management 
structure, and open-book arrangements etc. Rather, alliancing is also a complex 
transaction relationship between the owner and one or more service providers, 
involving substantial investments in assets and capabilities and complex uncertainties 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). The problems of economic organization are treated as the 
problems of contracting in TCE, which arise from the presence of ‘imperfect’ human 
natures (i.e. bounded rationality and opportunism). The degrees of bounded rationality 
and opportunism vary according to the transaction attributes. Transactions can be 
organized in any of several alternative forms to protect transactors against the hazards 
of contracting problems. However, such protections cannot be realized without certain 
costs. Transaction attributes can influence such costs directly and determine the 
organizational forms of transactions (Williamson 1985). Prior studies have neglected 
the roles of transaction characteristics of alliancing, and the costs and efforts 
associated with selecting alliance partners, drafting and negotiating contracts, 
monitoring performance and behaviour, coordinating resource and enforcing 
agreements in alliances. What is needed, therefore, is a more inclusive and cogent 
approach that links the attributes of alliancing transactions and the costs of setting up 
and running alliances. This research intends to address the shortcomings in the existing 
alliancing literature and to contribute more insights that may advance our 
understanding of the intricacies of alliancing. More specifically, it focuses on the 
impacts of transaction attributes on transaction costs in alliances by drawing upon TCE. 
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Whether these attributes significantly influence the transaction costs and how they do 
so are the concerns of this research.  
3.5.2 The Governance Performance and Efficiency of Alliancing 
Because it offers an attractive alternative to traditional contracting methods, alliancing 
has often been the focus of research interest. As presented in Chapter 2, one of the 
major directions of alliancing studies has been describing and explaining alliancing 
benefits (e.g. AAA 2008a; Barlow 2000; Halman and Braks 1999; Hauck et al. 2004). 
Without purporting to be exhaustive, the benefits and advantages of alliancing include 
capital cost reduction, improved project performance (in terms of time, quality, safety 
etc.), avoiding disputes, commencing projects earlier than by traditional methods, 
flexibility, economizing resource, source of learning, enhancing the partners’ 
reputation and improving competitive advantage etc. However, research suggests that 
traditional contracting methods can also result in similar benefits and alliancing does 
not guarantee them (Bresnen and Marshall 2000c). The contradiction stems from the 
fact that extant studies usually evaluate alliancing based solely on final project 
outcomes or outcomes of alliancing process, but neglected the cost and competence of 
alliancing in dealing with contracting problems, and the environment where 
transactions are conducted. It is difficult to appropriately assess alliancing only based 
on these superficial evidences without considering its transaction characteristics and 
governance efficiency. This research intends to understand how the characteristics of 
alliancing transactions may affect the capabilities of alliancing in dealing with 
contracting problems. Transactions organized by alliancing usually involve high 
uncertainty and substantial investments in assets and capabilities (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
Does alliancing serve as an effective approach to facilitate transactions characterized 
by such attributes, and does alliancing economize transaction costs? This question is 
another concern in this research. The focus of this question is governance performance 
of alliancing and the efficiency of alliancing in organizing complex transactions. 
3.5.3 The Attenuation of Transaction Risks in Alliances 
Due to differences in adaptability and the use of differential incentive and 
administrative controls, alternative organizational forms usually exhibit discriminating 
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competences and incur differential costs (Williamson 1991a). This implies that, on the 
one hand, the governance between contracting parties is costly, and on the other hand, 
governance mechanisms, when is aligned with the given situation in which the 
transaction is made, can economize transaction costs and facilitate the transaction. 
Interorganizational management control theories also submit that the control devices 
designed for interorganizational relationships should economize transaction costs 
while simultaneously creating transaction value. Furthermore, more detailed and 
specific mechanisms were explored in interorganizational management control studies. 
In the case of alliancing, this involves transactions between the project owner and 
NOPs. The transactions are controlled by a set of mechanisms characterised by a 
number of features (see Table 2.4, “Established principles and features of alliancing”). 
Both TCE and interorganizational management control theories subscribe that control 
devices are used for solving contracting problems; these devices, if used appropriately, 
can economize transaction costs. Using the above reasoning, it can be assumed that 
aligning the alliancing control mechanisms and governance structure with transaction 
attributes will result in the economization of transaction costs. The assumption needs 
empirical evidence to provide support in alliancing context. This task can be 
accomplished by investigating the performance consequences of control mechanisms 
of alliancing. Thus, the following research question becomes relevant: How do the 
control mechanisms of alliances influence transaction costs, and what factors have the 
potential to reduce transaction costs in alliancing? 
3.5.4 Supporting Cost Management Tools and Techniques in Alliances 
In interorganizational relationships, cost management provides management controls 
with supports to ensure the achievement of the objectives of collaborating companies 
and to solve control problems. They are not only the essential elements of management 
controls, but are also more specific and detailed tools and techniques compared to 
management controls. For example, goal setting in alliances is generally accomplished 
with the support of cross-functional teams and joint task groups. More often, the tools 
and practices used in cost management are influenced by relational context. A cost 
management practice may fit quite well for one relationship, but may not be suitable 
for other relationships. Consequently, a research opportunity arises to investigate the 
influence of arrangement of interorganizational setting on cost management in 
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alliancing projects. Thus, this study aims to investigate the IOCM practices used in 
alliancing context. This leads to the fourth research question: What IOCM practices 
are applied in alliances? 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter provides a review on relevant conceptions and propositions of TCE and 
interorganizational management control theories in a manner that facilitates their 
application in this study. Both TCE and interorganizational management control 
theories are suitable to this research. TCE holds that the governance of transaction 
relationships between parties is costly while “an understanding of transaction cost 
economizing is central to the study of organizations”, takes the “transaction” as the 
unit of analysis, and suggests that transaction attributes can influence transaction costs 
directly and determine the organizational forms of transactions (Williamson 1979; 
1981; 1985; 1991a). It studies the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures, and explains why 
some transactions are organized by one form whereas other transactions adopt other 
different organizational forms. Interorganizational management control supplants TCE 
with efforts to find suitable control solutions for a given relationship or a subset of 
homogeneous relationships in which the transaction/transactions is/are made. Both 
theories are committed to explain the choice of control structures (Speklé 2001). These 
theories are not only conducive to developing more relevant research questions, but 
also provide a basic theoretical framework for this study. Drawing upon these theories, 
several research questions are elaborated in this chapter.  The focus of these research 
questions is on transaction costs. More specifically, this research will accomplish the 
following. It will be centred on transaction costs in project alliances; it will take 
alliancing transactions as the unit of analysis and study the antecedents of transaction 
costs in project alliances, reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs and the 
associated control solutions, and tools and techniques adopted in project alliances that 
contribute to reducing transaction costs.  
TCE and interorganizational management control are served as reference disciplines in 
this study. Both theories have proven quite successful in their own domains. It is 
expected that this study could benefit from these theories in addressing research gaps 
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and limitations in previous alliancing research. As such, this study will extend TCE 
and interorganizational management control perspectives to the construction 
management discipline, and thereby provide both theories with empirical evidence in 
the construction industry. 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 outlines two pertinent research directions 
for project alliancing. The first is to examine the efficiency of project alliancing and to 
analyse the underlying reasons in improving efficiency in project alliancing. The other 
is to investigate the influence of project alliancing on management practice. Moreover, 
future research would benefit from economic theories. TCE can serve as a reference 
discipline in analysing and examining the efficiency of various contracting methods 
under different project contexts. Interorganizational management control theories, on 
the other hand, address and handle the emerging problems in interorganizational 
relationships such as project alliances, strategic alliances and joint ventures. Both 
theories provide the basic theoretical insights for this research.  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework on which the 
research is based by drawing upon TCE and interorganizational management control 
theories. The remaining part of this chapter explains how the arguments have been 
structured, and proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, the contract and governance of 
alliancing are discussed based on TCE. Section 4.3 defines and conceptualizes 
transaction costs in project alliances. Section 4.4 discusses in detail transaction 
attributes in alliances, particularly the impacts of transaction attributes on different 
transaction cost elements in the context of alliancing. Following the discussion, a 
number of hypotheses regarding the impacts of transaction attributes on transaction 
costs are proposed in this section. Section 4.5 primarily deals with the question of 
whether alliancing is an effective approach to facilitate transactions and economize 
transaction costs in organizing transactions characterized by given attributes. Three 
hypotheses are proposed based on the discussion. In Section 4.6, the unique control 
mechanisms of alliances are discussed and categorised into different control types. 
Section 4.7 explores more detailed control mechanisms: cost management in alliances. 
Cost management in alliances is defined in this section. Three alliance processes where 
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IOCM might be relevant are identified and discussed. Section 4.8 summarises this 
chapter. 
4.2 Governance Forms of Project Alliancing 
Scholars usually argue that alliancing belongs to the relational contracting paradigm 
(e.g. Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2002a; Sakal 2005). However, to view alliancing 
only as a relational contract misses much of what is truly distinctive about its forms of 
governance. By its very nature, alliancing is not only a project procurement strategy 
but also a complex transaction between contracting parties. Most typically, alliancing 
is characterized by a number of features such as risk and opportunity sharing, 
commitment to ‘no disputes’, acting in good faith, unanimous decision making, joint 
management structure, open-book arrangement, and “No fault - no blame” culture 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). Both bilateral and unified governance forms can be found in 
alliancing. On the one hand, alliancing creates transaction relationships between the 
owner and service providers (e.g. contractors, designers etc.). The transactions are 
governed by legal enforcement contracts, and supplemented by mutually accepted 
social guidelines (Macaulay 1963). Under alliancing arrangements, risks and 
responsibilities are shared and managed collectively. Contracting parties are jointly 
responsible for delivering the project in a collaborative and cooperative way. They 
have incentives to sustain the relationship till final completion of the project in order to 
pursue mutual benefits and avoid the sacrifice of valued specific investments. Despite 
the fact that contracting parties remain independent entities and have their own 
interests, adjustments to the mutual agreed targets and any decisions to the project 
should be made on the basis of ‘best-for-project’ instead of ‘best-for-self’. Contracting 
parties establish a peer relationship within the alliance where each party has an equal 
say in decisions. More importantly, conflicts and disputes are resolved internally rather 
than resort to litigation or arbitration. Obviously, the transactions are organized by a 
bilateral governance form. On the other hand, alliancing adopts a joint management 
mechanism where contracting parties work as an integrated team to make all project 
decisions collectively and manage all responsibilities jointly (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
This joint management structure, which is equivalent to a corporate structure in 
function and format and established by contracting parties according to the alliancing 
agreement, not only binds the parties and combines their resources into a joint team, 
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but also places all parties’ activities as objects for management and control. Under this 
circumstance, the alliance operates as a ‘virtual firm’ performing all of the functions 
required delivering a project (DTF Victoria 2006). This implies that transactions, to 
some extent, are organized by an integrated hierarchy.  
In summary, the governance mechanisms employed in alliancing contain both bilateral 
and unified governance characteristics, and is an intermediate mode between the two. 
All the contracting parties have a dual role in the alliancing context. For example, the 
owner is not only the client but also an alliance partner. Alliancing establishes and 
“capitalises on the relationship between the parties” by means of bilateral governance, 
whilst “[removing] organizational barriers and encourages effective integration” (DTF 
Victoria 2010a, p. 9) by means of unified governance. Prior studies have demonstrated 
the existence of similar type of governance forms in the construction industry. Typical 
examples include “quasi-firm” between general contractors and sub-contractors 
(Eccles 1981), and “quasi-integration” between contractors and consultants (Reve and 
Levitt 1984).  
4.3 Transaction Costs in Project Alliances: A Conceptualization 
Previous TCE literature has well-defined transaction costs and decomposed transaction 
costs into four separate costs elements, which are search costs, contracting costs, 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs (e.g. Dyer 1997; North 1990; Williamson 
1985). Construction management literature also offered some useful suggestions on the 
definition of transaction costs in alliances as summarized in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 Definitions on Transaction Costs in the Construction Industry 
Author(s) Definition on transaction costs 
Cox and Thompson 
(1998) 
Costs of identification, accreditation and selection of suppliers; 
Costs of performance monitoring; Costs of contract management 
Walker and Chau (1999) Project management costs incurred by project owners 
Turner and Simister 
(2001) 
Planning costs; Adapting costs; Costs of monitoring task 
completion; Costs of managing the contractual relationship 
Love et al. (2002b) Information costs; Negotiation costs; Monitoring costs 
Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 
(2002a) 
Costs of negotiation and writing contracts; Costs of monitoring 
contractual performance; Costs of enforcing contractual promises; 
Costs associated with breaches of contractual promises 
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Set-up Alliance 
Design the selection method; 
Prepare and release the tender documents; 
Participate in and manage the selection process; 
Evaluate and select participants 
Select alliance participants 
Write the contract/agreement; 
Develop the project proposal; 
Negotiate and agree with the project 
proposal & agreement 
Develop proposal and negotiate contract 
Manage cost (all resources), time, quality and 
other performance targets; 
Manage risks; 
Manage project scope; 
Manage the commitment of stakeholders; 
Manage the project team 
Manage the alliance and project 
Solve problems arise during project delivery; 
Deal with variations; 
Deal with claims; 
Resolve conflicts or disputes; 
Deal with litigation or arbitration; 
Sanction non-perform participants 
Deal with problems that might arise 
Evaluate and select preferred 
and qualified participants  
Although there are various types of transactions in the construction industry, this 
research focuses on project-based transactions – project procurement between the 
project owners and service providers (e.g. contractors and designers) governed by 
construction contracts. In this context, transaction costs in construction may include 
the costs and efforts that were required to establish the project team, monitor 
performance, manage the project team, coordinate resource, and deal with problems 
that might arise during the transaction relationship. Figure 4.1 illustrates the typical 
project alliance process and major activities in project alliances. The typical project 
alliance process scheme (upper part of Figure 4.1) is synthesised based on the policy 
guidelines for alliancing contracting that issued by Department of Treasury and 
Finance, State of Victoria (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a). A typical alliance process, as 
Figure 4.1 illustrated, consists of such major activities as establishing the alliance, 
managing the alliance relationship and project delivery process, and dealing with 
problems that might arise in the relationship. The costs and efforts associated with the 
activities listed in Figure 4.1 together compose transaction costs in alliances, and can 
be categorized as set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Typical Process and Major Activities in Project Alliances 
Operation of Alliance 
Develop and evaluate proposal; 
Develop and determine targets; 
Negotiate and agree contract 
Monitor and measure performance; 
Monitor behaviour; 
Deliver pre-agreed targets; 
Manage the project delivery process 
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4.3.1 Set-up Costs 
After deciding to use alliancing to procure its project, the owner needs to select the 
preferred and qualified service providers, i.e. NOPs for setting up the alliance at first. 
The selection process consists of a series of activities such as designing the selection 
method, preparing and releasing tender documents, and evaluating alliance participants. 
The selection instruments normally include assessing proponents’ written submissions, 
interviews, workshops, team-work, and role-playing. The NOPs are selected based on 
either price competition or a non-price competition approach (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
During the selection process, the project proposal development and contract 
negotiation are conducted in parallel with the evaluation of proponents. This process is 
of vital importance for an alliance. The final project proposal, which typically includes 
project design, construction methods, commercial framework, target cost and proposed 
alliance team, should be worked out. The alliance agreement should also be negotiated 
and signed by the owner and the selected NOPs in this process. In fact, the selection of 
NOPs and project proposal development are integral parts for establishing the alliance. 
Moreover, the project proposal development and contract negotiation play important 
roles in assessing NOPs’ competence and team-working ability. The selection process 
and contracting process together contribute to the establishment of the alliance. Thus, 
transaction costs attached to the establishment of alliance team can be defined as set-
up costs, which refer to the costs and efforts associated with evaluating and identifying 
the preferred alliance participants, developing, negotiating and agreeing with the 
agreement and project proposal, and (finally) establishing the alliance. 
4.3.2 Monitoring Costs 
After establishment of the alliance, all the alliance participants work together as an 
integrated team to manage the project and deliver the pre-agreed targets. At this stage, 
the alliance performs the functions of project management (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
According to Turner (2009), the primary functions of project management include: 
managing cost and resource, managing time, managing quality, managing risks, 
managing project scope, managing project team and managing the commitment of 
stakeholders. In addition, other key performance areas such as safety and environment 
also need to be managed. Besides the above major functions, alliance coaching, 
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facilitation or team development are very popular strategies in facilitating the alliance 
relationship and performance (DTF Victoria 2010a). The costs and efforts for 
implementing the functions of project management can be classified as monitoring 
costs. More specifically, monitoring costs in alliances refer to the costs and efforts 
associated with monitoring the project performance, the quality of services from 
participants and the behaviour of project teams, and allocating or coordinating 
resources to ensure that all pre-agreed targets can be achieved and all participants fulfil 
their responsibilities. 
4.3.3 Enforcement Costs 
Although alliance participants may endeavour to act in a cooperative and collaborative 
way, and make decisions on a “best for project” basis, problems and conflicts are not 
unusual due to bounded rationality and self-interest. For example, any adjustments to 
performance targets and changes to scope may lead to re-negotiation and ex-post 
bargaining. The conflict interests between participants may result in problems such as 
claim, arbitration, and sanction of non-performing participants during the alliance 
relationship. It would take alliance participants’ considerable costs and efforts to deal 
with these problems that may arise during the alliance relationship. These types of 
costs and efforts can be classified as enforcement costs. Therefore, enforcement costs 
in alliances refer to the costs and efforts associated with ex-post bargaining (e.g. 
variations and claims), resolving conflicts, disputes and litigation, and sanctioning a 
participant that does not perform according to the agreement. 
4.4 Transaction Attributes in Project Alliances 
According to TCE, transaction costs stem from the interactions between transaction 
attributes and the presence of imperfect human natures (Williamson 1985). This 
argument suggests that transaction attributes can influence transaction costs directly. 
Moreover, asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency represent the core dimensions 
of transactions, which together determine the organizational forms of transactions 
(Williamson 1981). Thus, transaction attributes lie at the centre of TCE. Transaction 
costs in alliances were deconstructed into three separate cost elements in Section 4.3. 
In this section, the transaction attributes in alliances are analysed.  Drawing upon TCE, 
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the impacts of transaction attributes on different transaction costs elements in alliances 
are discussed in detail. The discussion leads to a series of hypotheses on the relations 
between transaction attributes and transaction costs in alliances. A model of the 
proposed relations is presented in Figure 4.2. 
4.4.1 Asset Specificity in Project Alliances 
Alliancing requires contracting parties to commit best in class resource and engage 
substantial investments in assets and capabilities (DTF Victoria 2010a). Since these 
resource and investments, in either physical or immaterial form, are specialized to a 
given alliance relationship, they together compose the relationship-specific 
investments and play very important roles in maintaining the relationship and 
delivering the project successfully. On one side, the value of the investments will 
decrease significantly if the alliance relationship is terminated prematurely 
(Williamson 1985). On the other side, the recovery of the investments relies on the 
success of the alliancing project. Thus, contracting parties have incentives to establish 
a high performance alliance team and sustain the relationship in order to pursue mutual 
benefits and preserve the value of specific investments. For setting up an alliance, the 
owner needs to devise an appropriate and tailored selection method to ensure that the 
selection process is appropriate for a particular project, whilst the potential NOPs must 
demonstrate their various capabilities for delivering a successful alliancing project 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). Unlike traditional selection approaches, the potential NOPs will 
be assessed in “real time” against price and non-price criteria. In addition, the work 
routine is changed dramatically as contracting parties work in a collaborative way to 
develop a project proposal. In most cases, the owner engages specialized advisers to 
train its staff and assist with the establishment of the alliance (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
Alliancing usually seeks to align goal and incentives ex-ante through a form of cultural 
initiation or socialization process (Heide 1994). It is expected that considerable efforts 
and costs will be spent on setting up the alliance. Furthermore, adequate and high 
quality resources do not necessarily lead to success. They must be organized in an 
efficient way. Greater coordinated adaption is required in order to allocate and 
coordinate productive resources effectively when the relationship-specific investments 
increase (Williamson 1991a). In addition, coordination between contracting parties 
also becomes more significant as asset specificity arises. Thus, good project 
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management and control system should be in place for delivering a successful 
alliancing project and maintaining a constructive alliance relationship. As a result, the 
cost of devising and implementing project management and control systems increases.  
The existence of specific investments also induces opportunistic behaviours (Klein et 
al. 1978). As the level of asset specificity increases, contracting parties more tend to 
protect their investments against the hazards of opportunism. Accordingly, transaction 
costs associated with contract negotiation rise because contracting parties are 
increasingly willing to spend time and effort crafting contractual safeguards (Joskow 
1987). Opportunism is more prominent during the post-contract stage. One party may 
extract concessions from the other party. Moreover, “it can be expected that both 
owners and the NOPs will seek to implement the commercial and legal terms that are 
favourable to themselves” (DTF Victoria 2010a, p. 45). This kind of opportunistic 
behaviour increases the difficulties in monitoring behaviours and the performance of 
alliance participants, as well as in addressing problems that might arise during the 
alliance relationship. Consequently, the costs and efforts for dealing with bilateral 
dependence and opportunistic behaviours will increase as relationship-specific 
investments increase. 
On the basis of the above, this research proposes the following hypotheses: 
As asset specificity rises: 
H1a: Set-up costs in alliances will increase; 
H1b: Monitoring costs in alliances will increase; 
H1c: Enforcement costs in alliances will increase. 
4.4.2 Uncertainty in Project Alliances 
Alliancing projects usually are characterized by difficult engineering challenges, high-
risks, very tight timeframe, complex stakeholder issues, complex external threats, cost 
pressure and high quality requirement (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003). These 
characteristics, either inherent in alliancing projects or exerted by stakeholders, 
represent significant sources of uncertainty encompassed in alliances. One of the direct 
consequences of uncertainty is that it is impossible for contracting parties to predict 
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and plan precisely the future events. Customized design and new construction solution 
should be worked out. As uncertainty increases, contracting parties will devote more 
time and efforts to develop the project proposal in order to reduce the adverse effect of 
uncertainty. At the same time, negotiations and efforts revolving around the alliancing 
agreement and commercial framework will be more significant because contracting 
parties will be locked into a fixed target for an extended period of time. During the 
post-contract stage, contracting parties may also face the adverse effect of uncertainty 
due to the incomplete nature of the project proposal and contracts. Thus, contracting 
parties have to adapt continually, coordinate activities efficiently and renegotiate 
frequently to reflect the changing circumstances. Negotiation and ex-post bargaining 
are also required to resolve the disputes that arise as uncertainty increases. Uncertainty 
also increases the difficulty in assessing the performance (Pilling et al. 1994; 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). As a result, transaction costs associated with 
performance measurement will be incurred because the true level of performance 
cannot be readily measured under high-uncertainty conditions. 
The above discussion suggests that uncertainty makes it more difficult for contracting 
parties to establish the alliance relationship, manage the project process and deal with 
problems that might arise during the alliance relationship. Thus, this research expects 
to find support for the following hypotheses: 
As the level of uncertainty increases: 
H2a: Set-up costs in alliances will increase; 
H2b: Monitoring costs in alliances will increase; 
H2c: Enforcement costs in alliances will increase. 
4.4.3 Transaction Frequency in Project Alliances 
Transaction frequency can be used to justify the costs of devising specialized 
governance structure. However, the impact of frequency on transaction costs has not 
been paid enough attention and empirical efforts are very limited (Pilling et al. 1994; 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). According to Williamson (1985, p. 1), a transaction 
“occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable 
interface.” The main construction contract not only is a single transaction, but also can 
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be viewed as a series of repeated transactions such as variations, claims, disputes and 
settlements (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2002a). Generally, the values of alliancing 
projects are relatively high (DTF Victoria 2010a). Accordingly, repeated transactions 
would be very considerable in large-scale projects. Thus, transactions organized by 
alliancing exhibit high frequency. Contracting parties are more likely to craft 
specialized governance mechanisms to organize high frequent transactions 
(Williamson 1985). However, such specialized governance usually comes at high 
initial set-up costs. Furthermore, the collective responsibilities and joint decision-
making process under alliancing arrangements present a number of complexities for 
governance within the alliance (DTF Victoria 2010a). Therefore, the interactions 
between contracting parties would be more frequent and significant (Langfield-Smith 
2008). The greater the frequency of transactions, the greater the transaction costs 
associated with coordinating activities, allocating resource and monitoring behaviours. 
In addition, complex transactions often involve ex-post bargaining and frequent 
renegotiation, which in turn incurs transaction costs. In light of the above reasoning, 
this research proposes the following hypotheses: 
As the level of frequency increases:  
H3a: Set-up costs in alliances will increase; 
H3b: Monitoring costs in alliances will increase; 
H3c: Enforcement costs in alliances will increase. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 A Representation of the Relationships between Transaction Attributes 
and Transaction Costs in Alliances 
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Figure 4.2 summarises the main predictions on the relationships between transaction 
attributes and transaction costs in project alliances. It suggests how transaction 
attributes (i.e. asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) influence different 
transaction cost elements in alliances. The transaction characteristics of project 
alliances will incur high transaction costs. Transaction costs are higher under 
conditions of high asset specificity, high uncertainty and high frequency in project 
alliances. 
4.5 The Efficiency of Project Alliancing 
This section focuses on governance performance and efficiency of alliancing. The 
appropriate assessment of a governance mode can be achieved, as informed by 
Williamson (1981), by assessing the reducing effect of the governance mode on 
transaction costs. TCE posits that transaction cost economizing is accomplished by 
aligning governance forms with transaction attributes (Williamson 1985). Following 
TCE propositions, the governance performance and efficiency of alliancing are 
discussed and combined with the transaction attributes of alliances to explain whether 
alliancing serves as an effective approach to facilitate transactions with given 
characteristics and economize transaction costs. Three hypotheses are proposed in this 
section.  
4.5.1 The Efficiency of Project Alliancing under Conditions of High Asset 
Specificity 
One of the direct consequences of specific investments is to create bilateral 
dependency between parties because the value of these assets will decrease 
significantly if the relationship is terminated prematurely (Williamson 1985). As asset 
specificity deepens, bilateral dependency between contracting parties is expected to be 
reinforced. Accordingly, coordination becomes more frequent and significant as asset 
specificity rises. Therefore, contracting parties are required to respond more quickly 
and easily, otherwise maladaptation costs will be incurred due to disagreement and 
self-interested bargaining (Williamson 1991a). In addition, the increased asset 
specificity requires greater coordination to make sure that specific investments can be 
more effectively allocated and better utilized. Different governance forms rely on 
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differential adaptability, incentive and management controls to facilitate coordinated 
responses. Internal organization is the preferred form for transactions with high 
specific investments due to its superior adaptive advantages. However, such a formal 
hierarchy structure reduces incentive and incurs bureaucratic costs (Williamson 1991a). 
The governance mechanisms employed in alliancing (which is basically bilateral 
governance, whilst containing some characteristics of hierarchy) can redeem the above 
shortcomings associated with hierarchy. Alliancing preserves greater incentives than 
hierarchy by its bilateral governance. Meanwhile, its joint management structure 
encourages superior coordination. Thus, alliancing maintains superior coordination 
without degrading strong incentive. According to TCE’s line of reasoning (Williamson 
1991a), the superior coordination and strong incentives of alliancing can coordinate 
activities, allocate specific assets and monitor behaviours more efficiently in 
transactions with high asset specificity, and therefore economize the associated 
transaction costs. 
Specific investments can also lead to safeguarding problems against opportunistic 
behaviours (Williamson 1985). As the level of asset specificity increases, contracting 
parties tend to protect their specific investments as well as economize transaction costs 
associated with safeguarding against the hazards of opportunism through more 
efficient control mechanisms. TCE-based research has identified and demonstrated a 
number of arrangements that can act to discourage opportunistic behaviours and 
reduce transaction costs under conditions of high asset specificity such as information 
sharing and communication (Artz and Brush 2000; Dyer 1997), use of self-enforcing 
safeguards (Dyer 1997), inter-firm collaboration and cooperation (Artz and Brush 
2000; Buvik 2002), investments in reciprocal/co-specialized assets (De Vita et al. 2010; 
Dyer 1997; Judge and Dooley 2006), sharing benefits and burdens (Dekker 2004). 
These arrangements can also be found in alliancing. In fact, they are the key features 
that operate collectively as part of the governance mechanisms of alliancing (DTF 
Victoria 2010a). Besides the above mechanisms, the standards of conduct in alliancing, 
which are reflected as the “No fault - no blame” culture and acting in ‘good faith’, also 
have the potential to suppress opportunistic behaviours. By establishing the “No fault - 
no blame” culture, alliancing drives contracting parties towards acting in a ‘best for 
project’ manner instead of ‘best for self’ (DTF Victoria 2010a). The obligation to act 
in ‘good faith’ spells out the boundaries of behaviour including not reaping self 
interests at the expense of other parties (DTF Victoria 2010a). More importantly, the 
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commercial framework agreed by contracting parties—which is described as a set of 
arrangements that align contracting parties’ interests towards the achievement of 
project objectives and link contracting parties’ financial pain/gain with performance of 
both cost and non-cost areas (DTF Victoria 2010a)—can lead to collaborative and 
cooperative behaviour (Love et al. 2011). This in turn suppresses opportunistic 
behaviours (Laan et al. 2011).  
The above discussion suggests that alliancing has superiorities in allocating specific 
assets, coordinating activities, monitoring behaviours and impeding opportunism under 
conditions of high asset specificity. Moreover, such superiorities are expected to be 
enhanced as investments in asset specificity deepen. Thus, this research proposes the 
following hypothesis:  
H4: Project alliancing is more efficient in reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of higher asset specificity. 
4.5.2 The Efficiency of Project Alliancing under Conditions of High Uncertainty 
The impact of uncertainty on transactions is threefold. Firstly, due to bounded 
rationality, future events and contingencies cannot be specified ex-ante in uncertainty 
environments. Thus, every contract is incomplete (Williamson 1985). The increased 
uncertainty makes it more difficult for contracting parties to develop the project 
proposal. Contract negotiation would be more challenging because contracting parties 
will dedicate to the transaction relationship for several years. Secondly, uncertainty 
increases the difficulties in evaluating the performance (Pilling et al. 1994), and leads 
to performance measurement problems (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Therefore, 
transaction costs associated with performance measurement will be incurred because 
the true level of performance cannot be readily measured under high uncertainty 
conditions. Thirdly, due to the incomplete nature of contracts, contracting parties have 
to adapt continually, coordinate activities efficiently and renegotiate frequently to 
reflect the changing circumstances. At the same time, negotiation and bargaining are 
also required to resolve the disputes that arise as uncertainty increases. The above 
reasoning suggests that uncertainty is one of the major sources of transaction costs. 
Moreover, when uncertainty is higher, the associated transaction costs also rise. 
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Contracting parties are increasingly willing to introduce more efficient governance to 
eliminate the adverse effect of uncertainty and economize the associated transaction 
costs as uncertainty increases. 
Alliancing, reliance on its governance and control mechanisms employed, has the 
advantages in dealing with high uncertainty environments surrounding transactions. To 
address high uncertainty, the project proposal, which typically includes project design, 
construction methods, target cost, commercial framework and project team, is 
developed in a concurrent style by alliance participants with owner’s continuously 
interaction (DTF Victoria 2010b). During the development of the project proposal, 
potential risks and opportunities are identified and assessed through joint intellectual 
effort. The mechanics of developing the proposal not only increase the ability of 
contracting parties to plan effectively for future conditions, but also reduce information 
asymmetry and potential opportunism in a high-uncertainty environment. This in turn 
economizes the associated transaction costs (Dyer 1997). More importantly, the 
concurrent proposal development approach ensures that project solution, target cost 
and commercial framework are interconnected, and can better reflect each other. Thus, 
potential disagreements and subsequent bargaining will be reduced greatly. In addition, 
contracting parties have been working on proposal development in an interactive and 
collaborative manner over a given period before reaching agreement. This will 
improve their cognitions regarding ‘what they will do’, ‘how to do’ and ‘what they 
want’ as well as strengthening their confidences in the transactions, and therefore 
streamlining the forthcoming contract negotiation. In the post-contract stage, the 
unified governance structure of alliancing is superior in adapting the changing 
circumstances and may limits the extent of costly ex-post bargaining (Williamson 
1985; Williamson 1993). In addition, project targets including cost and non-cost 
targets, and corresponding performance measurement methods are jointly established, 
mutual agreed, and explicitly specified in contracts. This will improve the efficiency in 
performance evaluation.  
The above arguments suggest that alliancing can deal with high uncertainty and 
eliminate the adverse impact of uncertainty effectively. The alliancing process can be 
viewed as a collaborative effort on the part of contracting parties to minimize 
uncertainty of projects and to reduce the unfavourable consequences caused by high 
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uncertainty. Accordingly, transaction costs, in connection with the adverse impact of 
uncertainty, will be reduced significantly. Therefore, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis:  
H5: Project alliancing is more efficient in reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of higher uncertainty. 
4.5.3 The Efficiency of Project Alliancing under Conditions of High Frequency 
For transaction cost economizing purpose, contracting parties more tend to craft 
bilateral or unified governance, just as employed in alliancing, to organize high 
frequent transactions (Williamson 1985). First, alliancing significantly reduces the 
probability of the potential problems such as variations, claims, disputes, conflicts and 
litigation etc. Transaction frequency is thus lowered through the reduction of these 
non-value-adding activities. Moreover, these problems are major source of transaction 
costs since they can lead to costly ex-post bargaining, renegotiation and enforcing 
agreements. Accordingly, the associated transaction costs are economized by 
eliminating these problems. Furthermore, as the relationship develops over time in 
high-frequency transactions, contracting parties not only commit themselves further to 
the transaction, but also become more familiar with repeated transactions. 
Consequently, potential opportunistic behaviours are attenuated with the increased 
commitments of contracting parties. Furthermore, as Dyer (1997) argues, repeated 
transactions can promote cooperation between contracting parties and reduce 
bargaining costs. Thus, the transaction costs are economized. In addition, the higher 
the value of transaction, the lower the transaction costs per unit of transaction (Dyer 
1997). On the basis of the above, this research proposes the following hypothesis: 
H6: Project alliancing is more efficient in reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of higher frequency. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the proposed relations between transaction attributes and the 
efficiency of alliancing. It is suggested that alliancing is more effective in reducing 
transaction costs under conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
than under conditions of low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. The 
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governance efficiency of alliancing becomes stronger as contracting parties’ 
investments in specific assets, uncertainty and frequency increase. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 A Representation of the Main Predictions of Efficiency of Alliancing 
4.6 Management Controls in Project Alliances 
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relationships (Williamson 1985; 1991a). Interorganizational management control 
theories view them either as formal controls or informal controls to manage control 
problems and reduce transaction risks (Das and Teng 1998b; Dekker 2004; Langfield-
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theories, this section discusses in detail the governance and control mechanisms of 
alliances, and their roles in mitigating transaction risks and managing control problems. 
According to DTF Victoria (2010a), the key mechanisms of project alliancing include: 
risk and opportunity sharing, joint management structure, transparency expressed as 
open-book documentation and reporting, commitment to ‘no disputes’, ‘best for 
project’ unanimous decision making processes, operation according to ‘good faith’ and 
integrity, and “No fault - no blame” culture. Furthermore, the strategies used in goal 
setting and planning in alliancing are quite different with those used in traditional 
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contracting methods. This is usually manifested as joint planning by a multi-
disciplinary team. Thus, joint planning is also considered one of the key mechanisms 
of alliances. Figure 4.4 illustrates unique features of governance and control 
mechanisms in alliances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Unique Features of Control Mechanisms in Project Alliances 
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4.6.1 Outcome Controls in Project Alliances 
Outcome controls focus on monitoring and measuring the outcomes that are achieved 
by the alliance and its participants. They usually consist of setting goals, planning and 
budgetary reporting and controls, incentive systems and rewarding, financial reporting 
and disclosure (Das and Teng 2001b; Dekker 2004; Langfield-Smith 2008).  
− Joint goal setting and planning 
Scholars usually regard goal setting and planning as the most important and relevant 
outcome control mechanisms to alliances (Das and Teng 1998b; 2001b; Geringer and 
Hebert 1989). In alliances, the outcome and performance cannot be assessed without 
objectives and relevant performance measures (Das and Teng 2001b). Clear goals not 
only contribute to setting the direction for performance and clarifying alliance 
participants’ expectations, but they also facilitate the establishment of specific rules 
and regulations (Das and Teng 1998b). Regarding planning, it is used for ensuring that 
the desirable outcomes and the goals are more likely to be achieved (Das and Teng 
2001b). Future contingencies and consequential duties and responsibilities in an 
alliance relationship should be made explicitly in the planning process (Macaulay 
1963). However, goal setting is often a challenging and critical task in alliances owing 
to the relatively high degrees of goal incongruence. Thus, the process of goal setting 
and planning is of paramount importance in alliances. It is also argued that this process 
is an important and useful social control mechanism in alliances (Das and Teng 1998b).  
In project alliances, the goals and plans are usually contained in the project proposal 
and typically include project solution, target cost, commercial framework and project 
teams (DTF Victoria 2010b). Goals include cost targets (i.e. TOC, or target-outturn 
cost), non-cost performance targets such as quality, safety, functionality and time, and 
the regime for measuring the performance against objective criteria. The plans 
comprise project design, construction methods, delivery strategy, adjustment 
mechanics and other policies, procedures and action plans. Thus, the goal setting and 
planning process is also called as the project proposal development. Under the project 
alliancing arrangements, project proposal development can be described as a 
collaborative process among alliance participants to reduce uncertainty and improve 
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alliance participants’ commitment to project goals. It is an ex-ante control mechanism 
(Dekker 2004), and is important for both formal and informal controls (Das and Teng 
1998b).  
− Risk and opportunity sharing 
Risk and opportunity sharing is an important principle for establishing an alliance (Das 
and Teng 1998a), and the core strength of project alliancing (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
Contrary to other contracting methods, risks and opportunities associated with the 
project are usually assumed collectively by contracting parties (i.e. alliance 
participants) under the project alliancing arrangement. Scholars usually regard shared 
equity ownership as the most effective control mechanism to minimise partners’ 
incentive for opportunism in equity alliances and joint ventures (Das and Teng 1996; 
Geringer and Hebert 1989; Sohn 1994). However, risk and opportunity sharing can 
provide the comparable advantages. In project alliancing, risk and opportunity sharing 
is underpinned by the collective sharing of risks and opportunities and the alignment 
of the achievement of project objectives with participants' commercial interests (DTF 
Victoria 2010a). The risk and opportunity sharing mechanism is argued to be a key 
attraction and precondition for organizations’ willingness to entering into alliances 
(Dekker 2004; DTF Victoria 2010a).   
One major problem that alliance participants face is that the intended goals of the 
alliance cannot be achieved.  Das and Teng (1998a) defines this problem as 
performance risk, and argues that uncertainty is the major source of performance risk. 
By assuming risks collectively, the adverse impact of uncertainties is lowered. First, 
risks can be identified, assessed and managed more efficiently through joint 
intellectual effort. Second, joint risk management entails information and strategy 
sharing. Decisions can be made based on more comprehensive and reliable information. 
Third, the alliance’s ability to reduce the hazards of bounded rationality is improved in 
uncertainty environment because sharing risk and opportunity provides incentives for 
all the alliance participants to be proactive in mitigating and managing risks. More 
importantly, alliance participants’ commercial interests are aligned with the 
achievement of both cost and non-cost objectives through a tailored incentive system, 
i.e. commercial framework (DTF Victoria 2010a). In the commercial framework, cost 
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and non-cost performance targets and relevant measurement methods are set out 
explicitly. Alliance participants either win or lose, depending on the actual 
performance that will be evaluated against the jointly-developed and pre-agreed 
objective criteria. Thus, the incentive system not only creates goal alignment but also 
incentivises alliance participants to perform adequately (Dekker 2004), which in turn 
minimises opportunism (Langfield-Smith 2008). Love et al. (2011)’s study also 
provides empirical evidence on the influence of risk and opportunity sharing on the 
behaviour of alliance participants. In their study, Love et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
(1) the incentive system can promote positive and constructive behaviours, and (2) 
alliance participants’ collaboration and engagement are ensured since the alliance 
provides benefits to each participant when successful. Risk and opportunity sharing 
also creates a mutual hostage situation among alliance participants since each party’s 
benefits rely not only on individual but also on each other’s performance. This 
situation is useful in controlling opportunism (Langfield-Smith 2008).  
− Open book arrangement 
To facilitate cost and accounting information exchange, alliance participants are 
committed to an ‘open-book’ arrangement and have much broader mutual access and 
audit rights (DTF Victoria 2010a). This ‘open-book’ arrangement adopted in project 
alliancing is also termed open-book accounting in the management accounting 
discipline. By its very nature, open-book accounting is an accounting practice in which 
a firm discloses cost information to a particular counterpart (Carr and Ng 1995). It is 
an IOCM practice that originated from the Japanese auto manufacturing industry 
(Cooper and Yoshikawa 1994). Currently, open-book accounting has become an 
important and indispensable mechanism to support the information exchange in 
interorganizational relationships. Under the open-book arrangement, information such 
as cost structures and strategies are transparent among alliance participants, and are 
able to be fully read and understood. This significantly reduces the information 
asymmetry in project alliances, and thereby enhances trust among participants and 
curbs alliance participants’ potential opportunistic behaviours in respect of shirking, 
cheating, distorting information, appropriating resources and self-interest seeking. 
Moreover, the open-book arrangement enables that information can be more easily 
accessed and accurately assessed. As a result, alliance participants’ ability to make 
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decisions is improved in high-uncertainty environments because decisions can be made 
based on more accurate information. At the same time, actions and decisions are more 
rational when alliance participants possess more accurate and complete information. 
This in turn reduces the potential conflicts. 
4.6.2 Behaviour Controls in Project Alliances 
As the name implies, behaviour controls are used for specifying and monitoring 
alliance participants’ behaviour. Project alliance management structure and dispute 
resolution procedures are typical behaviour control mechanisms (Das and Teng 2001b; 
Dekker 2004).  
− Joint management structure 
According to DTF Victoria (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a), project alliancing adopts a 
joint management structure which has parallels to a corporate structure in function and 
format, and is established by alliance participants according to the alliancing 
agreement. Generally, an alliance board or alliance leadership team governs the 
alliance. The alliance board “is responsible for providing leadership governance, 
ensuring performance and securing value for money for the alliance” (DTF Victoria 
2010c, p. 11). Day-to-day management is the responsibility of an alliance management 
team, which is headed by an alliance manager. Both the alliance board and alliance 
management team consist of representatives from each alliance participant. It is argued 
that such a joint management structure provides superior monitoring and control over 
alliance participants’ behaviours, and offers coordinating advantages (Dekker 2004; 
Langfield-Smith 2008).  
First, all the alliance participants work as an integrated team to make all project 
decisions collectively and manage all responsibilities jointly in this joint management 
structure. Such an integrated hierarchy is particularly effective in controlling alliance 
participants’ opportunistic behaviours because it provides monitoring and realizing 
control by fiat (Gulati and Singh 1998; Williamson 1991a). As Dekker (2004, p. 43) 
demonstrated, the alliance board “oversees the functioning and performance of the 
alliance and serves to reduce information asymmetry between the partners, by regular 
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information sharing, pre-action reviews, joint decision making and problem solving”. 
More importantly, the joint management structure offers significant advantages in 
controlling the alliance activities and resources involved (Dekker 2004), which ensures 
that alliance participants’ relationship investments will not be appropriated by other 
participants.  Second, the alliance operates as a ‘virtual firm’ performing all of the 
functions required to deliver a project (DTF Victoria 2006). This implies that project 
alliancing not only binds all alliance participants and combines their resources into a 
joint team, but also places all participants’ activities and resources as objects for 
management and control. In addition, the risk and opportunity sharing creates high 
interdependencies among alliance participants (Langfield-Smith 2008), and in turn 
entails timely coordination. One advantage of the joint management mechanism is that 
it can facilitate a coordinated response because: (1) the joint management structure 
eliminates the overlapping of duties and duplication of roles, and thus creates seamless 
between functional teams. Consequently, information can be more easily accessed and 
accurately assessed; (2) adaption and adjustment are less costly in hierarchies 
(Williamson 1991a); and (3) the joint management structure provides comparable 
advantages to hierarchies in coordination of alliance participants’ activities and 
resources.  
− Commitment to “no disputes” 
Dispute resolution is a typical ex-ante behaviour control mechanism (Dekker 2004; 
Gulati and Singh 1998), because it specifies behavioural principles when disputes and 
other problems arise in a transaction relationship. According to DTF Victoria (2010a), 
project alliancing generally excludes a formal dispute resolution procedure from 
contracts, but rather adopts “a ‘no dispute’ mechanism where the participants agree 
not to litigate, expect in limited circumstances”. The ‘no dispute’ mechanism does not 
mean there are no disputes, conflicts or disagreements among alliance participants. It 
refers to disputes should be resolved by alliance participants jointly within the alliance 
rather than resorting to arbitration or litigation. Thus, the dispute resolution mechanism 
used in project alliancing is internal and employs joint dispute resolution. This implies 
that alliance participants waive their common law right to sue each other regarding the 
disputes (Langfield-Smith 2008). One advantage of internal and joint dispute 
resolution over the formal dispute mechanism is that resolving disputes by the alliance 
 Page | 87 
itself (rather than arbitration or litigation) facilitates timely problem solving. By 
resolving disputes internally and jointly, alliance participants’ efforts are directed 
towards finding solutions to problems rather than seeking to blame others and denying 
responsibility (DTF Victoria 2010a). Alliance participants take joint responsibility for 
the problems. As such, ex-post bargaining and renegotiation are reduced, whilst 
problems can be resolved more efficiently and constructively. Furthermore, joint and 
internal dispute resolution is less costly than arbitration and litigation. Research and 
statistics show that arbitration and litigation usually incurs significant costs and 
consumes vast resources to settle contract disputes. For example, in the UK, the cost of 
settling disputes was £300 million in 1992 which accounted for 7% of the total 
construction output for the year (Baker 1993). In Australia, the construction industry 
incurs $5 billion to $7 billion of dispute costs annually, among which $560 million to 
$840 million were taken out of the industry largely by legal experts (The Civil 
Contractors Federation 2009). The costs and efforts associated with settling disputes 
and administering contractual activities could be saved significantly through joint and 
internal dispute resolution. In addition, joint dispute resolution is said to be critical in 
alliances (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). The entrenched adversarial or ‘claim based’ 
culture of the industry often leads to differences in perceptions between contracting 
parties, and more seriously, less caring for each other. (The Civil Contractors 
Federation 2009) reported that “they don’t listen to each other and they’re not prepared 
to solve each other’s problems”. However, joint dispute resolution provides alliance 
participants with the chances not only to understand each other better—including 
appreciating differences in perspectives, ideas and approaches—but also to 
demonstrate their mutual forbearance and having regard for each other (Das and Teng 
2001b). Trust is thus enhanced. As a result, alliance participants’ potential 
opportunistic behaviour is discouraged. 
4.6.3 Social Controls in Project Alliances 
 
Das and Teng (2001b) argue that social controls are very useful in reducing goal and 
preference incongruence and increasing alliance participants’ commitment by 
influencing people’s behaviour. In project alliances, typical social control mechanisms 
include alliance culture and decision-making processes. 
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−  “Best for Project” and unanimous decision making process 
In project alliance, each alliance participant has an equal say in decision-making. All 
the decisions are made jointly by alliance participants based on the ‘best for project’ 
principle (DTF Victoria 2010a). The decision making process is one of the major 
mechanisms that can be used in alliances (Das and Teng 2001b; Dekker 2004). First, 
by making decisions jointly, alliance participants can create a shared vision and values 
(Grandori 1997). The participatory nature of the decision-making process is also very 
important in improving the goal and preference congruence and increasing alliance 
participants’ commitments because the preference of each participant is more likely to 
be understood and incorporated into the final decisions (Das and Teng 2001b). The 
potential conflicts among alliance participants are thus reduced. In addition, the joint 
decision-making process can promote alliance participants’ cooperative behaviours 
which in turn facilitates more cooperative working relationships (Das and Teng 2001b). 
Secondly, alliance participants actively take part in the decision making and contribute 
their respective kinds of expertise (Das and Teng 2001b). The joint decision-making 
process is therefore likely to result in more informed decisions. Third, the “best for 
project” principle directs alliance participants’ decisions towards the shared vision and 
objectives of the alliance, rather than their own self-interests (DTF Victoria 2010a). An 
alliance participant’s potential opportunistic behaviours are more likely to be 
suppressed since “best for self” decisions are less likely to be accepted by other 
participants.  
−  “No fault - no blame” culture 
As opposed to the adversarial or ‘claim based’ culture of the traditional contract, 
project alliancing is underpinned by the “No fault - no blame” culture. “No fault - no 
blame” states: “Where there is an error, mistake or poor performance under the 
alliance contract, the participants will not attempt to assign blame but will rather 
accept joint responsibility and its consequences and agree a remedy or solution which 
is ‘best for project’. If the participants disagree, they must work together to resolve 
issues in a ‘best for project’ manner.” (DTF Victoria 2010a, p. 16). Essentially, “no 
fault - no blame” is a “soft” measure which parallels the “no dispute” mechanism to 
solve problems and reduce conflicts among alliance participants. By establishing the 
 Page | 89 
“No fault - no blame” culture, alliance participants’ efforts are directed towards the 
joint problem solving instead of assigning blames when issues emerge. This will 
reduce the potential disputes and conflicts, and in turn economize the efforts and costs 
associated with dealing with disputes and conflicts.  
− Operate according to “good faith” and integrity  
The central element of project alliancing culture is “good faith” and integrity. As DTF 
Victoria (2010a, p. 17) suggested, “the requirement to act in ‘good faith’ and with 
integrity underpins each of the key features of alliancing.”  Typically, acting in good 
faith and with integrity relates to three shared values and norms. They are (1) 
cooperation, (2) open, straight and honest communication, and (3) acting fairly and 
reasonably instead of reaping self-interests at the expense of other participants. In a 
general sense, the alliancing agreement explicitly sets out alliance participants’ 
obligation to commit to “good faith” and integrity (DTF Victoria 2010d). These three 
shared cultural values and norms have been often the focuses in both TCE and 
interorganizational management control research, especially their efficiencies in 
reducing transaction costs and managing transaction risks (e.g. Artz and Brush 2000; 
Dyer 1997). The shared values and norms play an important and constructive role in 
encouraging cooperative behaviours and discouraging opportunistic behaviours 
(Goldberg and Erickson 1987; Noordewier et al. 1990).  
Cooperation in delivering the project and achieving the pre-agreed objectives is a 
general requirement in project alliancing (DTF Victoria 2010a). More specifically, the 
cooperative culture requires alliance participants to have a clear understanding of the 
objectives of the project and to work together and collaborate in respect of all aspects 
of the performance of the project. By establishing this culture, alliance participants’ 
efforts are directed towards the achievement of the pre-agreed objectives and the 
owner’s project goals. DTF Victoria (2010d, p. 20) suggested that “given that the 
participants will collaborate in all aspects of the performance of the works, all of the 
participants will have complete buy in with respect to the project and any objectives 
will be achieved by the participants as a whole (rather than any one participant) and 
will be recognised by the participants as a ‘team effort’”. Alliance participants’ 
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cooperation and collaboration not only contributes to reducing potential opportunism, 
but also improves the alliance’s ability to mitigate and manage performance risks. 
Communication is defined as the people in the organisations that translate the 
meanings, and disseminate, comprehend, receive and utilise the information 
(Checkland and Holwell 1998; Cheng et al. 2001; Gayeski 1993). Under the project 
alliancing arrangements, the communication culture promotes openness, straightness 
and honesty which means that alliance participants are transparent in dealing with each 
other, share all information and do not hold back ideas (DTF Victoria 2010d). Honest, 
straight and open communication can improve the flow of information, and share 
knowledge, learning and experience. Obviously, it is likely to result in sounder 
decisions. Furthermore, opportunistic behaviours are discouraged since there is no 
room for hidden agendas.  
Acting fairly and reasonably instead of reaping self-interests at the expense of other 
participants can be used for holding back alliance participants’ self-interest behaviours. 
In the alliance, participants must not act in best for self-interest and without 
consultation with the other participants (DTF Victoria 2010d). Their ability to make 
unilateral decisions is constrained (DTF Victoria 2006).  
The unique control mechanisms discussed in this section are summarised in Table 4.2. 
In summary, people in transactions are subject to bounded rationality and given to 
opportunism (Williamson 1985). It has been argued that outcome, behaviour, and 
social control mechanisms are designed to direct alliance participants’ behaviours 
towards the achievement of objectives of the alliance. In other words, the mechanisms 
in alliances are useful in mitigating and managing transaction risks by influencing 
participants’ behaviours.  
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Table 4.2 Unique Control Mechanisms Used in Project Alliances 
Outcome controls 
 Joint planning and goal setting 
 Sharing risks and opportunities collectively and equitably 
 
Alignment of the achievement of project objectives with participants' commercial 
interests 
 Open-book arrangement 
Behaviour controls 
 One integrated team approach 
 Joint alliance management structure 
 Resolving conflicts and disputes internally 
 Commitment to no litigation or arbitration 
Social controls 
 Making decisions and acting in a ‘best for project’ manner 
 Collective and unanimous decision making mechanisms 
 Open, straight and honest communication among all participants 
 Cooperation and collaboration in delivering the project 
 Acting fairly and reasonably instead of reaping self-interests at the expense of others 
 ‘No fault-no blame’ principle in relation to errors, mistakes or poor performance 
4.7 Cost Management in Project Alliances 
Cooper and Yoshikawa (1994) argue that firms intentionally blur their organizational 
boundaries to create relationships that share organizational resources (including 
information), especially when resources critical to one firm are possessed by another 
firm. The interorganizational relationship between firms leads to the development of 
IOCM across the organizational boundaries (Cooper and Slagmulder 2004). In the 
construction industry, project alliancing is such a representative arrangement under 
which contracting parties are opting to blur their organizational boundaries, developing 
cooperative relationships, and deepening interdependence between partners. It is 
expected that IOCM could be encountered in the context of project alliancing. This 
section firstly defines cost management in project alliances, and then identifies three 
processes where IOCM might be relevant, as well as the potential cost management 
practices that support each process.  
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4.7.1 Cost Management in Interorganizational Settings 
IOCM is often described as a number of techniques, tools and practices by which the 
involved organizations direct their collaborative efforts towards the improvement of 
the interorganizational coordination and the entire efficiency of the value chain 
(Agndal and Nilsson 2009; Cooper and Slagmulder 2004; Cooper and Yoshikawa 
1994). Essentially, cost management is a fundamental element of interorganizational 
relationship management control (Dekker 2004). It has a strong effect on the 
interorganizational relationships in supporting the development of relationships 
(McIvor 2000; Munday 1992b). Section 3.4 identified a number of IOCM practices 
that are used in interorganizational contexts based on a review on management 
accounting literature. The most prominent features of IOCM practices are that (1) there 
must be a degree of interdependence between firms in the relationship where IOCM 
takes place (Berry et al. 2005), (2) individual goals of each involved firm are 
coexistence with common goals of the interorganizational relationship, and (3) IOCM 
focus on the overall efficiency of the interorganizational relationship and the reduction 
of the shared costs.  
As discussed in Section 3.4, literature offers little empirical evidence on the 
application of IOCM practices in the construction sector, and theory development is 
still at an early stage. As a starting point, cost management in project alliances is 
defined as the owner and NOPs’ coordinated efforts to reduce costs. It is adopted to 
control alliance operations and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of alliances. 
From this point, cost management in project alliances places all alliance participants’ 
activities and resources as objects for management and control and extends to cover 
the overall alliancing relationship and deal with the blurring organizational boundaries 
in the alliance. Traditional cost management practices, however, limit their scope to 
the boundaries of the organization (Axelsson et al. 2002; Kulmala et al. 2002). Thus, 
this research focuses exclusively on the IOCM practices that cover alliance 
relationships and all alliance participants’ joint activities, and ignores those that are 
used for dealing with individual alliance participants’ internal activities. 
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4.7.2 The Alliances Processes where Interorganizational Cost Management might 
be Relevant 
Despite the fact that IOCM has been well applied in a broad range of industries and 
received increased research attention (Håkansson et al. 2006), only a few efforts have 
been made to study its application in the construction industry. Typical examples 
include the action research conducted by Nicolini et al. (2000) in the UK, and Jacomit 
and Granja (2011)’s investigation into the adaption of target costing in Brazil. In 
addition, these studies focus on the determination of the target cost of construction 
projects in the design stage, and are less concerned with the IOCM practices during the 
construction process. Consequently, the construction management literature as such 
does not offer any comprehensive models of processes involved in construction 
project-based transactions where IOCM might be relevant. Nevertheless, management 
accounting literature argues that IOCM practices entail efforts to reduce costs both 
before and during the production stage in manufacturing environments (Seuring 2002; 
Slagmulder 2002). In addition, as discussed in Section 4.3, a typical alliance process 
consists of the set-up and operation of alliance (see Figure 4.1). Setting up alliances 
usually occurs prior to the construction of projects and involves joint development of 
the project proposal, whereas the operation of alliances exists mainly to deliver project 
targets that were pre-agreed during project proposal development. Thus, two broad 
processes are clearly distinguished. Additionally, more or fewer changes to project 
scope, specifications, and corresponding price revision may occur during the project 
delivery. Further efforts are required to deal with project variation and price revision in 
a more efficient way. IOCM may play an important role in this process. When the 
above are taken together, three different processes where IOCM practices might be 
relevant in alliances can be identified.  
− Joint project proposal development 
Normally, the objective of project proposal development in alliances is to work out 
project solutions including project design and construction methods, the estimate and 
determination of target cost and other performance targets of the alliance such as time, 
quality and safety, and finalisation of commercial arrangements (DTF Victoria 2010b). 
In addition, the selection of NOPs is an integral part of project proposal development 
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as potential NOPs are evaluated and selected during project proposal development 
(DTF Victoria 2010a). Actually, project proposal development in project alliances is 
not a simple activity, but rather a joint effort of the owner and NOPs to find project 
solutions and set cost and non-cost goals of alliances, especially when extremely 
complex projects are involved that require collaboration, cooperation and interaction 
between the owner and NOPs. Thus, IOCM practices are highly relevant when looking 
at the project proposal development as an activity in which both the owner and NOPs 
play important roles.  
The project proposal is usually developed by NOPs with the owner’s interaction and 
collaboration (DTF Victoria 2010b). The continuous interaction and collaboration 
enables the functional specifications, owner’s requirements, objectives, experience and 
knowledge of the project are simultaneously incorporated in the final proposal. In the 
project proposal, project solution is the primary driver for target cost, and target cost is 
the quantitative representation of the other elements of the project proposal (DTF 
Victoria 2010b). Thus, project design lies at the centre of proposal development in 
project alliances. As is frequently stressed in both construction management and 
management accounting literature, design is crucial to cost savings because a large 
proportion of costs is committed in the design stage (e.g. Ansari et al. 2006a; DTF 
Victoria 2010b; Kato et al. 1995; Nicolini et al. 2000). In most cases, the project 
design process consists of such activities as concept design, design alternative options, 
assessment and comparison of options, and selection of the preferred option. 
Concurrently, risk analysis and assessment is undertaken, construction methods and 
associated procurement strategies are developed, and related costs are estimated along 
with each design activity in the design process. This makes the project proposal 
development an iterative and interactive process rather than a linear activity (DTF 
Victoria 2010b). Since “it requires high degrees of experience, judgement and 
innovation that will not come from any one individual but from the combined input of 
all proponent members and the owner participants” (DTF Victoria 2010b, p. 26), the 
project proposal development in project alliances entails a multi-disciplinary team and 
the involvement of all major players in the value chain such as owners, designers, 
estimators, constructors, service operators and suppliers. More importantly, the owner 
is interested in achieving VfM throughout the project life cycle, and VfM is usually 
assessed on a “whole‐of‐life” or “total cost-of-ownership” basis (DTF Victoria 2010a). 
In addition, the proposed target cost is often benchmarked by the relevant reference 
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cost or price to obtain the best-in-market price (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010b).  The 
approach for project proposal development in project alliances is very similar to that of 
product design and process development in manufacturing sectors that involve 
collaboration and cooperation between buyers and suppliers (Agndal and Nilsson 2009; 
Cooper and Slagmulder 2004; Mouritsen et al. 2001). In management accounting 
literature, a similar approach used in manufacturing environments that is customer-
focused, design-centred, cross-functional, life cycle-oriented, value chain-involved and 
price-led, is usually referred to as target costing (Ansari et al. 1997). Besides target 
costing, the design of alternative options in proposal development can be likened to the 
value management or value engineering process where alternative options and 
innovative solutions are identified, compared, assessed and selected based on the best 
balance between cost and functionality (Langfield-Smith 2008; Nicolini et al. 2000). 
Value engineering can be either a critical technique for target costing (Ansari et al. 
2006a), or a separate tool from target costing (Cooper and Slagmulder 1999). 
Concurrent engineering is another possible methodology that is applied in developing 
project proposal in project alliances. Various proposal development tasks and activities 
(such as project design, construction methods and procurement strategies development, 
risk assessment, and cost estimate) overlap and are undertaken simultaneously. Usually, 
the abovementioned IOCM practices are underpinned by information sharing on 
costing elements and strategies, the purpose of which is to facilitate the mutual access 
of information, improve the transparency between parties, and—most importantly—to 
help develop the best possible solutions (Cooper and Slagmulder 1999; Seal et al. 
1999). 
−  Joint delivery of the project  
Although it is a consensus that project costs are largely determined at the design stage, 
there is still room for cost savings or functional improvement (Nicolini et al. 2000), 
and the achievement of the target cost in the delivery stage is as important as the 
determination of target cost. Further, Ansari et al. (1997, p. 86) argue that “an 
optimized supply chain is one of the most critical elements in attaining the target cost.” 
IOCM practices play an important role in optimizing supply chain and achieving target 
cost. For example, research suggests that IOCM practices enable the involved firms to 
coordinate, cooperate and integrate effectively in order to find low-cost solutions and 
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realize the target cost, consequently making the entire supply chain more efficient 
(Cooper and Yoshikawa 1994). Research also suggests the success of IOCM practices 
heavily relies on cooperation and integration of the involved firms (Cooper and 
Slagmulder 2004). This implies that IOCM practices often arise from and are 
introduced in commercial environments where collaborative and cooperative 
relationships exist and a certain level of integration between firms is involved. In 
delivering projects, project alliances resort to joint management and collective 
assumption of risks, aiming to align the achievement of the owner’s project objectives 
with the commercial objectives of the NOPs (DTF Victoria 2010a), and encourage 
alliance participants to work together in a cooperative and integrated manner. In such a 
situation, IOCM practices could be intensively introduced.  
Since the project solution has been worked out, and project targets (including target 
cost and also non-cost targets) have been determined through joint project proposal 
development, the task that alliances face is how to realize the pre-determined targets 
during project delivery. Thus, the delivery of alliance projects can be viewed as a 
process to attain various project targets. For the owner, achieving project objectives at 
the target cost is a major concern. For NOPs, their commercial benefits from alliances 
can be realized only when the owner’s project objectives and pre-determined targets 
are achieved. In project alliances, the achievement of the owner’s project objectives is 
usually aligned with the commercial objectives of the NOPs by a sophisticated 
commercial framework (DTF Victoria 2010a). The key features of commercial 
framework of project alliances include such arrangements as performance-based 
remuneration which means that remuneration to NOPs is based on comparing actual 
and target performance in both cost and non-cost areas, and risk and opportunity 
sharing which implies that any risks and benefits raised from the alliance are 
collectively shared by all participants of the alliance. Thus, the commercial 
framework— especially the performance-based remuneration and risk/reward 
regime—encourages and drives alliance participants to find solutions to reduce costs 
whilst realizing the performance levels, because every participant can benefit from the 
cost saving and the achievement of pre-agreed targets. From this point, the commercial 
framework can be viewed as an important IOCM practice in project alliances. 
Furthermore, the project delivery process is usually supported by the joint management 
approach in which all alliance participants work as an integrated team to deliver the 
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project. Also, such an approach enables cost information and knowledge to be 
mutually accessed in project alliances, and thus entails open-book accounting.  
− Project change and price revision 
Unlike other traditional project delivery methods, events such as design evolution 
changes, mistakes by the owners, late delivery of owner-supplies materials, changes to 
the quantities of work and reduction in the quality of materials do not constitute project 
variations in alliances because these changes have been covered by the commercial 
framework of the project alliance (DTF Victoria 2010a; Ross 1999). However, project 
variations may have to be made due to fundamental changes in project scope or 
specifications since the delivery of alliancing projects might continue for years, and 
emerging risks may materialise. As a result, the target cost needs to be adjusted 
correspondingly. In project alliances, such variations which may lead to the target cost 
being adjusted are usually known as adjustment events (DTF Victoria 2010a). Project 
variation may also result in changes to project completion date or other non-cost 
targets. Since all the participants collectively assume the consequences of project 
variations, it is expected that alliance participants will focus on jointly finding 
solutions and solving any related problems as project variations occur, in order to 
reduce the adverse impact caused by project variations. Management accounting 
literature suggests that IOCM practices such as target costing and value engineering 
are useful when the product redesign occurs and price needs to be revised in the 
manufacturing environment (Agndal and Nilsson 2009). In addition, product redesign 
and price revision in the manufacturing environment is argued to be a part of 
continuous improvement (Ansari et al. 1997; Kato et al. 1995; Slagmulder 2002).  
It has been argued that cost management in project alliances entails the owner and 
NOPs’ coordinated efforts to reduce costs, and aims to support the integration of 
project activities and direct contracting parties’ efforts to manage shared costs 
collaboratively. Based on this, the alliancing relationship and alliance participants’ 
joint activities instead of individual participants’ internal activities become the focus of 
analysis. In order to explore IOCM practices in alliance relationships, three processes 
in an alliance (as discussed above) were identified where IOCM practices might be 
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relevant. Moreover, the IOCM practices that were potentially used in each process 
were discussed.   
4.8 Summary 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework for this research. The arguments were 
mainly based on TCE and interorganizational management control theories.  
Firstly, in this chapter, it is argued that project alliancing contains both bilateral and 
unified governance characteristics, and is an intermediate governance mode between 
the two since alliances are self-governed/managed by alliance members through joint 
management mechanisms rather than resorting to a third party.  
Secondly, in defining transaction costs in project alliances, various alliance activities 
were categorized into three dimensions, i.e., efforts required to set up the alliance, 
managing the project, and dealing with problems in the alliance relationship. The costs 
and efforts associated each dimension are defined as set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs respectively. The three cost elements together compose the 
transaction costs in project alliances.  
Thirdly, it is hypothesized that the transaction attributes of project alliances will incur 
high set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. The three transaction costs 
are higher under conditions of high asset specificity, high uncertainty and high 
frequency in project alliances. It should be mentioned that this is a major difference 
with previous TCE studies which usually treat transaction cost as a single construct, 
and do not test differential effects of transaction attributions on different transaction 
cost elements.  
Fourthly, since transactions organized by project alliancing usually involve substantial 
investments in assets, capabilities and complex uncertainties (DTF Victoria 2010a), 
does project alliancing serve as an effective approach to facilitating transactions 
characterized by such attributes and economizing transaction costs? It is suggested that 
alliancing is more effective in reducing transaction costs under conditions of high asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency than under conditions of low asset specificity, 
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uncertainty and frequency. This means that the efficiency of alliancing becomes 
stronger as contracting parties’ investments in specific assets, uncertainty and 
frequency increase.  
Fifthly, the control mechanisms used in alliances were categorised into three groups, 
which are outcome controls, behaviour controls and social controls. These mechanisms 
play important roles in mitigating and managing transaction risks.  
Finally, the more detailed control devices – cost management in project alliances were 
defined and discussed. The discussion also identifies three alliance processes where 
IOCM practices might be relevant, and the potential IOCM practices that support each 
process.  
The whole theoretical framework for this research is illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.6 Theoretical Framework for the Research 
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Project 
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Objective: Test the impact of 
transaction attributes on transaction 
costs. 
Question: Whether the transaction 
attributes of alliances significantly 
influence the transaction costs and 
how? 
Hypotheses: H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, 
H2b, H2c, H3a, H3b and H3c predict 
that set-up, monitoring and 
enforcement costs will increase as the 
increased asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency in alliances. 
Objective: Examine the 
reducing effect of project 
alliancing on transaction costs. 
Question: Whether alliancing is 
served as an effective approach 
to facilitate transactions and 
economize transaction costs? 
Hypotheses: H4, H5 and H6 
predict that alliancing is more 
effective in reducing transaction 
costs under conditions of higher 
asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency. 
Objective: Identify the mechanisms that 
contribute to reducing transaction costs. The 
mechanisms of alliancing are viewed as the 
potential factors to economize transaction 
costs.  
Question: what factors have the potential to 
influence transaction costs in alliancing? 
14 unique control mechanisms are 
categorised into outcome, behaviour and 
social controls, and argues that they are 
efficient in reducing transaction costs. 
 
 
Objective: Explore IOCM tools, 
techniques or practices that support 
the interorganizational relationship 
in project alliances. 
Question: What cost management 
practices are applied in alliances? 
3 processes where IOCM might be 
relevant in alliances are identified. 
The practices that potential used in 
each process were discussed. 
 
Cost management in project 
alliancing is defined as contracting 
parties’ coordinated efforts to reduce 
costs. It is adopted to control alliance 
operations and improve 
interorganizational efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The research methods of this study are described in this chapter. More specifically, the 
aims of this chapter are (1) to define the methods by which the research questions are 
identified and answered, (2) to discuss the underlying science behind the methods, and 
(3) to present the processes by which the research objectives are achieved.  
Methodology lies at the centre of research. Fellows and Liu (2008, p. 47) define 
research methodology as “the principles of the methods by which research can be 
carried out”. More specifically, it is a procedure that comprises a series of actions and 
methods by which the research problems is identified, interpreted, conceptualized, 
operationalized, examined and resolved. According to Fellows and Liu (2008), 
research methodology mainly addresses four issues: (1) the definition of the problem; 
(2) the statement of the problem and its interpretation; (3) the formulation of 
hypotheses; and (4) the empirical testing of the hypotheses. Moreover, the adopted 
research methodology should guide the research process in extending knowledge and 
seeking solutions towards the research problems (Fellows and Liu 2008). The 
methodology adopted in this research generally follows the above principles.  
Regarding the research types in the study, Research Questions 1 and 2, which engage 
in hypotheses testing, aim to explain the nature of relationships proposed by the 
underlying theories, and establish the differences among groups. Research Questions 3 
focuses on testing the explanatory power of the theoretical framework developed in 
Section 4.6, and attempts to ascertain and describe the characteristics of variables. This 
part of research is descriptive in nature. Research Question 4 is designed as 
exploratory as its aim is to explore poorly understood phenomenon and to answer 
‘what’ questions by using observation. Both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are adopted to provide the empirical evidence in the study. The research 
process is composed of the following five major activities. They are:  
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− Research task establishment; 
− Theoretical framework development; 
− Data collection;  
− Data analysis; and 
− Results report. 
Each activity is sequentially developed with a view to helping inform its subsequent 
activity. This chapter starts with a brief review on the processes of and approaches 
used for establishing the research tasks and developing the theoretical framework, 
which has been done in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. Section 5.4 defines the data requirements 
of the research, specifies the data collection methods used in this research, and 
explains the underlying reasons for the selected methods. The operationalization and 
measurement of independent and dependent variables are presented in Section 5.5. 
Section 5.6 presents the development and administration of the questionnaire survey. 
Data analysis and results report issues are reported briefly in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 
summarizes the chapter.  
5.2 Research Task Establishment 
Establishing research tasks is one of the major concerns in the initial phase of research. 
Its purpose is to decide or confirm what the research aims or objectives are, and what 
research questions will be answered in the subsequent phases of research. The major 
method used for establishing research task is the literature review, which involves 
searching sources’ theory and extant studies to determine what has been researched 
already and what issues remain or have emerged for investigation, and discovering the 
appropriate bases for the subsequent work (Fellows and Liu 2008). More importantly, 
the literature review is continuous (Kumar 1996), dynamic and open-ended (Fellows 
and Liu 2008). This means that literature review should be conducted throughout the 
whole research process.  
For establishing the research tasks, several topics of literature such as project 
alliancing, project management, TCE, management control and IOCM have been 
reviewed during the initial stage of the research. The types of the reviewed literature in 
this research include journal articles, conference papers, published books, theses, 
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government documents, Internet web sites and other publicly available information. 
The literature covers several disciplines, i.e. construction management, strategic 
management, management accounting and new institutional economics. The literature 
review not only helped to identify the gaps in previous project alliancing research and 
proposed directions for the present study, but also discovered the appropriate reference 
theories (See Chapters 2 and 3). Based on the findings of the literature review, this 
research established its aim as studying the economics of project alliancing by drawing 
upon TCE and interorganizational management control theories. There are four 
primary research questions. They are:  
− Research Question 1: Do the transaction attributes of project alliances significantly 
influence the transaction costs, and if so, how? 
− Research Question 2: Does project alliancing serve as an effective approach to 
facilitate transactions and economize transaction costs? 
− Research Question 3: How do the control mechanisms of alliances influence 
transaction costs, or what factors contribute to reducing transaction costs in 
alliances?  
− Research Question 4: What IOCM practices are applied in project alliances? 
By answering the above questions, the research intends to achieve the following 
objectives including:   
− Objective 1: Examining the impacts of transaction attributes of alliances on 
transaction costs; 
− Objective 2: Testing the governance performance and efficiency of project 
alliancing in the construction industry; 
− Objective 3: Investigating the effects of control mechanisms of alliances on 
transaction costs; and  
− Objective 4: Exploring the IOCM tools, techniques and practices used in project 
alliances. 
5.3 Theoretical Framework Development 
Just like a structural steel or reinforced concrete frame provides structural support for a 
building, theory provides the research project with a comparable function (Fellows and 
Liu 2008).  Therefore, Fellows and Liu (2008, p. 67) suggest that “it is a good way, 
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whenever possible, to use theory to build a model of the proposed research – the 
variables and relationships, the points of issue and those of substantiation”. 
Developing a theoretical framework is the foundation on which this research is based. 
Project alliancing has often been the focus of research interest because it offers an 
attractive alternative to traditional contracting methods. However, extant studies have 
less concerned with the economics of project alliancing. In other words, prior studies 
have largely neglected contracting parties’ investments in assets and capabilities, the 
differential characteristics of alliancing projects, and the cost and competence of 
alliancing in dealing with contracting problems. Project alliancing research is likely to 
benefit from theories that provide a more cogent and comprehensive perspective to 
address the economics of project alliancing. By reviewing the literature of TCE and 
interorganizational management control theories, Chapter 3 examines the potential of 
these theories to inform the study of project alliancing. It is argued that both TCE and 
interorganizational management control theories can inform the project alliancing 
research by providing a rich theoretical platform with respect to developing a 
theoretical framework and empirical supports with regard to data collection and 
analysis methods.  
The theoretical framework was developed in Chapter 4. The variables in this research 
were determined and conceptualized. More importantly, hypotheses were formulated 
to specify the focus of the research and suggest the relationships between variables. 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrated the formulated hypotheses in this research. However, 
not all the questions in this research have hypotheses to be examined. For example, 
Objective 4 seeks to carry out a fundamental investigation to observe phenomena. This 
part of research is qualitative in nature. Furthermore, little research of this kind has 
been carried out. In such a situation, it is not only impossible to formulate meaningful 
hypotheses but also inappropriate to include hypotheses in the research (Fellows and 
Liu 2008). Thus, the theoretical framework for Objective 4 does not involve the 
formulation of hypotheses but rather provides information and direction for the data 
collection and subsequent data analysis. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6 illustrated the 
theoretical framework for this research. 
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5.4 Data Collection 
The present study involves not only testing hypotheses but also investigating 
phenomena. Table 5.1 summarises the data required for this research, the applied data 
collection methods and data analysis approaches. 
5.4.1 Data Required for the Research  
Fellows and Liu (2008) proposed a model of information system in construction 
research and suggested that it is desirable to decide what research outcomes must be 
achieved at first, then consider what analysis can be carried out, and finally determine 
what appropriate data is required. Obviously, this is an outcome-oriented approach to 
decide the data requirements. This approach is useful in the present study because the 
research aims, objectives, questions and hypotheses have been well developed and 
established in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. From this, the researcher can decide the data 
requirements.  
Research Objective 1 mainly deals with the relations between various dimensions of 
transaction attributes and different aspects of transaction costs in project alliances. This 
question can be addressed by testing Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a, 
H3b and H3c. These hypotheses predict transaction attributes and transaction costs as 
the important variables relating to Research Question 1, and how the variables relate to 
each other (see Section 4.4 and Figure 4.2). As these hypotheses suggest, transaction 
attributes can influence transaction costs significantly. Thus, the transaction attributes 
of project alliances—which include asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency—
constitute the independent variables relating to Research Question 1. Transaction costs 
in project alliances (i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs) 
constitute the dependent variables. Moreover, the investments of contracting parties 
(i.e. the owner and NOPs) are dedicated to the particular requirements of the alliancing 
project, and managed and coordinated by the alliance rather than by one particular 
party under the alliancing arrangements. This implies that the effects of both the owner 
and NOPs’ specific investments on transaction costs cannot be neglected in project 
alliances, and therefore need to be tested distinctively. 
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Hypotheses: H4, H5 and H6 are related to Research Objective 2, which is focused on 
the efficiency and governance performance of project alliancing (see Section 4.5 and 
Figure 4.3). The three hypotheses propose the relations between various dimensions of 
transaction attributes and the efficiency of project alliancing. The major prediction of 
these hypotheses is that the efficiency of project alliancing improves as contracting 
parties’ investments in specific assets, uncertainty and frequency increase. Moreover, 
TCE places special emphasis on transaction attributes in explaining the choice of 
governance arrangements of transactions. Therefore, transaction attributes of project 
alliances (i.e. asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) constitute the independent 
variables relating to Research Question 2. The reducing effect of project alliancing on 
transaction costs is the dependent variable. Similarly, the owners and NOPs’ 
relationship investments are managed and coordinated by the project alliance (not by 
one particular party) due to the joint management structure adopted in project 
alliancing. Both the owner and NOPs’ specific investments have the potential to 
influence the efficiency of project alliancing. Therefore, it is advisable to disaggregate 
asset specificity into the owners’ and NOPs’ dimensions, and examine their differential 
impacts on the efficiency of project alliancing. 
Research Objective 3 is concerned with the impact of control mechanisms of project 
alliances on transaction costs. By addressing this question, the factors that may 
economize transaction costs can be identified. A theoretical framework that proposes 
relationships between control mechanisms of project alliances and transaction costs 
was developed in Section 4.6. For testing the explanatory power of this framework, 
data should be collected on the variables and relations proposed in this framework 
(Dekker 2004). Thus, the data required for addressing Research Question 3 is the 
impact of each control mechanism of project alliances on various transaction cost 
elements (i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs). 
Research Objective 4 is focused on exploring the cost management tools, techniques 
and practices used in project alliances. As discussed in Section 3.4, literature offers 
little empirical evidence on the application of IOCM practices in the construction 
sector, and theory development is still at an early stage. This part of research is 
designated as exploratory since its nature is to investigate phenomena (Fellows and Liu 
2008). Section 4.7 suggests a set of IOCM practices used in interorganizational 
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relationships. These practices are mainly identified in project alliancing literature and 
management accounting literature. However, it remains unknown whether those cost 
management practices are suitable for the construction industry, or whether any 
improvement has been made to fit them to the industry. As a starting point, it is 
necessary to investigate their applicability in project alliances and identify other 
potential IOCM practices. Thus, the data required for addressing Research Question 4 
are the cost management tools, techniques and practices used in project alliances. 
5.4.2 Questionnaire Survey  
In the social sciences and management research areas, a very popular method for data 
collection is conducting surveys of people which involves asking and obtaining 
answers to questions such as questionnaires and interviews (Fellows and Liu 2008). In 
the present study, the data collection methods include a questionnaire survey and semi-
structured interviews. 
This study focused on the relationships between various dimensions of transaction 
attributes and different aspects of transaction costs in alliances. Alliancing 
relationships in the construction industry constitute the unit of analysis in this study. 
This study employs a questionnaire survey as the primary data collection approach 
based on the following consideration. Firstly, a questionnaire survey allows the 
responses to be captured from a large audience. A large sample questionnaire survey 
not only provides an opportunity for a rich assessment of constructs but also 
contributes to statistical testing of the relationships (Grover and Malhotra 2003), 
especially when the research knows exactly what is required and how to measure the 
variables (Sekaran 1992). Secondly, a large number of previous TCE studies employed 
questionnaire surveys as the primary data collection method to test the proposed 
relationships between variables (e.g. Artz and Brush 2000; Barthélemy and Quélin 
2006; Buvik 2002; Grover and Malhotra 2003; Jin 2010). Thirdly, the Australian 
construction industry provides a good source for data collection because Australia has 
developed world-class leadership in making project alliances in delivering 
infrastructure projects (AAA 2008b). Finally, the questionnaire survey is a low-cost 
data collection method compared with other data collection approaches.  
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The questions in this survey cover all four research questions of the present study, 
especially Research Questions 1, 2 and 3. The data collected will not only be used to 
statistically test the hypotheses of the research but also to provide information for the 
interview in the next research stage. However, the questionnaire approach has several 
disadvantages such as response bias, low response rate and respondents’ inability to 
provide reliable information about the focal research issues. These issues, together 
with the development and administration of questionnaire and sampling, will be 
considered and discussed in detail in this chapter. 
5.4.3 Interviews  
Objective 4 involves the investigation to observe phenomena. A questionnaire survey 
could not meet the data requirements of this research. Communications on a one-to-
one basis would be more useful in this regard since the researcher can immediately 
clarify any ambiguities in questions and answers. In addition, questionnaire surveys 
are highly labour-intensive on the part of respondents (Fellows and Liu 2008). A 
lengthy questionnaire may lead to a low response rate since responding to the survey 
means additional work for respondents. It is advisable to leave some questions to be 
investigated in detail in the latter stage of this research. Thus, semi-structured 
interviews are used as the other important date collection method in this research. 
Compared with questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interview techniques have the 
advantage of studying other peoples’ views and behaviours because they allow for in-
depth discussions of the focal research issues. Further, semi-structured interviews 
direct the work of both interviewer and interviewee towards the stated objectives of the 
research, and thus remedy one shortcoming associated with unstructured interviews – 
deviating from the subject matter. In this research, the aims of conducting semi-
structured interviews are, first to further investigate the use of IOCM practices in the 
alliancing process, and second, to validate the findings resulted from the questionnaire 
survey. Thus, the interviews were chosen as the second-stage data collection method 
after the data collected from the questionnaire survey has been analysed. The design 
and organization of interviews, and findings from interviews will be presented in 
Chapter 8.  
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Table 5.1 Data Required for the Research and Data Collection Methods 
 
Research Objective & Question Hypotheses Data Analysis Data Required Data Collection Method(s) 
Objective 1, Research Question 1:  
Examining the relationships between 
transaction attributes and transaction 
costs in project alliances. 
H1a, H1b, H1c, 
H2a, H2b, H2c, 
H3a, H3b, H3c 
Quantitative; 
Factor Analysis, and 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
• Independent variables: asset specificity 
(owner and NOPs’), uncertainty and 
frequency; 
• Dependent variables: transaction costs 
(i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs) 
Questionnaire survey 
Objective 2, Research Question 2:  
Testing the governance performance and 
efficiency of project alliancing. 
H4, H5, H6 
Quantitative; 
Factor Analysis, and 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
• Independent variables: asset specificity 
(owner and NOPs’), uncertainty and 
frequency; 
• Dependent variables: the reducing effect 
of project alliancing on transaction costs. 
Questionnaire survey 
Objective 3, Research Question 3:  
Investigating the impact of control 
mechanisms of project alliances on 
transaction costs, and identifying the 
factors that may economize transaction 
costs. 
Not applicable 
Quantitative; 
Descriptive statistics, 
and Paired-samples T 
test 
The impact of each mechanism of project 
alliance on various transaction cost elements 
(i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs) 
Questionnaire survey 
Objective 4, Research Question 4:  
Exploring the IOCM tools, techniques 
and practices used in project alliances. 
Not applicable 
Qualitative; 
Descriptive statistics 
IOCM tools, techniques and practices 
Questionnaire survey; 
Interviews 
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5.5 The Measurement of Variables 
In Chapter 4, the relationships between variables and the theoretical definitions of 
variables were proposed and established based on TCE theories in order to address 
Research Questions 1 and 2. Table 5.1 lists the independent and dependent variables in 
this research. However, theoretical constructs focus on conceptual definitions, and are 
the abstract definitions derived from theories (Fellows and Liu 2008). In order to test 
the hypotheses and the proposed theoretical framework, these variables need to be 
operationalized and measured precisely in this research because they normally exist on 
the basis of indirect evidence, and cannot be adequately described by a single measure. 
5.5.1 Measurement of Transaction Attributes 
Transaction attributes comprise three dimensions, which are asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency (Williamson 1985). They are central constructs in TCE. 
Williamson (1985; 1991a) provides theoretical definitions on transaction attributes. 
Moreover, much extant TCE-base research involves the quantitative measurement of 
transaction attributes (e.g. Artz and Brush 2000; Buvik 2002; De Vita et al. 2010; Dyer 
1997; Masten et al. 1991). However, none of the studies have empirically measured the 
transaction attributes in construction transactions. This research may be the first 
attempt in this regard. 
− Asset specificity in project alliances 
Depending on the nature of specific assets, asset specificity can take several forms 
including site asset specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, 
dedicated asset specificity, reputational asset specificity, and temporal asset specificity 
(Masten et al. 1991; Williamson 1985). However, this research excludes physical, site 
and temporal asset specificity dimensions as they are less important in determining 
contracting methods in project-based transactions. For example, physical assets in 
construction are less likely to be specific to a particular project and need to be 
adaptable for use in varying applications due to the unique nature and limited 
quantities of final products of construction projects (Eccles 1981; Masten et al. 1991). 
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Thus, there is no significant difference between project alliancing and other 
contracting methods in term of physical assets. Moreover, the site of every 
construction project is unique. Most of the works are undertaken on the construction 
site. The site where the construction transaction takes place is determined by the 
project itself, no matter which contracting method was used. As a result, site assets, 
which refer to the investments that were made on a specific site in order to reduce 
inventory, transportation and processing costs (Williamson 1991a), are less likely to be 
important in determining organizational forms of projects. Temporal asset specificity 
refers to transaction relationships in which timely responsiveness and coordination are 
critical for performance (Masten et al. 1991). However, time and coordination are vital 
for any large construction projects, including alliancing projects. Therefore, temporal 
asset specificity was also excluded from the analysis. Compared with other contracting 
methods, project alliancing generally requires contracting parties to commit additional 
high-quality resources such as substantial internal resource, senior management and 
technical personnel, training and learning, specialized equipment, customized 
workflow and routine, and reputation (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a). Thus, this research 
covers three asset specificity dimensions in a project alliancing context: (i) dedicated 
asset specificity, (ii) human asset specificity, and (iii) reputational asset specificity.  
• Dedicated asset specificity 
Dedicated assets refer to the investments with general purpose that are made in favour 
of a particular transaction relationship (Williamson 1991a). For example, a large 
construction project contract may impel contractors to expand their production 
capacity to meet the requirements of the project, or make investments in equipment to 
adapt to the technical standards of the project. From the project owner’s side, extra 
investments may be made to maintain a constructive alliance relationship. Drawing 
upon the theoretical insights of Williamson (1991a) and Joskow (1987), and the 
empirical works of De Vita et al. (2010), this research develops three items for 
measuring the owner’s dedicated asset specificity, i.e. (1) substantial internal resources; 
(2) extra investments to maintain a constructive alliance relationship; and (3) providing 
specialist equipment or materials at favourable prices. For measuring the NOPs’ 
dedicated asset specificity in project alliances, two items are developed as observable 
indicators: (1) investments made to adapt to the technical standards of alliancing 
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projects; and (2) additional investments made to meet the production requirements of 
alliancing projects. 
• Human asset specificity 
Human asset specificity arises from “learning by doing” (Williamson 1996, p. 105), 
and relates to knowledge-based assets (Dibbem et al. 2005), which are devoted to a 
particular transaction setting to a great extent. Human assets involve two major 
dimensions. One is the expertise and experience that are necessary for undertaking a 
particular transaction; the other is the training and development in order to support 
interactions with transaction partners (Lamminmaki 2005). Compared with traditional 
contracting methods, alliancing usually requires contracting parties to appoint staff 
with sufficient seniority, expertise and experience for the development, management 
and operation of alliances. In most cases, the owner usually engages specialized 
advisers to train their staff and assist with various stages of alliances. Thus, owners’ 
human asset specificity is measured by four items, which are: (1) owners’ managerial 
and technical staff assigned for the alliances; (2) owners’ training; (3) the engagement 
of facilitators and specialist advisers; and (4) owners’ knowledge and expertise 
contributed to the alliances. 
On the other hand, NOPs must demonstrate their various capabilities for delivering a 
successful alliancing project by introducing new technologies or innovative solutions. 
The workflow and routine of NOPs would be changed dramatically in order to adapt 
and meet the requirements of project alliances. Thus, this research uses the following 
items as observable indicators of NOPs’ human asset specificity: (1) NOPs’ new 
technology or innovative solutions introduced to the alliances; (2) NOPs’ adaptation in 
terms of workflows and routines; and (3) NOPs’ managerial and technical staff 
assigned for the alliances.  
• Reputational asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets that supports a given transaction. 
Definitely, reputational asset specificity (brand name capital) is one kind of asset 
specificity, which relates to reputation investment that supports a transaction. As the 
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name implies, reputational asset describes contracting parties’ reputation investments 
and brand capital (Williamson 1985). Williamson (1991a, p. 282) argues: “Asset 
specificity, especially in its first five forms, creates bilateral dependency and poses 
added contracting hazards”. Brand name and other reputational investments are 
intangible assets. These assets are less redeployable to uses other than general-purpose 
assets (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993). A contracting relationship involving functions 
that have a direct impact on the overall firm’s reputation is one of high brand capital 
specificity. In addition, there would be high specificity relating to the reputational 
aspects of the relationship for contracting parties. For a contractor, it is necessary to 
invest in reputational, and brand name assets in order to compete and be successful in 
the construction market. For a project owner, it is also a normal practice to endeavour 
to engage a reputable appraisal contractor. More importantly, reputational assets 
require a high level of maintenance in a given transaction. For example, the owner 
should pay the contractor on time. The contractor needs to complete the work 
according to the relevant requirements. In such a circumstance, reputational assets may 
be interpreted as commitments of one party to the other party.  
Specific to project alliancing, the performance of an alliance has a direct impact on 
contracting parties’ reputation. For the owner, any underperformance of the alliance 
will result in a highly negative effect on its reputation, and potentially lead to 
accountability issues (Langfield-Smith 2008). Similarly, the NOPs will also suffer 
serious damage to reputations if the performance of the alliance is poor (DTF Victoria 
2006). In addition, any underperformance of the alliance may result in a highly adverse 
impact on the NOPs' opportunities to bid for future alliancing projects, and work with 
any other projects from the same owner in the future. In the alliancing context, the 
owner’s reputational asset specificity is measured by (1) the negative effect of 
underperformance of the alliances on the owner’s reputation; and (2) the potential 
accountability issues caused by underperformance of the alliance. NOPs’ reputational 
asset specificity is measured by (1) the negative effect of underperformance of the 
alliances on the NOPs’ reputation in the industry; (2) adverse impact of 
underperformance of the alliances on the NOPs' opportunities to bid for future 
alliancing projects; and (3) negative impact of underperformance of the alliances on 
the NOPs' potential transactions with the same owner.  
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− Uncertainty in project alliances 
Winch (1989) points out that one of the major sources of uncertainty comes from the 
construction project itself in the construction industry. Projects delivered via alliancing 
generally exhibit a high level of complexity and risky. Inspired by the policy 
guidelines on alliancing in the Australian public sector (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a),  
uncertainties in alliances are measured by five items in this study, including: (1) 
ambiguous specifications and/or scope; (2) particularly unique or rare projects; (3) 
inherent complexity; (4) complex external threats; and (5) special requirements, e.g. 
tight time constraint and cost pressure. 
− Frequency in project alliances 
Frequency of transactions refers to the volume of transactions organized through a 
specialized governance form (Williamson 1985). A project alliance is not only a stand-
alone transaction but also incorporates a series of repeated transactions such as 
variations, claims, disputes and settlements because a transaction “occurs when a good 
or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface” (Williamson 
1985, p. 1). Nooteboom (1999, p.17) argues that “a transaction is an event that takes 
place during a process of exchange, which includes either a claim to profits and/or 
decision rights.” A number of researchers such as Bucklin and Sengupta (1993), 
Pilling et al. (1994), Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002a), Langfield-Smith (2008) and 
share this viewpoint.  
As alliancing projects are organized through alliancing from start to completion, the 
present study measures the frequency using alliancing project value (e.g. contract 
value) as a proxy. This is due to the following considerations. Firstly, the larger the 
project value, the higher the frequency is, since a large-scale project incorporates more 
repeated transactions (such as claims, variation orders, disputes, settlements and 
decision rights) than a small one. Therefore, project value is an appropriate indictor for 
frequency. Secondly, project value is an important factor in its own right, and is also 
an attribute affecting governance structure. In the Australian public sector, policy 
guidelines stipulate that alliancing is generally appropriate for complex procurement 
projects valued above AUS$50 million. A threshold level of frequency permits the 
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recovery of the costs required to craft specialized governance structures. Also, in 
general some meaningful level of frequency is required to justify specialized 
investments. In project-based transactions such as project alliances, there is no proxy 
more suitable for frequency than project value. 
5.5.2 Measurement of Transaction Costs 
In the TCE research area, the measurement of transaction costs is a challenging task. It 
is very difficult to quantify or readily measure the transaction costs in practice (Hobbs 
1996). Capturing the accurate figure of transaction costs from financial data is almost 
impossible (Grover and Malhotra 2003). Given the fact that procurement of 
construction projects is more complex than normal commodity transactions, this task 
appears to be much more difficult in construction project transactions. One feasible 
method to measure transaction costs is to solicit transacting parties’ evaluation on 
transaction costs. A few studies in other industries have applied this measurement 
method (e.g. Buvik 2002; Grover and Malhotra 2003; Pilling et al. 1994). Inspired by 
these empirical works, a measurement method was developed to assess transaction 
costs in alliances. In this method, various alliance activities that are listed in Figure 4.1 
can be categorized into three dimensions: (a) efforts required to set up the alliance, (b) 
managing the project, and (c) dealing with problems in the alliance relationship. 
Obviously, the costs and efforts associated with (a), (b) and (c) correspond to set-up 
costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs respectively. The three cost elements 
together comprise the transaction costs in alliances.  
5.5.3 Measurement of Reducing Effect of Project Alliancing on Transaction Costs 
The reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs is the proxy of the efficiency and 
governance performance of project alliancing in this research. The measurement of this 
item is mainly based on survey respondents’ assessment on the ability of project 
alliancing in reducing transaction costs. 
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5.6 The Design and Administration of Questionnaire Survey 
This research employs a questionnaire survey as the primary data collection method. 
The purpose of the survey is to collect information about the transaction attributes, 
transaction costs, mechanisms of project alliances and cost management practices in 
project alliances. The data extracted from the survey will be used for testing the 
hypotheses of the research and providing information for the next stage interview. The 
questionnaire disseminated to respondents in this survey is enclosed in Appendix A.  
5.6.1 Questionnaire Development 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to designate an alliancing project that 
they have appropriate involvement in and/or knowledge of, which would in turn serve 
as the referent in answering survey questions. Most of the questions used in this survey 
are closed. The measurement scales are rated on a seven-point Likert scale where “1”, 
“4” and “7” denote that respondents “strongly disagree”, “neutral” and “strongly agree,” 
respectively, on a particular statement. A few open-ended questions were mainly used 
for investigating survey respondents’ general personal details, and alliancing project 
details. Thus, respondents were also asked to provide true and reliable information 
about their alliancing experience and profiles of designated alliancing projects in the 
survey. The questionnaire consists of five sections. 
− Section One: General Information 
Section One aims to obtain information about the sample characteristics such as the 
profile of the respondents who participate in this survey and the profile of their 
organizations. Information gathered from Section One includes both respondents and 
their organizations’ industry experiences, and can be used to justify whether 
respondents possess sufficient knowledge of project alliancing.  
− Section Two: Profile of Typical Alliance Project 
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Section Two contains questions on both general alliancing project information and 
transaction characteristics of alliances. To complete the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to designate as the referent an alliancing project in which they had 
appropriate involvement and/or sufficient knowledge. In fact, Section Two is the core 
of the questionnaire through which transaction attributes of project alliances 
(independent variables) such as transaction frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity 
are measured. 
General alliancing project information includes ‘project location’, ‘type of the project’, 
‘nature of the project’, ‘organizational roles’, and ‘the strategy applied in the selection 
of alliance participants’. These questions are closed-ended. Respondents select their 
answers from a number of predetermined alternatives. Other project details include 
‘duration of the project’, ‘value of the project’ and ‘respondents’ job titles in alliances’. 
These questions are open-ended. As discussed in Section 5.5.1, ‘value of the project’ is 
regarded as a substitute for ‘transaction frequency’. In addition, the question about 
respondents’ positions in alliances is designed to verify respondents’ qualification.  
For uncertainty, five issues that may lead to uncertainty in project alliances were 
investigated (the five issues have been discussed in Section 5.5.1). Correspondingly, 
this questionnaire designed five questions to measure uncertainty in project alliances. 
Respondents were requested to rate, on a seven-point Likert scale, to what extent they 
agreed or disagreed with the statements regarding issues contributing to the uncertainty 
in alliancing projects.  
Section Two of the questionnaire also measured both owners and NOPs’ asset 
specificity including dedicated assets, human assets and reputational assets. Seventeen 
questions were designed in total. Among these questions, nine were used for 
measuring owners’ assets, and eight for measuring NOPs’ assets. These questions ask 
respondents to rate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statements 
regarding the asset and resource input into alliances by both owners and NOPs. For 
example, “the Owner trained its staff for gaining an appropriate level of knowledge to 
undertake their roles in the Alliance” is one of the questions used for investigating 
owners’ human assets. “The NOPs made additional investments in order to expand its 
production capacity to meet the requirements of the Project” is one of the questions 
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used for investigating NOPs’ dedicated assets. A seven-point Likert scale was also 
used for both question types. 
− Section Three: Cost Elements 
Section Three of the questionnaire was used to measure dependent variables such as 
transaction costs in project alliances and the reducing effect of alliancing on 
transaction costs. 
As mentioned in Section 5.5.2, transaction costs were decomposed into three separate 
costs in project alliancing context. They are set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs. Considering the fact that alliancing practitioners may not be 
familiar with the concept of transaction costs, this survey provided survey respondents 
with detailed definitions of set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs in 
alliances. Second, survey respondents were also asked to pre-assess the cost and effort 
associated with the related alliance activities in each category before formally 
evaluating a particular transaction cost element. This approach improves respondents’ 
awareness of the concept of transaction costs as well as facilitates their evaluation on 
the three transaction cost elements in alliances. A seven-point Likert scale was used to 
investigate alliancing practitioners’ evaluation on the amount of efforts and costs 
associated with various alliance activities. In this scale, “1”, “4” and “7” denote the 
efforts and costs attached on ‘setting-up the alliance’, ‘managing the alliance’ and 
‘solving problems in alliances’, and correspond to “very low”, “moderate” and “very 
high” respectively.  
The reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs is a single construct, and is 
measured by asking respondents to rate, on a seven-point Likert scale, to what extent 
they agree/disagree with the statement regarding whether project alliancing reduces 
transaction costs. 
− Section Four: Cost Influence Factors 
Section Four is designed for investigating the impact of control mechanisms of project 
alliances on various cost elements. Based on the discussion presented in Section 4.6, 
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this questionnaire lists fourteen unique control mechanisms used in project alliances 
for investigation. The questions in Section 4 gave each respondent an opportunity to 
indicate on a seven-point scale his/her response to the statements regarding the impact 
of each control mechanism on various cost elements, i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs 
and enforcement costs.  
− Section Five: Interorganizational Cost Management Practices in Your 
Alliance 
Section Five of the questionnaire is designed for investigate the application of IOCM 
techniques, tools and practices in project alliances. A definition of the IOCM practices 
was given in this questionnaire, allowing respondents to focus on cost management 
practices in interorganizational settings instead of on traditional cost management 
practices. However, it would be very impractical and meaningless to ask respondents 
to indicate whether particular IOCM techniques such as target costing and open-book 
accounting were applied in their alliances. Thus, the questionnaire decomposed some 
multi-facet IOCM techniques into a number of elements by drawing upon management 
accounting literature, and sifting and summarizing from project alliancing literature. 
The IOCM practices that possibly used in project alliances were set out below. 
CM 1. Establish a multi-disciplinary team to develop the project proposal (Ansari et 
al. 1997; Cooper and Yoshikawa 1994; Nicolini et al. 2000); 
CM 2. Develop the project proposal by Participants with the Owner's continuous 
input, guide and interaction (DTF Victoria 2010b); 
CM 3. Develop design, construction methods, cost estimation and commercial 
arrangements in a concurrent style (DTF Victoria 2010b; Nicolini et al. 2000); 
CM 4. Undertake value management and optimisation studies(DTF Victoria 2010b; 
Mouritsen et al. 2001); 
CM 5. Encourage innovative solutions (Langfield-Smith 2008); 
CM 6. Identify and assess risks and opportunities using advanced probability 
analysis(DTF Victoria 2006; 2010b); 
CM 7. Conduct multi-party value engineering iteratively (Cooper and Slagmulder 
2004; Nicolini et al. 2000); 
CM 8. Share information on basic costing elements and strategies during the project 
proposal development (Baldwin et al. 1999; Seal et al. 1999); 
CM 9. Interact continually and intensively between functional teams during the 
project proposal development (Langfield-Smith 2008); 
CM 10. Take life cycle cost into consideration when designing the project (Ansari et 
al. 2006a; Langfield-Smith 2008; Nicolini et al. 2000); 
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CM 11. Review and check Participants' TOC, the scope of work, quantities and the 
construction methods by the Owner’s Estimator (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010b); 
CM 12. Check and validate the TOC against the Owner's comparative TOC and 
relevant benchmarks (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010b; Ross 2003); 
CM 13. Extend alliancing philosophy downward to major subcontractors and 
suppliers (DTF Victoria 2006; Ross 2003); 
CM 14. Reimburse the NOPs 100% of direct costs and project specific overheads 
(DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 15. Put the NOPs’ Profit and Corporate Overhead at risk (DTF Victoria 2006; 
2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 16. Cap risk for the NOPs' painshare (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 17. Share equitable pain/gain between the Owner and the NOPs (DTF Victoria 
2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 18. Increase appropriately the shared proportions of risk/reward for 
designers/consultants (Love et al. 2011); 
CM 19. Link financial pain/gain with both cost and non-cost areas performance (DTF 
Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 20. Use web-based management program and electronic information exchange 
system (Baldwin et al. 1999); 
CM 21. Disclose cost data, records, knowledge and other information among 
participants (Cooper and Yoshikawa 1994; Munday 1992a; Munday 1992b); 
CM 22. Establish recordkeeping and accounting practices and procedures to support 
the open-book arrangement (DTF Victoria 2010a); 
CM 23. Build effective communication framework between the owner, the alliance 
and external stakeholders (Langfield-Smith 2008); 
CM 24. Report regularly the progress, performance against the pre-agreed targets and 
corrective actions (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a); 
CM 25. Benchmark performance against the performance of other alliances or similar 
projects (DTF Victoria 2006); 
CM 26. Undertake periodic and independent measurements of the progress and 
performance (DTF Victoria 2010a); 
CM 27. Carry out ongoing independent audits of financial transactions and progress 
claims throughout the project (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a); 
CM 28. Configure the project office for the co-location of all personnel involved in 
the project (Das and Teng 2001b; Ross 2003); 
CM 29. Create and maintain seamless interfaces between various functional teams 
(Hauck et al. 2004; Kulmala 2004; Tomkins 2001); 
CM 30. Perform the alliance activities in co-ordinated and efficient manners (Hauck et 
al. 2004; Walker 2002); 
CM 31. Work out solutions collectively as issues and risks emerge throughout the 
project life (Hauck et al. 2004; Ross 2003); 
CM 32. Develop and agree with guidelines for scope variation by participants during 
the selection process (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
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CM 33. Review and justify rigorously any proposed or potential scope variations 
(DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
CM 34. Adjust the TOC only in the limited situations agreed by participants (DTF 
Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003); 
This section asks each respondent, from the list, to select which 
methods/tools/practices were used by his/her designated alliance. At the end of this 
section, the questionnaire also provided space to allow respondents to add any other 
IOCM practices that have not been listed.   
This questionnaire also asked respondents whether they would like to contribute to the 
next stage interview.  
5.6.2 Sampling and Recruitment of Survey Participants 
Alliancing relationships in the construction industry constitute the unit of analysis in 
this research. The data collection for the survey was conducted following a key-
informant approach, which has been often used in previous TCE studies (e.g. Artz and 
Brush 2000; Buvik 2002; De Vita et al. 2010; Reuer and Ariño 2007). In these studies, 
the informants were selected with a view of identifying survey respondents highly 
knowledgeable about the core research issues. In the alliancing research area, senior 
alliancing professionals have frequently been used as a source of information (e.g. 
Jefferies et al. 2006; Love et al. 2011; Love et al. 2010; Wood and Duffield 2009), 
since they have been engaged in one or more alliancing relationships and are often 
responsible for managing the alliances. According to the policy guides to project 
alliancing in Australia (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a), Alliance Leadership Team, 
Alliance Manager, Alliance Management Team and Alliance Project Team served as 
key roles in the governance, leadership and management of project alliances, and 
usually assumed by senior and highly experienced alliancing professionals.  
− Alliance Leadership Team consists of senior executives from each of the alliance 
participant. The team provides leadership, governance and oversight to the alliance.  
− Alliance Manager is the person who chairs the Alliance Management Team and is 
responsible for the delivery of the alliancing project. Usually, an Alliance Manager 
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is a highly experienced project manager and appointed by Alliance Leadership 
Team.  
− Alliance Management Team is the management team that is responsible for delivery 
of the alliancing project and day-to-day management of the alliance, and provides 
leadership to the wider project team. The team usually consists of senior project 
personnel. 
− Alliance Project Team consists of owner and NOPs’ professionals and support staff 
that plan, design and manage construction and delivery of all aspects of the 
alliance’s targets and objectives. 
Therefore, the target population of the survey and the most appropriate survey 
participants are the senior alliancing professionals who have served, or currently are 
serving as Alliance Leadership Team Chairman/Members, Alliance Managers, 
Alliance Management Team Members and Alliance Project Team Members in project 
alliances in the Australian construction industry. Other senior alliancing professionals 
such as project owners’ representatives and alliancing consultants are also considered 
appropriate since they also play important roles in planning and delivery stages during 
alliancing relationships.   
Following Fellows and Liu (2008)’s suggestion, a two-stage approach was used in 
identifying the most appropriate survey participants. First, the organizations that have 
engaged in alliancing relationships in Australia were identified. The next step was to 
look for the senior alliancing professionals within each organization. An industry 
association is usually the leading entity representing a particular area or sector. 
Industry associations have often been a very useful source for identifying highly 
knowledgeable survey participants in previous studies (e.g. Buvik 2002; De Vita et al. 
2010; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2004). In Australia, Alliancing Association of 
Australasian (AAA) is such a leading organization, made up from a wide range of 
corporate organisations and individuals interested in the development and management 
of alliances and committed to excellence in strategic partnering across Australia, New 
Zealand and international members. Thus, AAA was contacted at first with the 
objective of identifying the most appropriate survey participants. Consultation with 
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AAA indicated that its members consisted of infrastructure clients, large construction 
companies, design or consulting companies, alliancing advisory services providers, 
and academics. Of these, academic members are individuals. Others are organization 
members. Normally, one organization member has one representative or contact in 
AAA. The representatives or contacts of each organizational member in AAA are 
senior executives in their respective companies and responsible for their companies’ 
alliancing businesses. These representatives have rich experiences of alliancing and 
possess sufficient knowledge about alliancing, and thus were invited to participate in 
this survey. However, the number of AAA members is very limited. More importantly, 
this survey excluded those members (accounting for half of the members) who provide 
legal or financial advisory services for alliancing projects because they are neither 
relevant contracting parties in alliances nor responsible for the management of 
alliances. Academic members were also excluded. Given their knowledge of alliancing 
businesses in their respective companies and in the industry, the invited representatives 
of members of AAA were also asked to identify and recommend other experienced 
and suitable alliancing professionals to take part in the survey. This constitutes the 
majority of the potential respondents. In addition, some potential respondents were 
identified from the websites of alliancing projects and published magazines and 
newspapers. In total, 170 senior alliancing professionals were invited to participate in 
this survey. The identified alliancing professionals came from various organizations 
including public infrastructure clients, large construction companies, and design or 
consulting companies.  
5.6.3 The Administration of the Survey 
The survey was accomplished by means of a web-based questionnaire. Before formal 
survey, a pilot survey was conducted with ten randomly selected alliancing 
professionals in order to test whether the questions were intelligible, easy to answer, 
and/or ambiguous (Fellows and Liu 2008). The initial versions of the questionnaire 
were also discussed and reviewed by knowledgeable academics (including the 
researcher’s supervisors) to ensure that the questionnaire can collect required data that 
is not only suitable for analysis but also adequate to test the hypothesis through the 
analysis. The data yielded by the pilot survey was excluded from final data analysis. 
The questionnaire has been amended twice based on the feedback from the pilot 
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survey. The revised questionnaire was sent to potential respondents via email and 
consisted of an invitation letter, a plain-language information statement, and the set of 
questions that were designed for response over a web link. It would take respondents 
around one-and-a-half hours to complete the questionnaire. 
Given the increasing number of alliancing research projects and the fact that project 
alliancing has become a research focus in recent years in Australia, collecting data 
from the industry and administering this questionnaire survey is becoming 
progressively more difficult. As some senior alliancing professionals stated, “I must 
highlight that our project people are very busy and we are asked to respond to 
numerous alliance surveys so please accept if we are not able to respond”, and “I wish 
you good fortune in collecting your data - I know how troublesome this can be.” One 
executive also advised, “It is extremely hard to get people’s time and too many student 
surveys are sent without the most basic courtesy of reaching out the target 
contact. …… All these people are senior executives so please use the right process or 
doors will close on you.” To improve respondents’ willingness to provide data, the 
survey was conducted based on the following principles:  
− Be personal and contact each potential respondent; 
− Be clear and specific on what the research is about; 
− Explain why the research will add value to the understanding on project alliancing;  
− Do not treat the survey as a numbers game;  
− Commit to send a summary of the research report to respondents.  
The survey participants are mostly Alliance Leadership Team Chairman/Members, 
Alliance Managers or Alliance Management Team members, holding senior positions 
in their organizations. It is very difficult to ask them to contribute one-and-a-half hours 
to this research. For example, some respondents informed that “I have many work 
priorities that need my immediate attention so if you can bear with them, the survey 
will be completed when possible”, or “I am very busy – I will get to this early next 
week” To encourage their participation and prompt response, all the potential 
respondents had been contacted personally and directly, and provided with a clear and 
detailed statement of the objective and content of this research as well as what 
information was required of them in the survey. Sometimes, repeated communications 
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were required as some potential respondents request more information about the 
research and offer their viewpoints regarding alliancing research. The customised 
(instead of programmatic) communication with potential respondents convinced them 
that the research would add value to the understanding on alliances and the survey 
would not lead to any adverse effects to them. Furthermore, a summary of the research 
report will be offered on request. Although the communication processes were 
extremely time- and energy-consuming, the efforts led to desirable results and received 
strong support from the industry. For example, to support this survey, AAA issued an 
endorsement letter in which states “AAA believes the study will provide interesting 
outcomes of high relevance to AAA members and we would appreciate if you would 
accept to support this effort by assisting the researcher with pertinent information 
based on your wide experience with projects done as alliance.” Some companies’ 
senior executives responded, “We have had wide experience with Alliance projects and 
would be interested in assisting in your survey” or “We will be happy to be involved in 
your survey”. Some respondents also replied, “I am happy to complete your survey” or 
“I would be happy to respond to the survey” etc.  
Of the 170 potential respondents, two reported that they were unsuitable for the survey 
and could provide only minimal information due to the lack of thorough knowledge or 
experience of alliancing projects, or have not been involved in alliancing projects in 
recent years. Another two expressed explicitly that they declined to respond to this 
survey because of current workload. Eight are no longer contactable due to job 
changes or inaccurate contact details. Six were on leave or out of office during the 
survey period. Of the remaining 152 potential respondents, 88 responded to the survey 
in full, which resulted in a 58% response rate. Postal surveys with response rate of 
25%-35% are usually acceptable (Fellows and Liu 2008). The response rate of the 
survey is considered satisfactory. In addition, the questionnaire used in this survey also 
received good review. For example, one respondent commented, “I found the diversity 
and extent of questioning quite good and I think you will be able to build up some very 
serious data models from the information that you collect”. 
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5.7 Data Analysis and Results Report 
The primary purpose of data analysis is to look for statistical evidence of relationships 
between variables (Fellows and Liu 2008). Specific to this research, data analysis was 
focused on finding solutions for the four research questions by analysing the data 
collected through a questionnaire survey. A basic procedure for analysing data 
followed by this research contains such activities as data preparation and description, 
plotting data, looking for patterns, and applying statistical techniques (Cooper and 
Schindler 2003).  
Prior to analysing the data, preparations such as editing data, coding data and creating 
data files were made to facilitate the data analysis conducted in this research and 
ensure consistency of data. This followed by plotting data with aims to explore the 
nature of the data. A quantitative approach was used for analysing the data. The major 
statistical techniques applied in this research are as follows: 
− Validity and reliability tests, which are important and fundamental tests for the 
survey data. Validity and reliability will be tested by carrying out factor analysis 
and computing Cronbach’s alpha respectively. 
− Two-independent-samples T test, which is used for checking the homogeneity of 
variables, and providing reliable data for the subsequent data analysis. 
− Factor analysis, which is performed to summarize and condense the information 
regarding contracting parties’ asset specificity and uncertainty into a smaller set of 
factors. The summated scales created through the factor analysis will be used for the 
subsequent multiple regression analysis.   
− Multiple linear regression, which is carried out to test the hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 4. More specifically, the purposes of the multiple regression analysis are to 
examine the relationships between dependent and independent variables on the one 
hand, and on the other hand assess the extent to what independent variables 
influence dependent variable and how.  
− Paired-samples T test, which is performed to rank and group the mechanisms of 
project alliances that contribute to reducing transaction costs. 
− Descriptive statistics, through which the cost management techniques and practices 
that are widely used in project alliances are identified and ranked.  
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The analysis follows the guidelines of Norušis (2008) and Hair et al. (2010) strictly, 
and was conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The 
detailed data analysis methods, processes and results will be discussed and presented 
in Chapter 6. 
Once the data has been analysed, the research work turns to reporting the results. In 
this research, results report involves interpreting and discussing the data analysis 
results in the context of literature and theory, drawing conclusions, making 
recommendations and explaining limitations of this research.  
5.8 Summary 
This chapter focused on the research methods adopted in this research as well as the 
methodological issues. Five major activities (research task establishment, theoretical 
framework development, data collection, data analysis and results report) comprise the 
research process by which research objectives are achieved and research questions are 
answered. The five research activities, relevant methods and outcomes are summarized 
and presented in this chapter.  
Besides the above, this chapter discussed in detail the data required for the research. In 
this research, the data is determined by the developed and established research 
objectives, questions and hypotheses. Each objective and corresponding research 
question has special requirement for the data, particularly research objectives 1 and 2, 
which involve testing relationships between variables proposed in the theoretical 
framework. These variables are very difficult to be measured since they usually exist 
on the basis of indirect evidence. Further, some of the variables, such as owner and 
NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty, are multi constructs and cannot be adequately 
represented by a single measure. This makes the data collection a challenging job. All 
the variables introduced for testing were operationalized in a measurable way in the 
context of project alliancing. The operationalization and measurement of transaction 
costs and transaction attributes presented in this chapter also have implications for 
future empirical works in project-based transactions.  
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Since this research adopting a questionnaire survey as the primary data collection 
approach, the methodological issues inherent in the questionnaire survey were 
discussed in this chapter. The survey was conducted based on a key-informant 
approach in which the informants were selected with a view of identifying survey 
respondents highly knowledgeable about the core research issues in the Australian 
construction industry. Key steps in the design and development of the questionnaire 
survey were clearly presented, which enables the survey to be replicated.  
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Chapter 6 
Data Analysis and Results 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the data collected through the questionnaire 
survey by applying statistical techniques and present the data analysis results. This 
chapter is structured as follows. 
− The data analysis starts with exploring the nature of the sample characteristics. In 
Section 6.2, the profile of both the respondent and typical alliancing projects are 
analysed by using descriptive statistics and presented in the form of a graph or 
diagram. One of the purposes of exploring the nature of the sample characteristics is 
to validate the reliability of the data collected through survey. 
− The homogeneity of variables is checked by performing a two-independent-samples 
T test in Section 6.3. The test aims to check whether the data collected from 
different groups, (i.e., project owner and non-owner) can be pooled together for 
further analysis. Moreover, homogeneity of variables is the prerequisite to perform 
factor analysis and multiple linear regression analysis.  
− By adopting factor analysis techniques, the multidimensional variables such as 
owner and NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty in project alliances are 
summarized and condensed into a number of factors in Section 6.4. In this research, 
the factor analysis is used for reducing the number of variables, creating new 
represent dimensions by grouping high correlated variables. The extracted factors 
and their corresponding summated scales are substituted for the original variables in 
the subsequent multiple regression analysis. 
− Section 6.5 presented the design, process and results of regression analysis. Four 
multiple regression models are proposed to find solutions for research question one 
and two. Each model corresponds to a group of hypotheses. The analysis explored 
the type and strength of relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables. 
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− In Section 6.6, the fourteen control mechanisms of project alliances are ranked and 
grouped according to their relative effectiveness in reducing set-up costs, 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs respectively. The adopted statistical 
techniques include descriptive statistics and paired-samples T test.  
− Section 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics for the investigated thirty-four cost 
management techniques that potentially used in project alliances.  
− Section 6.8 summarizes this chapter. 
The interpretation of the data analysis results and empirical findings will be reported in 
Chapter 7.  
6.2 Sample Characteristics 
Despite the best intentions and vigorous precaution in the selection of survey 
participants and the conduct of the questionnaire survey, questions still remain: 
whether the sample provides a good representation of population, and whether the 
information obtained is reliable. Therefore, it is helpful to examine the characteristics 
of the sample prior to performing any further analysis.  
6.2.1 Respondent Profile 
The questionnaire developed a number of questions that were used for collecting 
information related to respondents’ experience in the construction industry as well as 
their experience with project alliancing.  
The average work experience of the 88 respondents’ in the construction industry is 
25.52 years. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the respondents’ work experience in 
the construction industry. It was grouped into 5 different categories. Group 1 
represents those having experience less than or equal to 5 years; Group 2, from 6 to 10 
years; Group 3, from 11 to 20 years; Group 4, from 21 to 30 years; and Group 5 are 
those with more than 30 years of experience in the industry.  
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Figure 6.1 Sampling Distribution of Respondents by Experience 
Figure 6.2 shows the sample distribution of the number of alliancing projects that 
respondents have worked on. From Figure 6.2, it can be seen that 31.82% respondents 
have worked on 1 to 2 alliancing projects, 38.64% have worked on 3 to 5 alliancing 
projects, 13.64% have worked on 6 to 10 alliancing projects, 10.23% have worked on 
11 to 20 alliancing projects, 5.68 % respondents even have worked on more than 20 
alliancing projects.  The average alliancing projects that respondents have worked on 
are 8.53. 
 
Figure 6. 2 Sampling Distribution of Respondents by the Number of Alliancing 
Projects Experienced 
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Figure 6.3 shows respondents’ positions or job titles in their designated project 
alliances. Among the 88 respondents, 36.36% are Alliance Leadership Team (ALT) 
members or Chairmen, 20.45% hold the position of Alliance Manager, 27.27% work in 
the Alliance Management Team (AMT), 4.55% serve as the Alliance Advisors, and the 
remaining 10% of the respondents hold other positions such as estimator and project 
engineer.  
  
Figure 6.3 Sampling Distribution of Respondents by Position in Project Alliances 
The questionnaire survey has also investigated alliancing experience of respondents’ 
organizations and respondents’ position or job title in their respective organizations. 
The average number of alliancing projects that respondents’ organizations have been 
involved in is 18.19. Regarding respondents’ job titles in their respective organizations, 
a considerable proportion of the respondents hold senior positions. Statistical results 
will be not reported here because this information is too sensitive, and more 
importantly, could potentially be used for tracking respondents’ identifications.  
6.2.2 Profile of Typical Alliancing Projects 
In this research, the unit of analysis is the alliancing relationship in the construction 
industry. Since the questionnaire survey asked each respondent to select an alliance as 
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the referent in answering questions, one may suspect that multiple respondents could 
reflect upon the same alliance. To avoid this, all the responses were carefully checked 
after the survey closed. The check was made based on the comparison of project 
location, project type, duration of project and value of project between the received 
responses. No multiple respondents reflected upon the same alliance. Therefore, every 
alliance collected in this survey is regarded as exclusive, and can be further analysed.  
All the alliancing projects in the data analysis are located in Australia. Figure 6.4 
indicates that 30.7% of alliancing projects used in this survey by respondents are 
located in New South Wales, 28.4% in Victoria, 20.5% in West Australia, 19.3% in 
Queensland, and 1.1% in Australia Capital Territory.  
 
Figure 6.4 Sampling Distribution by Project Location 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the type of alliancing projects used in this survey. It can be seen 
that there are 50 road projects, which account for 56.8% of the 88 alliancing projects. 
Water projects are the second largest group (29.5%) consisting of 26 projects. Rail 
projects account for 7% of the total number. Other project types only account for small 
proportion of the total number of alliancing projects. For example, 2.3% are energy 
projects. Other projects include building, oil and gas projects. 
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Figure 6.5 Sampling Distribution by Project Type 
As shown in Figure 6.6, respondents’ organizational roles in project alliances were 
categorized into two groups, which represent project owner and non-owner 
respectively. The non-owner group include the organizational roles such as contractor, 
designer and consultant. The numbers of the two groups are very close.  
 
Figure 6.6 Respondents’ Organizational Role 
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Regarding the selection methods used in alliancing projects, Figure 6.7 shows that 
majority of alliancing projects (89.8%) adopted non-price competition selection 
method. The remaining part (10.2%) used price competition in selecting NOPs.  
 
Figure 6.7 Selection Method Used in Typical Alliancing Projects 
In Figure 6.8, the sample was categorised into 5 groups according to the value of 
typical alliancing projects. Group 1 (2.3%) represents the alliancing projects having a 
value of up to $50 million, Group 2 (7.95%) having a value between $51 and $100 
million, Group 3 (62.5%) having a value between $101 and $500 million, Group 4 
(25%) having a value between $501 and $1 billion, and Group 5 (2.3%) having a value 
more than $1 billion. The average value of typical projects was 383.21 million. From 
Figure 6.8, it can be seen that the distribution of samples by project value is very 
uneven. Groups 3 and 4 account for the majority of alliancing projects (87.5%). In 
contrast, the smallest and largest groups (Group 1 and 5, respectively) only make up a 
small proportion (4.6%). 
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Figure 6.8 Sampling Distribution by Project Value Range 
The sampling distribution by project duration is presented in Figure 6.9. 1.1% projects 
were completed within 12 months. The duration of 34.1% of the projects was between 
12 and 24 months, 37.5% between 24 and 36 months, 10.2% between 36 and 48 
months, 17.1% more than 48 months. The average duration of alliancing projects was 
35.97 months. 
 
Figure 6.9 Sampling Distribution by Project Duration 
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Table 6.1 Profile of Respondents and Typical Alliancing Projects 
Item Category Frequency Percentage 
Respondents’ experience in the 
construction industry (Years) 
Mean: 25.52 years 
≤5 2 2.3% 
6–10 4 4.6% 
11–20 25 28.4% 
21–30 33 37.5% 
>30 24 27.3% 
Respondents’ experiences in 
alliancing projects (Projects) 
Mean: 8.53 projects 
1–2 28 31.8% 
3–5 34 38.6% 
6–10 12 13.6% 
11-20 9 10.2% 
>20 5 5.7% 
Respondents’ organizational role 
Owner 41 46.6% 
Non-owner 47 53.4% 
Respondents’ job title in selected 
alliances 
ALT Member/Chairman 32 36.4% 
Alliance Manager 18 20.5% 
AMT  Member 24 27.3% 
Alliance Adviser 4 4.6% 
Others 10 11.4% 
Project location by State 
NSW 27 30.7% 
VIC 25 28.4% 
WA 18 20.5% 
QLD 17 19.3% 
ACT 1 1.1% 
Project type by sector 
Road 50 56.8% 
Water 26 29.5% 
Rail 7 8.0% 
Energy 2 2.3% 
Building 1 1.1% 
Oil and Gas 1 1.1% 
Others 1 1.1% 
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Item Category Frequency Percentage 
Method used in selection of NOPs 
Non-Price Selection 79 89.8% 
Price Selection 9 10.2% 
Project value (Million AUDs) 
Mean: $383.21 million 
≤100 9 2.3% 
101-500 55 8.0% 
501-1000 22 62.5% 
>1001 2 25.0% 
Project duration (Months) 
Mean: 35.97 months 
≤12 1 1.1% 
12-24 30 34.1% 
24-36 33 37.5% 
36-48 9 10.2% 
>48 15 17.1% 
Table 6.1 summarises the profile of the sample used for data analysis in this research. 
From Table 6.1, it can be found that the respondents possess sufficient knowledge of 
alliancing. This increases the reliability and validity of reports in several ways. First, 
most of the respondents (93.2%) have at least ten years of experience in the 
construction industry. They are unlikely to have alliancing experience only. This can 
help respondents to reduce the biases in answering questions by comparing alliancing 
with other contracting methods, and alliancing projects with non-alliancing projects. 
Second, two-thirds of the respondents have worked on at least three alliancing projects. 
This enables them to possess reliable and rich information about the focal research 
issue. Third, nearly 85% of respondents served in senior management roles within their 
alliances (e.g. ALT Chairman/Member, Alliance Manager or AMT Member). These 
roles were responsible for the decision-making, providing leadership and governance 
to their alliances, or managing the day-to-day operations of their alliances. Normally, 
they must have a deep understanding of alliances, and were appointed based on their 
authority, decision-making ability, experience, skills and leadership (DTF Victoria 
2010a). Reliable information is more likely to be collected from those senior roles. 
The typical alliancing projects designated by respondents are also considered to be 
highly representative in the Australian construction industry. Almost all the alliancing 
projects (98.9%) are located in New South Wales, Victoria, West Australia and 
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Queensland. Road, water and rail projects account for 94.3% of all the alliancing 
projects and dominate the samples. Research and statistics show that New South Wales, 
Victoria, West Australia and Queensland are the most active states by the number and 
value of alliancing projects in Australia, and water, road and rail are the dominated 
sectors in using the alliancing contracting method (AAA 2008a; Wood and Duffield 
2009). Moreover, the alliancing method is more suitable for delivering large-scale 
projects, and generally inappropriate for simple projects valued under $50 million 
(DTF Victoria 2010a).  In this survey, the value of 97.7% of the projects is more than 
$50 million. The average value of the typical alliancing projects ($382.21 million) 
should not be considered as low. In addition, regarding the methods used in selection 
of NOPs, the default selection method has been changed from non-price-competition 
to the price-competition method since October 2010, according to the policy guide on 
project alliancing (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a). As Table 6.1 shows, a large proportion 
of typical alliances adopted a non-price selection method. This is also consistent with 
the development of the alliance contracting method in Australia, since the survey was 
conducted from February to May 2011. Respondents have responded to the survey 
based on their previous alliancing experience.   
6.3 Test of Significance of Variance between Groups of Respondents 
In project-based transactions, there are usually at least two transaction partners. One is 
the project owner. The other consists of non-owners including contractors, designers, 
consultants, and subcontractors. In this survey, respondents generally came from the 
two different groups. Depending on their organizational roles, respondents’ 
perceptions towards some aspects may differ from one another. This may result in 
significant differences in responses between groups. Only when the sample is 
homogeneous can the factor analysis and multiple linear regression proceed (Hair et al. 
2010). It is therefore necessary to perform a homogeneity test at first to check whether 
the data collected from the two groups can be pooled together for further analysis.  
The statistical technique adopted in this research for homogeneity test is called the 
two-independent-samples T test, and is used for checking whether two group means 
are equal. In performing the two-independent-samples T test, the 95% confidence level, 
which is usually referred to as a significance level of 0.05 (p≤0.05), was used. Thus, 
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the test result with a 95% confidence level is deemed to be acceptable. The list of the 
variables including the respective code is presented in Table 6.2 below.  
Table 6.2 The Code and Description of Variables 
Code Description of Items 
ODA1 The Owner inputted substantial internal resources (e.g. storage facilities, meeting 
venues, etc.) into the Alliance 
ODA2 The Owner made extra investments in order to maintain a constructive alliance 
relationship 
ODA3 The Owner provided specialist equipment or materials at a better than market rate 
OHA1 The Owner appointed staff with sufficient seniority, expertise and experience to provide active leadership and management in the Alliance 
OHA2 The Owner trained its staff for gaining an appropriate level of knowledge to undertake 
their roles in the Alliance 
OHA3 The Owner engaged facilitators, specialist advisers or other service providers to assist 
with various stages of the Alliance 
OHA4 The Owner contributed valuable knowledge and expertise to facilitating the development of project proposal and its implementation 
ORA1 Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in highly negative effects on the Owner's reputation 
ORA2 Any underperformance of the Alliance will lead to accountability issues for the Owner 
NDA1 The NOPs made comprehensive investments in specialized machines, equipment, tools 
or fixtures to adapt to the technical standards of the Project 
NDA2 The NOPs made additional investments in order to expand its production capacity to 
meet the requirements of the Project 
NHA1 The NOPs introduced new technology or innovative solutions to cater to the needs of 
the Project 
NHA2 The NOPs made a high degree of adaptation in terms of their own workflows and 
routines to the satisfaction of the Alliance 
NHA3 The NOPs appointed staff with sufficient seniority, expertise and experience for the development and operation of the Alliance 
NRA1 The NOPs will suffer serious damage to reputations if the performance of the Alliance is poor 
NRA2 Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in a highly adverse impact on the NOPs' opportunities to bid for future alliancing projects 
NRA3 Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in a negative impact on the NOPs' 
opportunities to work with any other projects from the same Owner in the future 
UN1 The output specifications and/or scope of the Project cannot be clearly defined or finalised upfront 
UN2 The Project is particularly unique or rare, e.g. delivering new or emerging technology, 
etc. 
UN3 The Project itself is featured as very complex, e.g. complex stakeholder issues, 
technological challenge, high or undimensionable risks, etc. 
UN4 The Project is exposed to complex external threats, e.g. sensitive environmental issues, 
unforeseeable or adverse site conditions, etc. 
UN5 The Project is confronted with some special requirements, e.g. tight time constraint, high quality or innovation requirements, cost pressure, etc. 
SCs Set-up costs 
 Page | 141 
Code Description of Items 
MCs Monitoring costs 
ECs Enforcement costs 
RTCs The alliancing reduces transaction costs 
F1 Joint planning and goal setting 
F2 Sharing risks and opportunities collectively and equitably 
F3 Alignment of the achievement of project objectives with participants' commercial interests 
F4 Collective and unanimous decision making mechanisms 
F5 One integrated team approach 
F6 Joint alliance management structure 
F7 Open-book arrangement in terms of cost data, documentation, information and knowledge 
F8 Making decisions and acting in a ‘best for project’ manner” 
F9 Open, straight and honest communication among all participants 
F10 Cooperation and collaboration in delivering the project 
F11 Acting fairly and reasonably instead of reaping self interests at the expense of other participants 
F12 No fault-no blame’ principle in relation to errors, mistakes or poor performance 
F13 Resolving conflicts and disputes internally 
F14 Commitment to no litigation or arbitration 
The homogeneity test result is enclosed in Appendix B. From Appendix B, it can be 
found that the observed significance level for the Levene test is greater than 0.05, and 
thus the equal variance hypothesis cannot be rejected. Using the results labelled ‘Equal 
Variance Assumed’ in Appendix B, the observed significance level for the T test is 
greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant difference between the two 
groups, and the sample is homogeneous and can be pooled together for further analysis. 
6.4 Factor Analysis 
As discussed in Section 5.4, asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency constitute the 
independent variables in this research. Frequency is a single item and measured by 
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alliancing project value as a proxy. For asset specificity and uncertainty, they are more 
complex because they normally exist on the basis of indirect evidence. It is impossible 
to adequately describe them by a single measure. Therefore, the questionnaire used in 
this research developed 17 items to investigate both contracting parties’ asset 
specificity in project alliances, and 5 items to collect information regarding the 
uncertainty encompassed in project alliances. As the number of measures increases, 
more and more correlation is likely among the measures. In such an instance, factor 
analysis needs to be performed to group highly correlated variables, reduce the number 
of variables, label or name the groups, and create new represented dimensions within 
the data prior to testing the hypotheses and the proposed theoretical framework (Hair 
et al. 2010).  
In this research, factor analysis techniques are applied to analyse multidimensional 
variables such as owner’s asset specificity, NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty. 
The factor analysis is performed following Hair et al. (2010)’s recommendation. 
Section 4.6.1 presented in detail the application of factor analysis to analyse owner’s 
asset specificity including the analysis process and results. Considering the fact that 
the same procedure and requirements are applied to analyse NOPs’ asset specificity 
and uncertainty, the analysis process reported in Section 4.6.1 can be regarded as an 
illustrative example of the application of factor analysis in this research. Thus, the 
analysis processes to NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty are omitted and only 
reports the factor analysis results in Section 4.6.2.  
6.4.1 Factor Analysis: Owner’s Asset Specificity 
− Step 1: Objectives of the factor analysis 
In the survey, owner’s asset specificity was measured by 9 items. If the 9 items can be 
represented in a smaller number of composite variables, then the multiple regression 
analysis can be made more parsimonious (Hair et al. 2010). Factor analysis was thus 
performed in order to reduce the items to a smaller set of factors. The condensed 
variables, which are represented by summated scales, will be used in regression 
analysis for testing the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical framework.  
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− Step 2: Designing the factor analysis 
The variables that were included in the factor analysis are those perceptions of survey 
respondents on 9 statements regarding owner’s asset specificity. As presented in Table 
6.2, the variables include ODA1, ODA2, ODA3, OHA1, OHA2, OHA3, OHA4, 
ORA1 and ORA2. Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics results. 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Owner’s Asset Specificity 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ODA1 88 1 5 3.52 .816 
ODA2 88 3 7 4.90 .872 
ODA3 88 1 5 2.55 .772 
OHA1 88 3 7 5.42 1.047 
OHA2 88 2 7 4.88 1.015 
OHA3 88 3 7 5.80 .860 
OHA4 88 4 7 5.99 .941 
ORA1 88 1 7 5.89 1.254 
ORA2 88 1 7 5.82 1.170 
Valid N (listwise) 88     
The sample size for the factor analysis is 88, which satisfies the sample size 
requirement for performing factor analysis (the minimum sample size should be 50 
observations). Also, the 9.78:1 (88:9) ratio of observation to variables is greater than 
the 5:1 threshold ratio (Hair et al. 2010).  
In addition, all the variables have been confirmed as homogeneous (see Section 6.3), 
and are therefore appropriate for factor analysis. 
− Step 3: Assessing the appropriateness of the factor analysis 
As discussed in Sections 4.4 and 5.5, these variables were developed based on TCE 
and previous empirical research. The variables to be analysed are considered 
appropriate for applying factor analysis conceptually and theoretically. 
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To ensure that the data matrix has sufficient correlations to produce representative 
factors, correlation analysis was performed at first. The correlation matrix for the 9 
perceptions of owner’s asset specificity is shown in Table 6.4, from which it can be 
found that correlations between variables are significant at both 0.01 and 0.05 level, 
and most of the correlations are greater than 0.30, which provides a strong basis for 
proceeding factor analysis.  
Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix 
 ODA1 ODA2 ODA3 OHA1 OHA2 OHA3 OHA4 ORA1 ORA2 
ODA1 1 .625
***
 .436*** .318*** .399*** .351*** .232** .283*** .281*** 
ODA2 
 
1 .392*** .551*** .583*** .570*** .461*** .273** .286*** 
ODA3 
  
1 .268** .396*** .326*** .309*** .243** .213** 
OHA1 
   
1 .796*** .824*** .787*** .343*** .307*** 
OHA2 
    
1 .787*** .733*** .305*** .290*** 
OHA3 
     
1 .807*** .309*** .283*** 
OHA4 
      
1 .301*** .301*** 
ORA1 
       
1 .894*** 
ORA2 
        
1 
Note: ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy value also justify the appropriateness of the factor analysis. As shown in 
Table 6.5, the Bartlett’s test finds that the overall correlations matrix is significant at 
the 0.001 level. The overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy value falls in the 
acceptable range (>0.5) with a value of 0.820.  
Table 6.5 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .820 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 553.572 
df 36 
Sig. .000 
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In summary, all the analyses performed above confirmed that the variables are 
appropriate for factor analysis. 
− Step 4: Deriving factors 
In the factor analysis, the principal component method was used for extracting the 
factors. The selection of the principal component method is based on the following 
considerations. First, it is the typical default method of most statistical programs when 
performing factor analysis. Second, the objective of the factor analysis is to summarize 
and condense the original information into a smaller set of factors for multiple 
regression analysis. In such a situation, principal component analysis is the most 
appropriate method (Hair et al. 2010). 
Table 6.6 Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.657 51.741 
 
2 1.515 16.829 
 
3 1.153 12.815 
 
4 0.659 7.317 88.702 
5 0.318 3.537 92.239 
6 0.249 2.762 95.001 
7 0.184 2.05 97.051 
8 0.167 1.854 98.905 
9 0.099 1.095 100 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
The criteria in determining the number of factors to be retained for interpretation 
include eigenvalues and the percentage of variance explained by extracted factors. The 
following principles were applied. First, factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (>1.0) 
will be retained. Secondly, the cumulative percentage of variance explained by the 
extracted factors should account for at least 60% of the total variance (Hair et al. 2010). 
Table 6.6 contains the information regarding the 9 possible factors and their relative 
explanatory power as expressed by their eigenvalues. Three factors were retained with 
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eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (>1.0). The scree test (Figure 6.10) also suggests that the 
three factors are appropriate.  
Figure 6.10 Scree Test 
As shown in Table 6.7, the three factors retained represent 81.385% of the variance of 
the 9 variables, which is considered sufficient in terms of total variance explained.  
Based on the above, three factors were retained for further analysis. 
Table 6.7 Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 51.741 4.657 51.741 51.741 
2 68.57 1.515 16.829 68.57 
3 81.385 1.153 12.815 81.385 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
− Step 5: Interpreting the factors  
With three factors to be extracted, the analysis now turns to interpreting the factors. 
The interpretation starts with calculating and examining the unrotated factor matrix, 
then the rotated factor matrix for significant factor loadings and adequate 
communalities, and finally describing and naming the factors based on the significant 
factor loadings characterizing each factor.  
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Table 6.8 Unrotated Component Matrix 
Component 
 
1 2 3 
OHA3 0.865 -0.289 -0.190 
OHA2 0.864 -0.257 -0.080 
OHA1 0.857 -0.258 -0.258 
OHA4 0.814 -0.272 -0.311 
ODA2 0.743 -0.073 0.385 
ORA2 0.544 0.779 -0.209 
ORA1 0.560 0.767 -0.212 
ODA1 0.578 0.138 0.655 
ODA3 0.520 0.067 0.531 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
                                 3 components extracted. 
Table 6.8 presents the unrotated component matrix. The three columns of numbers in 
Table 6.8 are the factor loadings of each variable on each of the factors. The factor 
solution extracts the factors in the order of their importance, with factor 1 accounting 
for the most variance (51.741%, see Table 6.7). Both the second and third factors have 
two significant loadings. In the research, significant loading is defined as greater than 
0.60.  
Table 6.9 Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
ODA1 1.000 0.782 
ODA2 1.000 0.706 
ODA3 1.000 0.556 
OHA1 1.000 0.867 
OHA2 1.000 0.818 
OHA3 1.000 0.869 
OHA4 1.000 0.833 
ORA1 1.000 0.947 
ORA2 1.000 0.947 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
However, the unrotated factor matrix did not have a completely clean set of factor 
loadings. Thus, it needs to be proceeded with a rotation process in order to result in a 
simpler and theoretically more meaningful factor pattern, and improve the 
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interpretation of factors (Hair et al. 2010).  Table 6.9 shows that all of the 
communalities are sufficiently high to proceed with the rotation process. By comparing 
Table 6.7 and 6.10, it can be found that the total amount of variance extracted remains 
unchanged in both unrotated and rotated solutions, 81.385%. However, the factor 
loading pattern and the percentage of variance for each of the factors are different. This 
makes the explanatory power shift to a more even distribution (Hair et al. 2010).  
Table 6.10 Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.409 37.883 37.883 
2 1.998 22.200 60.083 
3 1.917 21.302 81.385 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
The VARIMAX-rotated component matrix is presented in Table 6.11. In the rotated 
component matrix, each of the variables has a significant loading (>0.60) on only one 
factor. This is the major difference between the rotated and unrotated solutions. In 
addition, the communalities for each variable do not change when a rotation technique 
is applied (Hair et al. 2010). As Table 6.9 shown, all of the communalities are greater 
than 0.50 (the acceptable lower communality value is 0.50). This implies that all the 
variables meet acceptable levels of explanation.  
Table 6.11 Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
 
1 2 3 
OHA1 0.899 0.177 0.163 
OHA4 0.894 0.108 0.150 
OHA3 0.893 0.238 0.120 
OHA2 0.833 0.335 0.116 
ODA1 0.126 0.862 0.149 
ODA3 0.163 0.721 0.101 
ODA2 0.464 0.693 0.102 
ORA2 0.154 0.144 0.950 
ORA1 0.173 0.148 0.946 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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The above analysis and results collectively indicate that the 9-variable/3-factor 
solution is appropriate. The next issue is naming the factors based on the significant 
loadings. In Table 6.11, the variables are sorted by their loadings on each factor and 
loadings above 0.60 were shaded in gray. Factor 1 has four variables with significant 
loadings, and Factors 2 and 3 have three and two respectively. Each factor can be 
named based on the variables with significant loadings: 
1. Factor 1 Owner’s Human Assets:  OHA1, OHA4, OHA3 and OHA2. 
2. Factor 2 Owner’s Dedicated Assets: ODA1, ODA3 and ODA2. 
3. Factor 3 Owner’s Reputational Assets: ORA2 and ORA1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Component Plot in Rotated Space 
Figure 6.11 also illustrates the variables and loadings. 
− Step 6: Creating summated scales 
Creating summated scales is quite a simple procedure through which the variables with 
significant loadings on a factor are averaged (Hair et al. 2010).  In this case, the three-
factor solution suggests that three summated scales should be created. By doing so, 
each respondent will have three new variables that can be substituted for the original 9 
variables in the next stage multiple regression analysis. A new summated scale can 
represent the multiple aspects of a concept in a single measure, and the measurement 
error in a single item is thus reduced (Hair et al. 2010). 
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The last task in the factor analysis is measuring the reliability of scales with 
Cronbach’s alpha. Table 6.12 summarises the reliability statistics results and indicates 
that there is no Cronbach’s alpha less than the recommended level (0.70). Thus, the 
reliability is deemed to be acceptable.  
Table 6.12 Reliability Statistics 
Variables Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items Number of Cases 
OHA1, OHA2, OHA3, OHA4 .935 4 88 
ODA1, ODA2, ODA3 .740 3 88 
ORA1, ORA2 .943 2 88 
The overall variables .871 9 88 
6.4.2 Factor Analysis: NOPs’ Asset Specificity and Uncertainty 
Similar to owner’s asset specificity, NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty are also 
multi-dimensional constructs, which are represented by a number of measures. As 
mentioned before, NOPs’ asset specificity and uncertainty was measured respectively 
by 8 and 5 items, and therefore subject to factor analysis for reasons similar to owner’s 
asset specificity. The factor analysis procedure and requirements applied to NOPs’ 
asset specificity and uncertainty are same with that presented in Section 6.4.1. For the 
sake of brevity, this section only reports the factor analysis results.  
−  NOPs’ asset specificity 
The variables that were included in the factor analysis are those perceptions of survey 
respondents on 8 statements regarding NOPs’ asset specificity including NDA1, 
NDA2, NHA1, NHA2, NHA3, NRA1, NRA2 and NRA3 (The description of items can 
be found in Table 6.3). The development of the 8 items was based on TCE and 
previous empirical research. Correlation analysis, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity and 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy values all justify the appropriateness of the factor 
analysis.  
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Table 6.13 Total Variance Explained: NOPs’ Asset Specificity 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.589 44.859   
2 1.747 21.834   
3 1.028 12.85   
4 0.509 6.364 85.908 
5 0.413 5.157 91.064 
6 0.338 4.227 95.291 
7 0.216 2.701 97.993 
8 0.161 2.007 100 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 6.14 Total Variance Explained: NOPs’ Asset Specificity 
Component 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.450 30.626 30.626 
2 2.133 26.666 57.291 
3 1.780 22.252 79.544 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table 6.13 shows that the eigenvalues of the first three factors are greater than 1. The 
three factors explained 79.55% total variance (see Table 6.14), and therefore, retained 
for further analysis. In the rotated component matrix (see Table 6.15), it can be found 
that each of the variables has a significant loading (>0.60) on only one factor. Further, 
all of the communalities are greater than 0.50 (see Table 6.16). Collectively, the factor 
analysis indicates that the 8-variable/3-factor solution is appropriate. 
Based on the variables with significant loadings, three factors were named, which are: 
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1. Factor 1 NOPS’ Reputational Assets:  NRA2, NRA1, and NRA3. 
2. Factor 2 NOPS’ Human Assets: NHA1, NHA3 and NHA2.  
3. Factor 3 NOPS’ Dedicated Assets: NDA2 and NDA1. 
Table 6.15 Rotated Component Matrix: NOPs’ Asset Specificity 
Component 
 
1 2 3 
NRA2 0.922 0.208 -0.004 
NRA1 0.873 0.033 0.142 
NRA3 0.868 0.130 0.192 
NHA1 0.057 0.840 0.217 
NHA3 0.134 0.816 0.078 
NHA2 0.160 0.759 0.280 
NDA2 0.175 0.171 0.912 
NDA1 0.092 0.307 0.872 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 6.16 Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
NDA1 1.000 .863 
NDA2 1.000 .891 
NHA1 1.000 .756 
NHA2 1.000 .681 
NHA3 1.000 .690 
NRA1 1.000 .783 
NRA2 1.000 .893 
NRA3 1.000 .806 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Summated scales representing the three new variables were then created. The 
Cronbach’s alpha values are all greater than 0.7. 
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− Uncertainty 
Uncertainty was measured by 5 items that were developed based on TCE and policy 
guidelines for project alliancing. The variables included in the factor analysis are UN1, 
UN2, UN3, UN4 and UN5 (The description of items is presented in Table 6.3). 
Correlation analysis, Bartlett’s test of Sphericity and Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
values all confirmed the appropriateness of the factor analysis. The factor analysis 
extracted and named one factor, which explains 63.553% of total variance. The 
Cronbach’s alpha value is 0.848. The new produced summated scale that represents the 
uncertainty will be substituting the original five items in the subsequent multiple 
regression analysis.  
The full list of variables and detailed results of the factor analysis performed in this 
research are summarised and presented in Table 6.17 below. 
Table 6.17 Full List of Factors and Detailed Results of the Factor Analysis 
Factors and Contents Factor Loading Percentage of Variance Explained 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Means 
Owner’s Dedicated Assets  
- 22.200 0.740 3.66 
1. ODA1 0.862   3.52 
2. ODA2 0.693   4.90 
3. ODA3 0.721   2.55 
Owner’s Human Assets 
- 37.883 0.935 5.52 
4. OHA1 0.899   5.42 
5. OHA2 0.833   4.88 
6. OHA3 0.893   5.80 
7. OHA4 0.894   5.99 
Owner’s Reputational Assets 
- 21.302 0.943 5.85 
8. ORA1 0.946   5.89 
9. ORA2 0.950   5.82 
Total percentage of variance - 81.385   
Overall Cronbach’s alpha value for 
Owner’s Assets -  0.871  
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Factors and Contents Factor Loading Percentage of Variance Explained 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Means 
NOPs’ Dedicated Assets 
- 22.252 0.848 4.42 
1. NDA1 0.872   4.34 
2. NDA2 0.912   4.50 
NOPs’ Human Assets - 26.666 0.787 5.70 
3. NHA1 0.840   5.48 
4. NHA2 0.759   5.51 
5. NHA3 0.816   6.10 
NOPs’ Reputational Assets 
- 30.626 0.887 5.67 
6. NRA1 0.873   5.91 
7. NRA2 0.922   5.59 
8. NRA3 0.868   5.50 
Total percentage of variance - 81.385   
Overall Cronbach’s alpha value for 
NOPs’ Assets -  0.815  
Uncertainty - 63.553 0.848 5.10 
1. UN1 0.760   4.85 
2. UN2 0.744   3.97 
3. UN3 0.847   5.67 
4. UN4 0.827   5.30 
5. UN5 0.803   5.74 
Note: The Bartlett’s Sphericity tests are all significant at the 0.001 level; 
          The Measure of Sampling Adequacy values are all greater than 0.5. 
6.4.3 Validity and Reliability 
Validity tests how well a survey measures what it sets out to measure. In the context of 
establishing the validity of latent variables, factorial validity is argued to be the most 
important and appropriate approach among a number of alternatives (Gefen and Straub 
2005). Latent variables normally exist on the basis of indirect evidence. It is 
impossible to adequately describe them by a single measure. Factorial validity, 
examines how well the measures of latent constructs fit the underlying theories, and 
the degree to which a test do actually measure the theorised construct (Sekaran 1992). 
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According to Gefen and Straub (2005), factorial validity was most frequently assessed 
with an exploratory factor analysis. Exploratory factor analysis has been performed in 
Section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. The results confirm that the operationalization of latent 
variables (see Section 5.5) fit the underlying theories and the measurement items relate 
to the constructs quite well. Thus, the validity is considered to be acceptable.  
Reliability examines to what extent a measuring instrument produces stable and 
consistent results. The reliability of scales has been assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. 
As Table 6.17 shown, there is no Cronbach’s alpha less than the recommended level 
(0.70). Thus, the reliability is deemed to be acceptable.  
6.5 Multiple Regression Analysis  
In this section, the hypothesis proposed in Chapter 4 will be tested by using multiple 
regression analysis techniques. Multiple regression analysis is appropriate for this 
research because it is the most widely-used and versatile dependence technique to 
explore the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent 
variables, and to provide both prediction and explanation to researchers (Hair et al. 
2010). The primary predictions in this research involve the relationships between 
transaction attributes and transaction costs in project alliances, and the relationships 
between transaction attributes and the efficiency of project alliancing. In this research, 
multiple regression analysis, on the one hand, examines the relationships between 
dependent and independent variables, and on the other hand assesses the extent to what 
independent variables influence dependent variable and how. The regression analysis 
performed in this research follows Hair et al. (2010)’s guidelines. The analysis 
processes and results are presented in this section. Chapter 7 will discuss the findings 
in detail. 
6.5.1 Design of the Regression Analysis 
The relationships between transaction attributes and transaction costs were discussed 
in Section 4.4. Following the discussion, the impacts of differential transaction 
attributes on three individual transaction cost elements in project alliancing context 
were proposed. The relevant hypotheses can be categorized as follows.  
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− Group A: H1a, H2a and H3a suggest that set-up costs will increase with the 
increasing asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency in project alliances. 
− Group B: H1b, H2b and H3b predict that monitoring costs will increase as asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency rise in project alliances. 
− Group C: H1c, H2c and H3c hypothesize that enforcement costs are higher under 
conditions of higher level of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency in project 
alliances. 
− Group D: H4, H5 and H6 propose that project alliancing is more effective at 
reducing transaction costs under conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency than under conditions of low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. 
Table 6.18 Dependent and Independent Variables in the Regression Analysis 
Hypotheses and 
Research Question 
Dependent 
Variable c Independent Variables 
c
 
Group A 
Research question 1 
Set-up costs 
(Coded as ‘SCs’) 
Owner’s dedicated assets (Coded as ‘ODA’)a; 
Owner's human assets (Coded as ‘OHA’)a;  
Owner's reputation assets (Coded as ‘ORA’)a;  
Non-owner's dedicated assets (Coded as ‘NDA’)a; 
Non-owner's human assets (Coded as ‘NHA’)a; 
Non-owner's reputation assets (Coded as ‘NRA’)a; 
Uncertainty (Coded as ‘UN’)a; and 
Project value (Coded as ‘PV’)b 
Group B 
Research question 1 
Monitoring costs 
(Coded as ‘MCs’) 
Group C 
Research question 1 
Enforcement costs 
(Coded as ‘ECs’) 
Group D 
Research question 2 
Reducing effect of 
project alliancing 
on transaction costs 
(Coded as ‘RTCs’) 
a: use summated scales created through factor analysis in Section 6.4; 
b: use ‘Project Value’ as the substitute for ‘Frequency’; 
c: see Section 5.5 for the operationalization and measurement of variables. 
Four multiple regression models were proposed to test the above hypotheses. The 
dependent and independent variables to be included in each regression procedure are 
listed in the Table 6.18 above. To ensure the scales of all variables are compatible, the 
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logarithm of ‘Project value’ was used to replace the original ‘Project value’ in the 
regression procedure.  
According to Hair et al. (2010), the recommended sample size for multiple regression 
analysis is 50 observations minimum. Further, the minimum ratio of observations to 
independent variables is 5:1. The survey conducted in this research obtained 88 
effective responses, resulting in 88 observations available for analysis. The sample of 
88 observations not only satisfies the minimum sample size requirement, but also 
meets the guideline for the minimum ratio of observations to independent variable (5:1) 
with an actual ratio of 11:1 (88 observations with 8 variables). Table 6.19 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables included in multiple 
regression analysis. 
Table 6.19 Descriptive Statistics: Variables Included in the Regression Analysis 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
UN 88 3.00 6.80 5.10 0.77 
ODA 88 1.67 5.33 3.65 0.67 
OHA 88 3.00 7.00 5.52 0.89 
ORA 88 1.00 7.00 5.85 1.18 
NDA 88 1.00 6.50 4.42 1.23 
NHA 88 4.00 7.00 5.70 0.66 
NRA 88 2.67 7.00 5.67 0.98 
PV 88 3.69 7.82 5.65 0.79 
SCs 88 1.00 7.00 4.97 1.50 
MCs 88 1.00 7.00 4.40 1.36 
ECs 88 1.00 7.00 2.53 1.36 
RTCs 88 1.00 7.00 4.82 1.35 
Valid N (listwise) 88 
    
At the initial stage of regression analysis, linearity and normality of the individual 
variables were checked. Scatterplots of individual variables did not show any nonlinear 
relationships between the dependent and the independent variables. The Levene test 
for each variable confirms the homogeneity of variance. Visual inspection of normal 
P-P plots found that the distributions of all variables are assumed to be approximately 
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normal, and therefore no corrective actions are needed since slight departures from 
normal distribution have little effect on statistical analysis (Norušis 2008).  
Since the research problems have been well established, the dependent and 
independent variables were specified, and the sample size deemed adequate, the 
multiple regression analysis now turns on estimating the regression models and 
assessing overall model fit. This research chooses the confirmatory specification 
approach as the estimation technique through which all the independent variables are 
directly enter into the regression equation at the same time. Selecting the confirmatory 
approach is mainly due to 1) it is the simplest and most demanding approach for 
specifying the regression model, and 2) the set of independent variables, which heavily 
rely on theoretical justification, have been well specified (Hair et al. 2010). In Section 
6.5.2, the first model in which set-up costs are the dependent variable was used as an 
illustrative example to demonstrate the detailed process and requirements of multiple 
regression analysis in this research. Summarised results for the remaining three 
regression models are presented in Sections 6.5.3, 6.5.4 and 6.5.5 respectively. 
6.5.2 Set-up Costs as the Dependent Variable 
As shown in Table 6.18, ‘set-up costs’ was selected as the dependent variable in the 
first regression model. This model is stated as follows: 
Model 1: SCs=b0+b1ODA+b2OHA+b3ORA+b4NDA+b5NHA+b6NRA+b7UN+b8PV 
The estimation is a quite straightforward process as it was computed automatically by 
running the SPSS 17.0 program. The regression model summary is presented in Table 
6.20, which gives some information about the goodness of fit of the regression model. 
The coefficient of determination (R Square) is interpreted as the goodness of fit of a 
regression, and deemed as the overall measure of the usefulness of a regression. In this 
regression model, the R Square is 0.917 which means that 91.7% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the set of independent variables in the regression. 
The value of R Square can vary between 0 and 1. An R Square of 1.0 indicates that the 
regression line perfectly fits the data. The higher the value of R Square, the greater the 
explanatory power of the regression equation (Hair et al. 2010). The adjusted 
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coefficient of determination (Adjusted R Square), which is adjusted for the number of 
independent variables and the sample size, is given along with the R Square. The 
Adjusted R Square will not always be greater than R Square (Rawlings et al. 1998). In 
general, the explanatory power of the regression equation is assumed to be great.  
Table 6.20 Regression Model Summary (SCs as the Dependent Variable) 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
.958 0.917 0.909 0.452 2.149 
Table 6.21 illustrates ANOVA or F test result. The F test, which is the test of 
significance of the multiple linear regression, provides the statistical test for the overall 
model fit in terms of the F ratio. The F-test has the null hypothesis that there is no 
linear relationship between the variables. Table 6.21 shows that the F ratio is 
statistically significant at a level of .000, and thus rejecting the null hypothesis. It is 
confirmed that there is a linear relationship between the variables in the regression 
model (i.e., that R Square is significantly greater than zero). 
Table 6.21 ANOVA (SCs as the Dependent Variable) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 178.756 8 22.345 109.359 .000 
Residual 16.142 79 0.204 
  
Total 194.898 87 
   
Table 6.22 contains such information as the unstandardized and standardized 
regression coefficient, the standard error of the coefficient, the t value of variables in 
the analysis, and the collinearity statistics. The estimated unstandardized regression 
coefficients, termed “B coefficients”, indicate the extent to which the independent 
variable is associated with the dependent variables, and represent the type and strength 
of relationships between the independent and dependent variables (Hair et al. 2010). 
For example, in Table 6.22, the B coefficient corresponding to ‘UN’ is 0.454 which 
denotes that the relationship between ‘UN’ and ‘SCs’ is positive, and ‘SCs’ is expected 
to increase by 0.454 as ‘UN’ increases by one unit. However, the standardized 
regression coefficient (Beta coefficient) is more useful for explanatory purposes 
because it allows for a direct comparison between coefficients in terms of their relative 
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explanatory power of the dependent variable (Hair et al. 2010). The larger the Beta 
coefficient value, the more important the corresponding independent variable is in 
explaining the dependent variable. For example, 0.317 is the largest Beta coefficient in 
Table 6.22, which means that ‘PV’ has a relatively larger effect on ‘SCs’ than any 
other independent variables.   
In Table 6.22, the t values that are statistically significant at the 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 levels, 
were sorted and marked with ‘*’, ‘**’ or ‘***’, respectively. The regression 
coefficients of four independent variables such as ‘UN’, ‘OHA’, ‘NHA’ and ‘PV’, plus 
the constant, are significant at the 0.01 level. In addition, the four independent 
variables have positive coefficients, meaning that an increase in the perceptions on 
these variables has a positive impact on predicted set-up costs. Other independent 
variables including ‘ODA’, ‘ORA’, ‘NDA’ and ‘NRA’ were found to be insignificant. 
Thus, the regression analysis confirms that ‘UN’, ‘OHA’, ‘NHA’ and ‘PV’ have 
significant relationships with ‘SCs’. The four independent variables are sequenced as 
‘PV’, ‘OHA’, ‘NHA’ and ‘UN’ in descending order according to their relative impact 
and importance of the independent variables in the regression model. Now, the 
equation would be written: 
Equation 1: SCs=-6.701 + 0.491OHA + 0.556NHA + 0.454UN+ 0.603PV 
Table 6.22 Regression Coefficients (SCs as the Dependent Variable) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -6.701 0.500 
 
-13.401*** .000 
  
UN 0.454 0.158 0.233 2.876*** 0.005 0.810 1.234 
ODA 0.089 0.092 0.040 0.972 0.334 0.627 1.595 
OHA 0.491 0.152 0.291 3.234*** 0.002 0.586 1.706 
ORA -0.053 0.046 -0.042 -1.149 0.254 0.796 1.256 
NDA -0.075 0.051 -0.062 -1.477 0.144 0.600 1.666 
NHA 0.556 0.109 0.247 5.090*** .000 0.807 1.239 
NRA 0.068 0.054 0.044 1.254 0.214 0.845 1.184 
PV 0.603 0.111 0.317 5.412*** .000 0.792 1.263 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two tailed) 
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Table 6.22 also checks for multicollinearity in the regression model. Multicollinearity 
is the extent to which independent variables are correlated with each other, and occurs 
when a independent variable is highly correlated with other independent variables 
(Hair et al. 2010). In this research, the variance inflation factor (VIF) or Tolerance 
(inverse of VIF) was used to check multicollinearity among the independent variables 
for the regression model. The cut-off level of VIF is set at 10 (Tolerance: 0.1), which 
is the commonly acceptable and typical suggested threshold level (Craney and Surles 
2002; Hair et al. 2010; O’brien 2007). If VIF is greater than 10, there is a high 
suspicion of multicollinearity. Thus, VIF should be less than 10 (or Tolerance >0.1) for 
all variables. Table 6.22 shows all the VIF values are lower than 10 considerably. 
Therefore, it is deemed that there is no proof of multicollinearity in this regression 
model. 
To meet the assumptions required for the regression analysis, normality, independence 
of the residuals, homoscedasticity, and linearity were examined by checking the 
residuals. Following Norušis (2008) and Hair et al. (2010)’s recommendation, the 
detailed methods are listed as follows.  
− Normality: Using normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual to check for 
the normality of residuals. If a distribution is normal, the residuals fall more or less 
on the diagonal line with no substantial or systematic departures. The normal 
probability plot in Figure 6.12 indicates that the residuals are considered to meet the 
normal distribution requirement.  
− Independence of the residuals: Adopting Durbin-Watson test, which is the 
commonly used approach to test this assumption, to check for the independence of 
the residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistic should be close to 2 if there is no 
correlation between successive residuals. As shown in Table 6.20, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is 2.149, suggesting that adjacent residuals are not correlated.  
− Homoscedasticity: Plotting the studentized residuals against the predicted values to 
check for constant variance. In the scatterplot presented in Figure 6.13, the residuals 
appear to be randomly scattered around a horizontal line through 0. Therefore, the 
variance is assumed to be constant. 
 
 Page | 162 
Figure 6.12 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Figure 6.13 Scatterplot Figure 
− Linearity: Assessing the linearity through analysis of residuals and partial 
regression plots. The scatterplot in Figure 6.13 does not show any nonlinear pattern 
to the residuals, thus ensuring that the overall equation is linear. The partial 
regression plot was used to check for the linearity of each independent variable to 
ensure its best representation in the model. Figure 6.14 shows that relationships 
between each independent variable and dependent variable are linear. The 
independent variables such as ‘UN’, ‘OHA’, ‘NHA’ and ‘PV’ have strong and 
significant effects in the regression model. Other independent variables including 
‘ODA’, ‘ORA’, ‘NDA’ and ‘NRA’ are less well defined, both in slope and scatter 
of the points, thus demonstrating their lesser effect in the model. This can also be 
evidenced by relatively smaller regression coefficients and significant level.  
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Figure 6.14 Partial Regression Plots 
6.5.3 Monitoring Costs as the Dependent Variable 
For testing Group B hypotheses, the second regression model was proposed. As shown 
in Table 6.18, the dependent variable is monitoring costs (MCs) in this model. This 
model is stated as follows: 
Model 2: MCs=b0+b1ODA+b2OHA+b3ORA+b4NDA+b5NHA+b6NRA+b7UN+b8PV 
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Table 6.23 Result of Regression Analysis (MCs as the Dependent Variable) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -5.795 0.371 
 
-15.614*** .000 
  
UN 0.354 0.117 0.199 3.018*** .003 0.810 1.234 
ODA 0.177 0.068 0.086 2.587** .012 0.627 1.595 
OHA 0.345 0.113 0.224 3.058*** .003 0.586 1.706 
ORA 0.002 0.034 0.002 0.063 .950 0.796 1.256 
NDA 0.238 0.038 0.215 6.302*** .000 0.600 1.666 
NHA 0.437 0.081 0.213 5.388*** .000 0.807 1.239 
NRA 0.012 0.040 0.009 0.297 .767 0.845 1.184 
PV 0.393 0.083 0.227 4.751*** .000 0.792 1.263 
R Square: 
Adjusted R Square: 
0.945 
0.939 
F: 
Durbin-Watson: 
168.998*** 
1.742 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two tailed) 
The procedure and requirements for regression analysis are similar to the regression 
analysis 1 reported in Section 6.5.2. Table 6.23 summarises such information as 
regression model summary, ANOVA, regression coefficients. As Table 6.23 shown, 
the explanatory power of the regression equation is deemed to be high since 94.5% of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. 
ANOVA also demonstrates that R Square is significantly greater than zero, suggesting 
that a linear relationship exists between the dependent and independent variables. The 
regression result shows that the six independent variables such as ‘UN’, ‘ODA’, 
‘OHA’, ‘NDA’, ‘NHA’ and ‘PV’ are correlated with ‘MCs’ significantly and 
positively. The regression coefficients of ‘ORA’ and ‘NRA’ were found to be 
insignificant, suggesting that there are no significant correlations between ‘ORA’, 
‘NRA’ and ‘MCs’. Based on the estimation, the equation would be written: 
Equation 2: MCs=-5.795 + 0.177ODA + 0.345OHA + 0.238NDA + 0.437 NHA + 
0.354UN+ 0.393PV 
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6.5.3 Enforcement Costs as the Dependent Variable 
The third regression model is proposed to test the Group C hypotheses. Enforcement 
costs (ECs) was introduced as the dependent variable. The proposed regression model 
is written as follows: 
Model 3: ECs=b0+b1ODA+b2OHA+b3ORA+b4NDA+b5NHA+b6NRA+b7UN+b8PV 
Table 6.24 Result of Regression Analysis (ECs as the Dependent Variable) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -4.724 0.722   -6.542*** .000     
UN 1.897 0.228 1.073 8.321*** .000 0.810 1.234 
ODA 0.036 0.133 0.017 0.268 .789 0.627 1.595 
OHA -0.356 0.219 -0.232 -1.622 .109 0.586 1.706 
ORA -0.159 0.066 -0.138 -2.388** .019 0.796 1.256 
NDA 0.077 0.074 0.069 1.043 .300 0.600 1.666 
NHA -0.019 0.158 -0.009 -0.119 .906 0.807 1.239 
NRA 0.002 0.078 0.001 0.019 .985 0.845 1.184 
PV 0.017 0.161 0.010 0.107 .915 0.792 1.263 
R Square: 
Adjusted R Square: 
0.789 
0.768 
F: 
Durbin-Watson: 
37.027*** 
2.006 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two tailed) 
The regression result is presented in Table 6.24 above. The result shows that only ‘UN’ 
and ‘ORA’ have significant correlations with ‘ECs’. The coefficients of other 
independent variables are insignificant. In addition, ‘ORA’ was found to be negatively 
correlated with ‘ECs’. The analysis results in the third equation: 
Equation 3: ECs= -4.724 - 0.159 ORA + 1.897UN 
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6.5.4 Reducing Effect of Alliancing on Transaction Costs as the Dependent 
Variable 
The fourth regression model is introduced to test Group D hypotheses, and was 
concerned with the reducing effect of project alliancing on transaction costs. As shown 
in Table 6.18, the independent variables that included regression model 4 are same 
with the previous three regression models. The dependent variable is survey 
respondents’ perception on the capability of project alliancing to economize 
transaction costs. This model is stated as follows: 
Model 4: RTCs=b0+b1ODA+b2OHA+b3ORA+b4NDA+b5NHA+b6NRA+ b7UN+b8PV 
The regression result is summarised in Table 6.25 below.  
Table 6.25 Result of Regression Analysis (RTCs as the Dependent Variable) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -4.265 .663 
 
-6.436*** .000 
  
UN .419 .209 .238 2.004** .048 0.810 1.234 
ODA .262 .122 .129 2.152** .034 0.627 1.595 
OHA .348 .201 .228 1.728* .088 0.586 1.706 
ORA -.015 .061 -.013 -.252 .802 0.796 1.256 
NDA .236 .068 .214 3.486*** .001 0.600 1.666 
NHA .303 .145 .149 2.092** .040 0.807 1.239 
NRA -.007 .071 -.005 -.092 .927 0.845 1.184 
PV .253 .148 .147 1.711* .091 0.792 1.263 
R Square: 
Adjusted R Square: 
0.822 
0.804 
F: 
Durbin-Watson: 
45.546*** 
2.037 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two tailed) 
Table 6.25 shows that the regression coefficient of ‘NDA’ is significant at the 0.001 
level. ‘UN’, ‘ODA’ and ‘NHA’ are significant at the 0.05 level. ‘OHA’ and ‘PV’ are 
significant at 0.1 level. Therefore, the dependent variable is assumed to be 
significantly associated with the above six independent variables. The value of R 
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Square (0.822) indicates that the regression model has relatively high explanation 
power. The F value is statistically significant at 0.01 level, suggesting the existence of 
the linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  The analysis 
results in the fourth equation: 
Equation 4: RTCs= -4.265 + 0.262ODA + 0.348OHA + 0.236NDA + 0.303NHA + 
0.419UN + 0.253PV 
6.6 Rank Order of Control Mechanisms Affecting Transaction Costs 
Section 4.6 discussed the control mechanisms used in project alliances and proposed 
that these control mechanisms may be useful in mitigating and managing transaction 
risks. The impact of the mechanisms of project alliances on individual transaction cost 
elements (i.e., set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs) was investigated 
by the questionnaire survey. In the survey, control mechanisms of project alliances 
were condensed into fourteen items. The description of the items can be found in Table 
6.2.  
The purpose of this section is to analyse the collected data to provide solutions to 
research question 3. The major data analysis techniques adopted in this section include 
1) descriptive statistics which is used for calculating mean score for each variables, 
and ranking the corresponding mechanisms, and 2) paired-samples T test by which the 
means of individual variables are compared, and the variables with the same level of 
significance are grouped. The analysis process and results are reported in the following 
sub-sections.  
6.6.1 Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
As mentioned in Section 5.6.1, the impact of individual control mechanism of project 
alliances on set-up costs was measured by asking respondents to rate to what extent do 
they agree/disagree with the statement regarding whether a specific control mechanism 
contributes to reducing set-up costs on a seven-point Likert scale. If the mean score of 
a mechanism is greater than ‘4’ (the middle point of the seven-point Likert scale), then 
the mechanism is deemed to have the ability to reduce set-up costs. Table 6.26 below 
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arranges the fourteen mechanisms in descending order of their mean values. In Table 
6.26, it can be found that mean values of F10, F9, F11 and F1 are greater than ‘4’, 
suggesting that the four mechanisms contribute to reducing set-up costs. Other 
mechanisms whose mean values are less than ‘4’ are not considered to have the ability 
to reduce set-up costs.  
Table 6.26 Descriptive Statistics: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
Mechanism N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
F10 88 1 7 4.88 1.24 
F9 88 1 7 4.77 1.51 
F11 88 2 7 4.67 1.31 
F1 88 1 6 4.32 .99 
F5 88 2 7 3.99 1.15 
F8 88 2 7 3.94 1.15 
F4 88 1 7 3.91 .87 
F6 88 2 7 3.83 .90 
F12 88 2 7 3.80 .85 
F2 88 2 5 3.59 .64 
F13 88 1 5 3.58 .80 
F3 88 2 7 3.50 .97 
F7 88 2 5 3.47 .55 
F14 88 1 5 3.45 .62 
However, the information presented in Table 6.26 does not disclose the mean 
differences between mechanisms. If there is no difference between the average values 
for two mechanisms, then the two mechanisms could be grouped together and distinct 
from other mechanisms. Therefore, paired-samples T tests need to be performed to 
check whether the means of different mechanisms are equal. In this research, the 
procedure for paired-samples T tests is described as follows.  
The paired-samples T tests are to be performed between the highest ranked mechanism 
and the other mechanisms one by one, i.e., F10 and F9, F10 and F11, F10 and F1 etc. 
If the observed significance level is greater than 0.05 (95% confidence level was 
adopted in the paired-samples T tests), it suggests that there is no significant difference 
between the two mechanisms. In the first round of paired-samples T tests, the 
mechanisms with the same level of significance can be clustered together and labelled 
as the first-order mechanisms for interpretation or further analysis. The same 
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procedure is performed for other mechanisms that have been excluded in the first 
round paired-samples T tests. By iterating the paired-samples T test procedure, the 
fourteen mechanisms are grouped. The similar approach has been used by a number of 
researchers such as Drew and Skitmore (1997), Shirazi (2001), Alwi et al. (2002) and 
Budiawan (2003).  
Using the procedure reported above, the paired-samples T test was performed for the 
top two mechanisms i.e. F10 and F9, which are the first and second ranked 
mechanisms respectively in Table 6.26. As shown in Table 6.27, the computed 
significance level is 0.452, which is greater than the critical significance level 0.05. 
Thus, it is assumed that there is no significant difference between the two mechanisms. 
The means of the two mechanisms are equal. F10 and F9 can be in the same group. 
Table 6.27 Paired-samples T Test for F10 and F9 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F10 - F9 .102 1.269 .1353 -.167 .371 .756 87 .452 
The next paired-samples T test was performed for F10 and the third ranked mechanism 
F11.  The result is presented in Table 6.28 and indicates that no significant difference 
was found between F10 and F11, as the computed significance value is greater than 
0.05. This implies that F11 belongs to the same group with F10 and F9.  
Table 6.28 Paired-samples T Test for F10 and F11 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 2 F10 - F11 .205 1.23 .131 -.057 .466 1.556 87 .123 
In the first round, 13 paired-samples T tests were performed. When the test came to 
pair F10 – F1, the computed significance value is lower than 0.05 (see Table 6.29), 
meaning that F1 was found to be significantly different from F10 at the 5% confidence 
level, and therefore should be excluded from the first group (F10, F9 and F11 group) 
and categorized into the subsequent group. The subsequent tests in the first round 
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confirmed that other mechanisms are significantly different from F10. Consequently, 
the second round of paired-samples T tests, which start with the pair F1 – F5, and end 
with the pair F1 – F14, was initiated.  
Table 6.29 Paired-samples T Test for F10 and F1 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 3 F10 – F1 .557 1.183 .126 .306 .807 4.416 87 .000 
In total, the analysis performed four rounds paired-samples T tests for 36 paired data. 
As a result, the fourteen mechanisms were categorized into four groups. Although their 
mean scores are different, the mechanisms in each group are not significantly different 
from each other. The paired-samples T test result is enclosed in Appendix C. 
Table 6.30 Ranking and Grouping: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
Rank Mechanism Mean Group 
1 F10 4.88 
1 2 F9 4.77 
3 F11 4.67 
4 F1 4.32 2 
5 F5 3.99 
3 
6 F8 3.94 
7 F4 3.91 
8 F6 3.83 
9 F12 3.80 
10 F2 3.59 
4 
11 F13 3.58 
12 F3 3.50 
13 F7 3.47 
14 F14 3.45 
As shown in Table 6.30, Group 1 mechanisms (F10, F9 and F11) are ranked as the 
most important mechanisms that contribute to reducing set-up costs. Group 2 (F1) 
comes second and is less important than group 1. Mechanisms in Group 3 and 4 are 
not considered to have the ability to reducing set-up costs since their mean scores are 
lower than ‘4’.  
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6.6.2 Mechanisms Affecting Monitoring Costs 
The same data analysis methods and procedures presented in Section 6.6.1 were 
adopted in analysing impacts of the fourteen mechanisms on monitoring costs. The 
analysis started with  descriptive statistics by which the mean scores of mechanisms 
were computed and arranged in descending order. As shown in Table 6.31, all mean 
scores are greater than ‘4’, suggesting that the fourteen mechanisms of project 
alliances contribute to reducing monitoring costs. 
Table 6.31 Descriptive Statistics: Mechanisms Affecting Monitoring Costs 
Mechanism N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
F10 88 3 7 5.76 1.05 
F11 88 1 7 5.67 1.11 
F9 88 3 7 5.65 .83 
F14 88 3 7 5.47 1.05 
F13 88 1 7 5.41 1.08 
F5 88 3 7 5.39 1.09 
F6 88 3 7 5.33 1.01 
F1 88 3 7 5.25 .89 
F2 88 3 7 5.24 .96 
F3 88 3 7 5.17 .99 
F7 88 3 7 5.17 1.11 
F8 88 3 7 5.02 .92 
F12 88 1 7 4.97 1.11 
F4 88 3 7 4.94 .98 
Following descriptive statistics, paired-samples T tests were performed in order to 
compare the means between mechanisms and group the fourteen mechanisms. Table 
6.32 present the first-round paired-samples T tests results, indicating that F10, F11 and 
F9 are not significantly different from each other. Thus, the three mechanisms were 
categorized into one group, and ranked as the most effective mechanisms that 
contribute to reducing monitoring costs. 
Mechanisms excluded from the first group were paired and tested in the second round 
of paired-samples T tests. As Table 6.33 shows, the means of F14, F13, F5 and F6 are 
not significantly different from each other. The four mechanisms fall into the second 
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group, and are less important than mechanisms in the first group in terms of the ability 
to reduce transaction costs. 
Table 6.32 First Round Paired-samples T Test 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F10 - F11 .091 .721 .077 -.062 .244 1.182 87 .240 
Pair 2 F10 - F9 .114 .823 .088 -.061 .288 1.296 87 .198 
Pair 3 F10 - F14 .295 .730 .078 .141 .450 3.799 87 .000 
Pair 4 F10 - F13 .352 .959 .102 .149 .556 3.444 87 .001 
Pair 5 F10 - F5 .375 .862 .092 .192 .558 4.082 87 .000 
Pair 6 F10 - F6 .432 .944 .101 .232 .632 4.289 87 .000 
Pair 7 F10 - F1 .511 .971 .103 .306 .717 4.941 87 .000 
Pair 8 F10 - F2 .523 .947 .101 .322 .723 5.180 87 .000 
Pair 9 F10 - F3 .591 .918 .098 .396 .785 6.040 87 .000 
Pair 10 F10 - F7 .591 1.035 .110 .372 .810 5.354 87 .000 
Pair 11 F10 - F8 .739 .988 .105 .529 .948 7.011 87 .000 
Pair 12 F10 - F12 .795 1.136 .121 .555 1.036 6.567 87 .000 
Pair 13 F10 - F4 .818 1.012 .108 .604 1.033 7.585 87 .000 
Table 6.33 Second Round Paired-samples T Test 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F14 - F13 .057 .939 .100 -.142 .256 .568 87 .572 
Pair 2 F14 - F5 .080 .874 .093 -.106 .265 .854 87 .396 
Pair 3 F14 - F6 .136 .985 .105 -.072 .345 1.299 87 .197 
Pair 4 F14 - F1 .216 .999 .107 .004 .428 2.027 87 .046 
Pair 5 F14 - F2 .227 .931 .099 .030 .425 2.289 87 .024 
Pair 6 F14 - F3 .295 .924 .099 .100 .491 2.999 87 .004 
Pair 7 F14 - F7 .295 .937 .100 .097 .494 2.959 87 .004 
Pair 8 F14 - F8 .443 .933 .099 .246 .641 4.456 87 .000 
Pair 9 F14 - F12 .500 1.155 .123 .255 .745 4.062 87 .000 
Pair 10 F14 - F4 .523 1.039 .111 .303 .743 4.719 87 .000 
Table 6.34 indicates that the third round of paired-samples T tests groups F1, F2, F3 
and F7 together.  
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Table 6.34 Third Round Paired-samples T Test 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F1 - F2 .011 .652 .070 -.127 .150 .163 87 .871 
Pair 2 F1 - F3 .080 .834 .089 -.097 .256 .895 87 .373 
Pair 3 F1 - F7 .080 .985 .105 -.129 .288 .757 87 .451 
Pair 4 F1 - F8 .227 .881 .094 .041 .414 2.421 87 .018 
Pair 5 F1 - F12 .284 1.093 .116 .053 .516 2.439 87 .017 
Pair 6 F1 - F4 .307 .764 .081 .145 .469 3.770 87 .000 
The fourth group was formed in the last round of paired-samples T tests (see Table 
6.35 below). Table 6.36 shows the ranking and grouping of the fourteen mechanisms. 
Table 6.35 The Fourth Round Paired-samples T Test 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F8 - F12 .057 1.108 .118 -.178 .291 .481 87 .632 
Pair 2 F8 - F4 .080 .776 .083 -.085 .244 .961 87 .339 
Table 6.36 Ranking and Grouping: Mechanisms Affecting Monitoring Costs 
Rank Mechanism Mean Group 
1 F10 5.76 
1 2 F11 5.67 
3 F9 5.65 
4 F14 5.47 
2 
5 F13 5.41 
6 F5 5.39 
7 F6 5.33 
8 F1 5.25 
3 
9 F2 5.24 
10 F3 5.17 
11 F7 5.17 
12 F8 5.02 
4 13 F12 4.97 
14 F4 4.94 
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6.6.3 Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement Costs 
The same technique and procedure were used for analysing the impact of the fourteen 
mechanisms on enforcement costs. As Table 6.37 shows, the paired-samples T tests 
suggest a four-group solution for the fourteen mechanisms. The paired-samples T test 
result is enclosed in Appendix C. 
Table 6.37 Ranking and Grouping: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement Costs 
Rank Mechanism Mean Group 
1 F14 5.84 
1 
2 F10 5.76 
3 F13 5.74 
4 F5 5.70 
5 F6 5.66 
6 F11 5.57 
2 7 F9 5.51 
8 F7 5.51 
9 F3 5.39 
3 10 F2 5.38 
11 F1 5.31 
12 F4 5.16 
4 13 F8 5.15 
14 F12 4.90 
6.7 The Use of Interorganizational Cost Management in Project 
Alliances 
The survey preliminary investigated 34 cost management techniques and practices that 
may be used in alliances. The cost management techniques were described and coded 
in Section 4.7. The purpose of this section is to analyse the collected data to provide a 
basic vision on the IOCM practices in alliances. By applying a descriptive-statistics 
approach, the most widely used cost management techniques are identified and ranked. 
The analysis presented in this section only provides limited solutions to Research 
Question 4. Section 7.5 will be discuss the results and identify issues to be further 
investigated in the next stage interviews. 
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Figure 6.15 ranks the 34 cost management techniques and practices according to their 
using frequency in project alliances. Among the 34 practices, CM1-12 are relevant to 
joint project proposal development, and are used for setting target costs for project 
alliances. CM13-31 are mainly employed during the project delivery phase. CM32-34 
are used for dealing with project scope change and adjustment to target costs.  
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Figure 6.15 Using Frequency of Cost Management Practices in Alliances 
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6.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the date obtained through the questionnaire survey was analysed by 
using statistical techniques such as descriptive statistics, two-independent-samples T 
test, factor analysis, multiple linear regression analysis, and paired-samples T test.  
The data analysis started with exploring the nature of the sample characteristics, 
including respondents’ profiles and the profiles of typical alliancing projects. Results 
show that survey respondents have sufficient knowledge of project alliancing. They are 
also highly experienced in the construction industry as well as project alliancing 
business. The typical alliancing projects are also considered to be highly representative 
in the Australian construction industry. The reliability of information is warranted. 
In the followed data analysis, two major statistical techniques—factor analysis and 
multiple linear regression analysis—were employed to examine the relationships 
between transactions attributes and transaction costs in project alliances, and test the 
governance performance of project alliancing. The analysis follows the guidelines of 
Norušis (2008) and Hair et al. (2010) strictly, and was conducted using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Two-independent-samples T test was 
performed prior to factor analysis to check the homogeneity of variables. No 
significant difference was found between the two groups, suggesting that the two 
groups could be pooled together for further analysis. Except project value, other 
independent variables such as both owners’ and NOPs’ asset specificity, and 
uncertainty are multi-item constructs. Factor analysis was thus carried out to condense 
and summarize the information into a smaller set of factors. Results show that no items 
loadings are less than 0.65, and each item is significantly related to its underlying 
factors. In addition, all constructs exhibit satisfactory levels of reliability as no 
Cronbach’s alpha of each scale less than 0.70. The summated scales produced in factor 
analysis, which represent the original information, were then used in the subsequent 
regression analysis, which aimed to test the four groups of research hypotheses. The 
design, process, procedure and requirements and results of regression analysis were 
clearly set out. Results show that the explanatory power of the four regression 
equations is great. All the VIF values were much less than 10, implying that there is no 
proof of multicollinearity in the regression models. In addition, normal probability plot, 
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Durbin-Watson test, residual plot and partial regression plots confirmed that the 
assumptions required for the regression analysis such as normality, independence of 
the residuals, homoscedasticity and linearity are met. The four regression equations 
will be further interpreted.  
To comparing the effectiveness of control mechanisms of project alliances in reducing 
transaction costs, descriptive statistics and paired-samples T tests were performed. The 
fourteen control mechanisms were ranked according to their effectiveness on reducing 
set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. The mechanisms with the same 
level of significance were further grouped together.  
The cost management practices were ranked according to their usage frequency in 
project alliances.  
The findings and interpretation resulting from the data analysis will be reported in 
Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7 
Empirical Findings from the Questionnaire Survey 
7.1 Introduction 
The data obtained through the survey has been analysed by adopting statistical 
techniques in Chapter 6. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results in detail 
and report the empirical findings resulted from the data analysis. The discussion is 
divided into five sections, with each section (except Section 7.2) focusing on one 
research question. This chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 7.2 presents some general findings with a view to providing a basic idea 
regarding transaction attributes and transaction costs in project alliances. The findings 
resulting mainly from the descriptive statistics and factor analysis were presented in 
Chapter 6. The findings of the multiple regression analysis are reported in Section 7.3 
and 7.4 respectively. Section 7.3 focuses on the differential impact of transaction 
attributes on the three individual transaction cost elements in project alliances, while 
Section 7.4 deals with the reducing effect of project alliancing on transaction costs. 
The two sections interpret the multiple regression analysis results and discuss the 
findings.  Section 7.5 reports the findings yielded from the paired-samples T test 
performed in Section 6.6. For easy interpretation of the data analysis results, the 
control mechanisms are reorganized and classified according to their control modes. 
Section 7.6 discusses the cost management practices identified in the survey, and more 
importantly works out the questions that need to be further investigated in the next 
stage interviews. Section 7.7 summarises this chapter.  
7.2 General Findings Regarding Transaction Attributes and 
Transaction Costs 
The survey measured the central constructs of TCE, which are transaction costs and 
transaction attributes. Particularly, transaction costs in project alliances were 
decomposed into three individual cost elements, i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
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enforcement costs in the survey. Furthermore, the measurement of asset specificity has 
been disaggregated into various dimensions of project owners and NOPs. This section 
aims to provide a basic idea regarding transaction attributes and transaction costs in 
project alliances based on the results of descriptive statistics and factor analysis 
presented in Chapter 6. Relevant information can be found in Tables 6.17 and 6.19. 
Firstly, with respect to contracting parties’ specific investments, results show that both 
the owners and NOPs made substantial investments on human assets (Mean for OHA: 
5.52; Mean for NHA: 5.70) and reputation assets (Mean for ORA: 5.85; Mean for 
NRA: 5.67). Among the set of underlying items of human assets, the owners’ 
knowledge and expertise contributed to project alliances (Mean: 5.99) and the NOPs’ 
staff with sufficient seniority, expertise and experience appointed to project alliances 
(Mean: 6.10) were rated the highest. In comparison, contracting parties only made 
moderate investments on dedicated assets (Mean for ODA: 3.66; Mean for NDA: 4.42).  
Secondly, it was found that project alliances exhibited relatively high uncertainty 
(Mean: 5.10), especially when alliancing projects were confronted with some special 
requirements (Mean: 5.74), featured very complex (Mean: 5.67), or exposed to 
complex external threats (Mean: 5.30). This result is consistent with previous 
arguments that alliances are often encompassed with high uncertainty (Langfield-
Smith 2008), and alliancing projects usually present very complex and highly risky 
situations (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; Ross 2003). 
Thirdly, the values of projects procured through alliancing method are relatively high 
as the average value of the 88 alliancing projects in this research is AUS$383.21 
million. This implies that transaction frequency and interaction between parties would 
be very significant.  
Fourthly, results show that set-up costs (Mean: 4.97) and monitoring costs (Mean: 4.40) 
in project alliances are higher than the moderate level. Enforcement costs (Mean: 2.53) 
are lower than the moderate level. As mentioned in Section 5.5, survey respondents 
were also asked to pre-assess the cost and effort associated with individual alliance 
activities before formally evaluating a particular transaction cost element. Table 7.1 
below lists the mean values of survey respondents’ evaluation on the cost and effort 
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associated with each alliance activity. As Table 7.1 shows, the evaluation and selection 
of alliance participants is the most energy-consuming activity during the establishment 
of project alliance. The cost and effort associated with managing the commitment of 
project stakeholders is deemed as the highest in terms of managing the project alliance. 
The costs and efforts associated with addressing potential problems in project alliances 
are all below the moderate level. 
Table 7.1 Cost and Effort Associated with Alliance Activities 
Alliance Activity Mean 
Se
t-
u
p 
th
e 
al
lia
n
ce
 
Write the contract/agreement 4.53 
Design the selection method 4.61 
Prepare and release the tender documents 3.97 
Participate and manage the selection process 5.16 
Develop the project proposal 4.99 
Evaluate and select participants 5.22 
Negotiate and agree the project proposal & agreement 5.11 
M
an
ag
e 
th
e 
al
lia
n
ce
 
Manage cost (involves managing the consumption of all resources) 4.47 
Manage time  4.19 
Manage quality 4.34 
Manage other performance areas (e.g. safety etc.) 4.40 
Manage risks 4.51 
Manage project scope 4.58 
Manage the commitment of project stakeholders 4.83 
Manage the project team 4.44 
D
ea
l w
ith
 
pr
o
bl
em
s 
in
 
th
e 
al
lia
n
ce
 
Solve problems raised during project delivery 3.08 
Deal with variation 2.47 
Deal with claim 2.23 
Resolve conflicts or disputes 2.48 
Deal with litigation or arbitration 1.74 
Sanction non-perform participants 2.09 
This section provides a glance at the transaction attributes and transaction costs in 
project alliances before formally reporting the findings of the data analysis. In 
summary, the findings confirm that project alliances usually involve high uncertainty. 
The transaction frequency in project alliances is significant. To establish and manage 
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project alliances, contracting parties input high quality resource and made substantial 
investments in relationship specific assets, especially human assets and reputation 
assets. The perceived costs for establishing alliances and day-to-day management of 
alliances are high, and it is much easier for contracting parties to deal with problems 
that might arise during alliance relationships in the context of project alliancing.  
7.3 The Impact of Transaction Attributes on Transaction Costs in 
Alliances 
By drawing upon TCE theory, three groups of hypotheses were proposed in this 
research to predict the relationships between transaction attributes and transaction 
costs in the context of project alliancing (Hypotheses: H1a, H2a, H3a, H1b, H2b, H3b, 
H1c, H2c and H3c). These hypotheses were tested by three multiple regression models 
in which the three transaction cost elements (i.e. set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs) were selected as the dependent variables respectively, and survey 
respondents’ perceptions on transaction attributes of project alliances were included as 
independent variables. In particular, this research disaggregated asset specificity into 
three dimensions, and distinguished between owners’ and NOPs’ relationship 
investments. The regression analysis tested the differential impact of various 
dimensions of owners’ and NOPs’ relationship-specific investments on the three 
individual transaction cost elements in project alliances. The regression analysis 
yielded meaningful results. The findings of the regression analysis presented in Section 
6.5 are reported below. 
Model 1 examined whether set-up costs in project alliances are related to contracting 
parties’ asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. The positive relationships 
between both the owners’ and NOPs’ human assets and set-up costs are highly 
significant (OHA: B=0.491, p<0.01; NHA: B=0.556, p<0.01). However, such positive 
relationships were not found between contracting parties’ other asset specificity 
dimensions, i.e. dedicated assets and reputation assets, and set-up costs. The results 
demonstrate that increased human asset specificity incurs more costs for establishing 
alliances, and thus support H1a. In support of H2a, uncertainty was found to be 
positively related to set-up costs (UN: B=0.454, p<0.01). In accordance with H3a, it 
was found that project value is positively related to set-up costs (PV: B=0.603, p<0.01). 
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It suggests that, as expected, higher levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency increase set-up costs in project alliances. In addition, project value has the 
largest effect on set-up costs among the transaction attributes.  
In Model 2, the relationships between transaction attributes and monitoring costs were 
estimated. Within this group, both the owners’ and NOPs’ dedicated assets (ODA: 
B=0.177, p<0.05; NDA: B=0.238, p<0.01) and human assets (OHA: B=0.345, p<0.01; 
NHA: B=0.437, p<0.01) are positively related to monitoring costs, meaning that the 
increased asset specificity—especially dedicated and human asset specificity—incurs 
more costs for managing the project process. It was found that the positive relationship 
between uncertainty and monitoring costs is significant (UN: B=0.354, p<0.01). The 
finding reveals that uncertainty directly increases the cost for managing the project 
process. It was also found that project value has a positive effect on monitoring costs 
(PV: B=0.393, p<0.01), suggesting that the larger the alliancing project, the more 
significant the monitoring costs. The results in Model 2 provide strong support for H1b, 
H2b and H3b. Thus, monitoring costs will increase as levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency rise in project alliances. 
Model 3 asserted that enforcement costs would be greater for project alliances 
characterized by greater asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. However, 
regression results show that none of the contracting parties’ asset specificity 
dimensions were found to be positively related to enforcement costs. By contrast, 
owner’s reputation assets exhibit negative relationship with enforcement costs (ORA: 
B=-0.159, P<0.05). Project value was also found to be insignificant. Only uncertainty 
has a positive relationship with enforcement costs (UN: B=1.897, P<0.01). Thus, the 
regression analysis results reject H1c and H3c, while providing support for H2c, 
suggesting that higher levels of asset specificity and frequency will not lead to higher 
enforcement costs in project alliances, and enforcement costs increase only as 
uncertainty increases.  
Taking the above findings together, the results demonstrate that uncertainty positively 
affects all three transaction cost elements, suggesting that the overall transaction costs 
can be economized by minimizing uncertainty and the likely adverse effect of 
uncertainty. Frequency can increase set-up costs and monitoring costs; however, it 
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cannot affect enforcement costs. The results also show that the impact of asset 
specificity on the three transaction cost elements varies according to the particular 
specificity dimension examined. Set-up costs increase with contracting parties’ human 
asset specificity only. Monitoring costs are positively affected by contracting parties’ 
human and dedicated asset specificity. No dimensions of contracting parties’ asset 
specificity exert a positive and significant influence on enforcement costs. 
7.4 The Reducing Effect of Project Alliancing on Transaction Costs 
TCE assumes that the alignment between governance form and transaction attributes 
does promote governance performance and reduce transaction costs. Following TCE 
propositions, the present study has analysed whether alliancing serves as an effective 
approach to facilitate transactions and economize transaction costs, and proposed three 
hypotheses to suggest the relationships between the levels of contracting parties’ asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency in project alliances and the reducing effect of 
project alliancing on transaction costs (Hypotheses: H4, H5 and H6). The three 
hypotheses were tested by multiple regression Model 4 in Section 6.5.4.  
Hypothesis 4 concerns the relations between the reducing effect of alliancing on 
transaction costs and contracting parties’ specific investments. It was found that both 
the owner and NOPs’ dedicated assets (ODA: B=0.262, p<0.05; NDA: B=0.236, 
p<0.01) and human assets (OHA: B=0.348, p<0.1; NHA: B=0.303, p<0.05) are 
significantly and positively correlate with the reducing effect of alliancing on 
transaction costs. However, the coefficients of contracting parties’ reputational assets 
are insignificant. Therefore, the results generally support Hypothesis 1. More 
specifically, the reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs is enhanced as 
investments in dedicated assets and human assets deepen. 
In accordance with H5, it was found that the efficiency of project alliancing in 
reducing transaction costs is reinforced as uncertainty increases (UN: B=0.419, 
P<0.05). This means that as uncertainty increases, the reducing effect of project 
alliancing on transaction costs becomes stronger. Thus, alliancing is more efficient in 
dealing with high uncertainty. In other words, alliancing is more effective in delivering 
projects characterised by high uncertainties. 
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Hypothesis 3 examines whether the efficiency of alliancing in reducing transaction 
costs is related to the level of frequency in alliances. The positive relationship between 
alliancing project value and the reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs was 
found to be highly significant (PV: B=0.253, p<0.1). It suggests that, as expected, 
alliancing is more efficient in reducing transaction costs under conditions of higher 
frequency. This result also implies that the larger the project, the more effective the 
alliance contracting method. 
Table 7.2 Acceptance/Rejection of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description Accept/Reject Regression Model 
H1a Set-up costs will increase as the level of 
asset specificity rises. Accept 
Model One H2a Set-up costs will increase as the level of 
uncertainty rises. Accept 
H3a Set-up costs will increase as the level of frequency rises. Accept 
H1b Monitoring costs will increase with the increasing asset specificity Accept 
Model Two H2b Monitoring costs will increase with the increasing uncertainty Accept 
H3b Monitoring costs will increase with the increasing frequency Accept 
H1c Enforcement costs are higher under 
conditions of higher asset specificity Reject 
Model Three H2c Enforcement costs are higher under 
conditions of higher uncertainty Accept 
H3c Enforcement costs are higher under 
conditions of higher frequency Reject 
H4 
Project alliancing is more efficient in 
reducing transaction costs under conditions 
of higher asset specificity 
Accept 
Model Four H5 
Project alliancing is more efficient in 
reducing transaction costs under conditions 
of higher uncertainty 
Accept 
H6 
Project alliancing is more efficient in 
reducing transaction costs under conditions 
of higher frequency 
Accept 
In summary, the empirical findings demonstrate that alliancing is more effective in 
reducing transaction costs under conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency than under conditions of low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. 
The governance efficiency of alliancing becomes stronger as contracting parties’ 
investments in specific assets, uncertainty and frequency increase. It is also interesting 
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to note that the reducing effect of project alliancing would be significantly 
compromised and even reversed as the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency decrease. Table 7.2 summarizes the related testable hypotheses, and the 
acceptance or rejection of each hypothesis based on the multiple regression analysis 
performed.  
7.5 Control Mechanisms Contributing to Reducing Transaction Costs 
The impact of control mechanism of project alliances on transaction costs was 
investigated through a questionnaire survey and the collected information was 
analysed in Section 6.6. In the survey and subsequent data analysis, transaction costs 
were also decomposed into set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. The 
impact of control mechanisms of project alliances on individual transaction cost 
elements was investigated and analysed respectively. Findings of the data analysis are 
presented below. 
Descriptive statistics results show that all the mechanisms contribute to reducing 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs. Only four mechanisms (F10, F9, F11 and F1) 
contribute to reducing set-up costs. Other mechanisms, whose mean scores are lower 
than ‘4’, were not considered to have such an effect. F10 (Cooperation and 
collaboration in delivering the project) was found to be the most effective mechanism 
that contributed to reducing set-up costs and monitoring costs. In reducing 
enforcement costs, F14 (Commitment to no litigation or arbitration) was rated as the 
most powerful mechanism. Moreover, paired-samples T test categorised the fourteen 
mechanisms into four groups for each transaction cost element based on the 
comparison of means. From Group 1 to Group 4, the ability of mechanisms to reduce 
the corresponding transaction cost elements decreases successively.  
However, it seems to be very difficult to yield more meaningful findings based solely 
upon the data analysis results without theoretical support. The theoretical framework 
presented in Section 4.6 classified the control mechanisms into three categories, i.e. 
outcome controls, behaviour controls and social controls. It would be very helpful to 
interpret the results with reference to the theoretical framework. Table 7.3 reorganized 
the control mechanisms of project alliancing by combining Tables 6.30, 6.36, and 6.37. 
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The control category assignment of each mechanism was specified in Table 7.3. For 
example, F10 (Cooperation and collaboration in delivering the project) is a mechanism 
that is relevant to alliance organizational culture, and belongs to the social control 
category. F1 (Joint planning and goal setting) is one of the outcome controls in project 
alliances. After the refinement, the data analysis results can be interpreted more easily.  
Table 7.3 Ranking and Grouping for Control Mechanisms 
Mechanisms Affecting 
Set-up Costs 
Mechanisms Affecting 
Monitoring Costs 
Mechanisms Affecting 
Enforcement Costs 
Ran
k 
F10 SC F10 SC F14 BC 1 
F9 SC F11 SC F10 SC 2 
F11 SC F9 SC F13 BC 3 
F1 OC F14 BC F5 BC 4 
F5 BC F13 BC F6 BC 5 
F8 SC F5 BC F11 SC 6 
F4 SC F6 BC F9 SC 7 
F6 BC F1 OC F7 OC 8 
F12 SC F2 OC F3 OC 9 
F2 OC F3 OC F2 OC 10 
F13 BC F7 OC F1 OC 11 
F3 OC F8 SC F4 SC 12 
F7 OC F12 SC F8 SC 13 
F14 BC F4 SC F12 SC 14 
OC: outcome control; BC: behaviour control; SC: social control 
Group 1   Group 2   Group 3   Group 4  
From left to right, the first column of Table 7.3 lists the fourteen control mechanisms 
according to their effectiveness in reducing set-up costs in descending order. The 
mechanisms in Group 1 (rated as the most effective group that contributes to reducing 
set-up costs) include F9, F10 and F11. The three mechanisms belong to social controls. 
Only F1, one of the outcome control mechanisms, falls into Group 2. As mentioned 
before, the mechanisms in Groups 3 and 4 are not considered to be effective in 
reducing set-up costs. Potentially, they could increase set-up costs to some degree. 
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Group 3 contains three social and two behaviour control mechanisms. Group 4 consists 
of three outcome and two behaviour control mechanisms. In addition, it was found that 
all the mean values of the fourteen mechanisms are between ‘5’ to ‘3’, suggesting that 
the effects of the mechanisms on set-up costs tend to be moderate. 
In the second column of Table 7.3, the fourteen mechanisms are also sorted and 
grouped based on their relative reducing effects on monitoring costs. Similar to the 
first group in the first column, three social controls—F10, F9 and F11—constitute the 
first group of mechanisms. These three mechanisms are deemed to have the greatest 
strength to reduce monitoring costs. The second group, which is less effective in 
reducing monitoring costs than Group 1, consists of all four behaviour controls. All 
four outcome controls are in Group 3. The last group contains the remaining three 
social controls (F4, F8 and F12). All the mean values of the fourteen mechanisms are 
greater than or very close to ‘5’, meaning that the perceived effectiveness of the 
fourteen mechanisms on monitoring costs is stronger than on set-up costs.  
The mechanisms are rearranged based on their reducing effects on enforcement costs 
in the third column of Table 7.3. Different with the first and second columns, all the 
four behaviour controls come to Group 1. Only one social control (F10) is still in 
Group 1. The other two social controls (F9 and F11), which were previously 
categorised into Group 1, slip to Group 2. Besides F9 and F11, Group 2 also contains 
an outcome control mechanism (F7). The remaining three outcome controls (F1, F2 
and F3) constitute Group 3. Similar to the second column, Group 4 in the third column 
is made up of the same three social controls (F4, F8 and F12). Mechanisms in Group 4 
have the least effectiveness on reducing enforcement costs. Except F12, all the mean 
values of mechanisms are greater than ‘5’.  
Taken the above together, it was found that three social controls (F9, F10 and F11) are 
the most effective mechanisms that contribute to reducing both set-up costs and 
monitoring costs. In addition, one social control mechanism (F10) is also one of the 
most effective mechanisms that can lower enforcement costs. Interestingly, the other 
three social controls (F4, F8 and F12) were found to be the least effective mechanisms 
to reduce monitoring costs and enforcement costs. Further, they are lack of the ability 
to reduce set-up costs. Regarding behaviour controls, the four mechanisms were found 
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to have the greatest effectiveness on reducing enforcement costs, and rank second to 
the three social controls in terms of monitoring costs reduction advantage. None of the 
behaviour controls were found to contribute to reducing set-up costs. Compared with 
behaviour controls, outcome controls are less effective on reducing both monitoring 
costs and enforcement costs. Only one outcome control mechanism (F1) was found to 
contribute to reducing set-up costs.  
7.6 Cost Management Practices in Project Alliance 
The IOCM practices potentially used in project alliances were preliminarily 
investigated through a questionnaire survey approach. However, as highlighted in 
Section 5.4 and 6.7, the questionnaire survey alone could not meet the data 
requirements for this research objective. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics 
presented in Section 6.7 also provide a basic picture on the use of IOCM practices in 
project alliances. This section reports the finding from the data analysis and discusses 
the issues that need to be further investigated.  
The 34 cost management practices were primarily either identified by reviewing 
alliancing literature, or derived by drawing upon management accounting literature. 
Descriptive statistics results show that among the 34 practices, 17 (50%) have been 
used in more than 90% of alliances; 12 (35.3%) have been used in 80% to 90% of 
alliances; and the remaining 5 (14.7%) practices have been used in less than 70% of 
alliances. CM5 (Encourage innovative solutions) is ranked as the most commonly used 
practice that has been used in 98.9% of alliances, while CM25 (Benchmark 
performance against the performance of other alliances or similar projects) is the least 
popular practice, which has been used only in 37.5% of alliances. The results 
demonstrate that these practices were the most representative and widely adopted in 
project alliances. For easy presentation, a basic cost management work flow in project 
alliances is worked out and illustrated in Figure 7.1 based on the survey results and the 
policy guidelines for project alliancing in the Australian public sector (DTF Victoria 
2006; 2010a; b; d).  
In Figure 7.1, Steps 1-9 describe the proposal development and goal setting process in 
which the project solution is worked out, and the target cost and other performance 
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targets such as time, quality and safety are estimated and determined. In this process, 
the confirmed IOCM practices or techniques employed include value management, 
value engineering and concurrent engineering. Furthermore, alliance participants 
usually share information on basic costing elements and strategies during the project 
proposal development. Superficially, the overall proposal development process appears 
to be a target costing system. As observed in the survey, the major tenets of target 
costing (such as focus on customers, focus on design, cross-functional teams, value 
chain involvement and lifecycle orientation) are well reflected in project alliances. In a 
target costing system, however, target cost is determined by market price, i.e. cost is a 
function of a market determined price (Ansari et al. 2006a). According to Ansari et al. 
(2006a), a target costing process begins by establishing a selling price for the new 
product based on market research, customers’ requirements and the company’s 
strategies. The selling price is market driven. From this price, the desired profit is 
subtracted to determine the target cost. The resulting target cost is achieved by 
focusing on product and process design and by making continuous improvement 
throughout the product’s lifecycle. The most important principle of target costing is 
usually described by the following equation: 
Target cost = Market price – Profit (Ansari et al. 2006b) 
The survey has confirmed that alliance participants’ proposed TOC is often reviewed 
and checked by the owner’s estimator, and benchmarked and referenced against the 
owner's comparative TOC and market rates. In spite of this, the target cost in a project 
alliance is still not determined by market price because the market price for a 
construction project usually does not exist until a real commercial situation applies. As 
Nicolini et al. (2000) argue, setting prices for products is largely based on supply-and-
demand curves, while pricing of construction projects is more complex and difficult 
due to the unique nature of construction projects. The strategies used to establish target 
cost in manufacturing sectors may not be suitable for project alliances. Thus, it still 
remains an issue whether the project proposal development and goal setting in project 
alliances is a true reflection of the target costing process. The other questionable issue 
resulting from the survey concerns the lifecycle orientation. Target costing has a 
lifecycle orientation which means that production, operation, maintenance, repairs and 
disposition and other costs of owning a product over its entire life are modelled and 
 Page | 191 
considered in a target costing system for minimizing life cycle costs of the product 
(Ansari et al. 2006a). However, project alliancing is mainly used for delivering capital 
assets (DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a), implying that most project alliances are only 
responsible for delivering the capital phase of projects, rather than maintenance and 
operation of projects. In such a situation, project alliances may focus more on 
construction costs and lack incentives to reduce maintenance costs or operation costs. 
Even though the survey results show that in 94.3% of alliances, life cycle costs have 
been taken into consideration when designing projects, it is worthwhile to investigate 
how alliances take account of life-cycle costs and what measures are taken to address 
life-cycle costs in alliances.  
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Figure 7.1 A Basic Cost Management Workflow in Project Alliances 
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Steps 10-15 are related to the delivery of alliancing projects. The established target 
cost will be achieved in these steps. The observed cost management in this process can 
be categorised into outcome-based, behaviour-based and social-based techniques. They 
are either quantitative or qualitative mechanisms. Generally, outcome-based 
techniques are formal and quantitative mechanisms include remuneration to alliance 
participants, open-book accounting, performance measurement, progress reporting, 
and financial checking. Remuneration to alliance participants reflects the project 
alliancing principles, which are ‘sharing risks and opportunities’ and ‘aligning the 
owner’s project objectives with NOPs' commercial interests’. The principles are often 
incorporated into the commercial framework in project alliancing. The commercial 
framework and its key features have been well documented in alliancing literature 
(DTF Victoria 2006; 2010a; d; Love et al. 2011; Ross 2003), and has become an 
institutionalized measure in alliancing contracting. Despite the fact that the survey did 
not confirm whether the joint project proposal development is a target costing process, 
previous literature has evidenced that a target costing process operates successfully 
under similar commercial arrangements to project alliancing (CRINE 1994; Jaafari 
1996). Open book accounting enables cost data, records, knowledge and other 
information to be shared and exchanged within the alliance. Performance measurement, 
progress reporting and financial checking are straightforward outcome control 
measures in project alliances. It is also observed that some alliances benchmark their 
performance against the performance of other alliances or similar projects. Behaviour-
based practices are largely qualitative but formal mechanisms. The survey observed 
that alliance participants usually establish recordkeeping and accounting practices and 
procedures to support the open-book arrangement, build effective communication 
framework between the owner, the alliance and external stakeholders, and use 
information technology to facilitate information exchange. It is also noted that project 
alliances often develop project scope variation guidelines to review and justify any 
proposed or potential scope variations and adjustment to the established target cost. 
The observed social-based practices include co-location of all personnel involved in 
the project, integration of various functional teams, coordination and collaboration. To 
a great extent, the social-based practices provide support for both outcome-based and 
behaviour-based techniques.  
Considering the fact that the project delivery phase is the process in which the 
established target cost is achieved, it can be expected that there would be some other 
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IOCM practices or techniques employed by project alliances to manage the shared 
costs. Since the delivery of alliancing projects might continue for years, and the target 
cost is established prior to the delivery of an alliancing project, the actual cost could 
deviate from it. In other words, the actual cost could be lower, slightly higher or 
significant higher than the target level. Further, there would be high possibilities that 
risks were materialized, and fundamental changes to project scope or specifications 
incurred during project delivery phase. In such situations, in what ways would alliance 
participants work out solutions to risks or problems to reduce their adverse effects on 
costs? How to design the change part of the project, and how to re-estimate and adjust 
target cost correspondingly? Unfortunately, alliancing literature offers only very 
limited suggestions in a very general way. The survey, as well, provides a basic but 
limited vision on IOCM practices employed in the delivery phase of alliancing projects 
because the survey did not consider possible contingencies during the project delivery 
phase. Further information is required in this regard. 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the empirical findings from the questionnaire survey and provides 
an in-depth discussion on the findings.  
General findings regarding transaction attributes and transaction costs in project 
alliances were present at first. Results show that the level of asset specificity is high in 
project alliances, implying that alliance participants made substantial relationship 
specific investments into project alliances to support the relationships. Further, the 
complex and unique nature of alliancing projects leads to high uncertainty in project 
alliances. Frequency is also high, as reflected by the high value of alliancing projects.  
Regarding the relationship between transaction attributes and transaction costs in 
project alliances, results indicate that the impact of transaction attributes on transaction 
costs varies according to the particular attributes dimension examined. Uncertainty has 
a positive impact on all three transaction cost elements. Frequency and some 
dimensions of contracting parties’ asset specificity are positively associated with set-
up costs and monitoring costs. However, such a positive effect on enforcement costs 
does not exist.  
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With relation to the reducing effect of project alliancing on transaction costs, it was 
found that project alliancing is more effective in reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency than under conditions of 
low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, meaning that such a reducing effect is 
enhanced when the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency increase. 
Concerning the control mechanisms of project alliances that contribute to reducing 
transaction costs, results show that three social controls are the most effective 
mechanisms that contribute to reducing both set-up costs and monitoring costs. They 
are: cooperation and collaboration; open, straight and honest communication; and 
acting fairly and reasonably instead of reaping self-interests at the expense of other 
participants. Further, four behaviour controls were found to have the greatest 
effectiveness on reducing enforcement costs, including one integrated team approach, 
joint management, internal conflicts and disputes resolve resolution, and commitment 
to no litigation or arbitration. Outcome controls, however, were found to have less 
effectiveness on reducing transaction costs than the above social and behaviour 
controls.  
Finally, it was found that the proposed 34 cost management practices were widely used 
in project alliances. The survey results provide a basic picture on the use of IOCM 
practices in project alliances. Despite the finding, the survey also leads to some 
questions that need to be answered. A further investigation will be conducted to 
explore the IOCM in project alliances as well as validate the findings from the survey.  
The findings presented in this chapter responded to Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 
completely, and Research Question 4 partly. The next chapter will report the second-
stage data collection to provide a robust solution to Research Question 4.   
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Chapter 8 
Interorganizational Cost Management in Project Alliances: 
Interviews with Alliance Managers 
8.1 Introduction 
The questionnaire survey conducted in the first-stage data collection provides a basic 
vision on the use of IOCM in project alliances. The discussion of the findings 
presented in Section 7.6 leads to a number of questions that need to be further 
investigated. Interviews were chosen for this purpose. The interview approach allows 
the researcher and interviewees to in-depth discuss the cost management issues in 
project alliances. This chapter reports the findings of the interviews, and is structured 
as follows. 
Section 8.2 reports the design of the interviews. The data analysis is presented in 
Section 8.3. The results of the interviews are reported and discussed in Section 8.4, 8.5, 
8.6 and 8.7, with each section focusing on one theme. In the final section of the chapter, 
some conclusions are presented. Further, the IOCM practices and techniques used in 
project alliances are presented by combining the findings from both the interviews and 
the previous questionnaire survey. 
8.2 Data Collection 
The second-stage data collection involves interviewing experienced alliancing 
professionals, aiming to further explore IOCM practices and techniques used in project 
alliances as well as to validate the findings from the previous questionnaire survey. 
The interview approach was selected because it can help to capture in-depth 
information around the research topic, and is considered particularly useful for getting 
the story behind a participant’s experiences (McNamara 1999). Since the research 
studies the IOCM in project alliances, the interview therefore focuses purely on cost 
management practices that cover alliance relationships and all participants’ joint 
activities, and ignore those which are used for dealing with individual alliance 
participants’ internal activities. The questions asked in interviews consist of four 
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sections with each section focusing on one topic, i.e. lifecycle consideration in project 
alliances, the establishment of target cost, IOCM in project delivery phase and scope 
change respectively. In total, seventeen major questions were asked in the interviews. 
These questions were developed based on the findings of the questionnaire survey and 
the discussion presented in Section 7.6. Some questions include a number of sub-
questions. The interview questions can be found in Appendix C.  
Similar to the questionnaire survey conducted in the first-stage data collection, the 
interviews also adopted the key informant approach. The key informants were selected 
from the questionnaire survey respondents who have offered to take part in this stage 
interviews. Since the participants had responded to the questionnaire survey in the 
first-stage data collection, the interviews may be useful as follow-up surveys to further 
investigate their responses (McNamara 1999). In total, sixteen in-depth interviews 
were conducted over a two-month period. Of these 16 interviewees, 3 were from 
owner organizations, and the remaining 13 were from contractor organizations. The 
average work experience of the 16 interviewees in the construction industry is 25.5 
years. The average alliancing projects that respondents have worked on are 5.7. 
Moreover, All 16 interviewees have served as alliance managers. In the interviews, 
alliance managers were chosen because they are responsible for the delivery of 
alliancing projects, heading the Alliance Management Team, and are usually highly 
experienced project managers (DTF Victoria 2010a). Further, alliance managers would 
have greatest understanding of the cost management issues in project alliances. Thus, 
the interviewees are considered to be particularly knowledgeable about the subject 
under study. Besides the major questions listed in Appendix C, participants were also 
encouraged to give additional information by making encouraging remarks, 
summarizing what they had said, and asking follow-up questions. The interviews were 
conducted at the offices of interviewees. Each interview varied in length from 45 to 
120 minutes. Upon consent of interviewees, interviews were digitally recorded for data 
analysis purposes. 
8.3 Data Analysis 
The collected data was analysed concurrently with interviews. The data analysis 
process comprised three main steps intended to produce meaningful findings from raw 
information collected in interviews. The concurrent and iterative data collection and 
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analysis process used in this research allow for emerging understanding about research 
questions to be developed, and help to identify new categories or themes (DiCicco-
Bloom and Crabtree 2006). 
First, the interviews were transcribed verbatim to allow for capturing the common 
perspectives and nuances on a particular topic. After the transcription of recording, 
four shorter or follow-up interviews were made by phone to clarify some ambiguous 
expressions as well as to elaborate on interviewees’ own original statements. Second, 
the interview data was organized and compiled. Since the interviews mainly were 
conducted around four topics (i.e. lifecycle consideration in project alliance, the 
establishment of target cost, IOCM in project delivery phase and scope change), the 
four topics were therefore used for basic data sorting. The information collected 
through the interviews was grouped into four categories. After grouping, the 
information was manually and systematically searched. Four tables were created with 
each table focusing on one category. The relevant information concerning the purposes 
of costing and what IOCM techniques were used were entered into corresponding 
tables along with data source. Third, comparisons between interviewees’ statements 
were made based on the extensive tables. Through the comparisons, interviewees’ 
common perspectives and different viewpoints on a particular topic were identified. At 
the later stage of the interviews, some additional questions were asked with a view to 
validate and verify the statements made by previous interviewees.  
The sensitive information was coded for anonymity or specially treated in reporting the 
findings.  
8.4 Life Cycle Consideration in Project Alliances 
In Australia, most alliances were involved only in the project delivery phase. Once 
completed, projects will be handed over to the asset owners for maintenance and 
operation. The interviews investigated whether project alliances have taken account of 
lifecycle costs when designing projects and establishing target costs, and what 
measures were taken to address lifecycle costs. The result shows that there is a 
possibility that project alliances could increase the maintenance and operation costs to 
reduce the construction costs. According to interviewees’ responses, lifecycle is only 
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one of the main considerations in determining the final proposal because there are 
some other key result areas (KRAs) need to be taken into account simultaneously, such 
as time, safety, environment benefits, community benefits and stakeholder benefits. 
Alliances have to make balanced decisions across a number of KRAs. As an alliance 
manager explained: 
“One of the considerations we do and come up with solutions on proposals is 
not just look lifecycle. We look a series of key result areas. One of which is 
lifecycle, one of which is safety impact during delivery. One is operation 
impact, which will be during delivery and post delivery. We do balance 
decision making when we look each of the proposals and the engineer’s both 
designing and construction, then have to consider them in doing evaluation 
process. So it’s just not A versus B. it’s considering A, B, C, D, E, F, G. So we 
use a weighting process.” 
However, this does not mean that maintenance and operation costs were neglected in 
project alliances. Actually, interviewees indicated that lifecycle costs were considered 
and addressed in project alliances by using formal or informal mechanisms. This 
finding is consistent with the findings resulted from the questionnaire survey 
conducted in the first-stage data collection. There are several approaches to be used for 
addressing the lifecycle costs during designing projects and establishing target costs. 
Interviewees suggested that owner’s information and knowledge plays a very 
important role in minimizing maintenance and operation costs. The questionnaire 
survey conducted in the first-stage date collection confirmed that alliance participants 
have access to such information and knowledge. Further, alliance participants can 
consult or work with facility operators and maintainers to identify new solutions to 
reduce maintenance and operation costs. Interviewees indicated that the owner often 
has very good knowledge of its expectation and requirements, but may have less 
experience with construction. Operators and maintainers are more proficient in the 
operation and maintenance of facilities than other parties. With the owners, operators 
and maintainers’ support and interaction, project alliances are more likely to find 
optimal design options to minimize the lifecycle costs. An alliance manager stated: 
 Page | 200 
“During the TOC, I feel the alliance has used information from the owner’s 
organization and used people with them to help change the designs to minimize 
the maintenance and operation costs. …… With the alliance contract, you got 
to talk with operators and maintainers much more (compared with other 
contracting methods). So it helps to reduce the overall operation and 
maintenance costs.” 
In some alliancing projects, the construction costs account for only a small proportion 
of all lifecycle costs. To work out optimal solutions to reduce the lifecycle costs and 
balance various performance requirements, alliance participants adopted a 
collaborative approach. This is also an interactive process. All the relevant parties such 
as the owner, designer, constructor and operator are involved in proposal development 
and the decision-making process. Interviewees suggested that it is worthwhile to spend 
time and effort to develop proposals in such a way because the developed proposal not 
only leads to cost savings in the delivery phase but also reduces the operational risks of 
the project and makes the lifecycle costs more efficient. An alliance manager stated:  
“We didn’t do that on our own. The client and people involved in operation 
should agree it. If you have those people in the decision making process, then 
you’ve got a big tick, yes you get the answer. …… That costs about 10 million 
dollars more, however the whole of lifecycle cost around hundreds of millions. 
So that is why operators involved, maintainers involved, designer involved, 
constructor involved and going through a cycle of design, construction, 
commission. You come up with design, dollars and time based on methods, 
and program. You will go through this cycle, you keep going this cycle, until 
you come up with solutions, and come up with the decision making framework 
around no particular, safety, time and benefit, whole of life, cost, 
environmental benefits, community benefits, stakeholder benefits, and usually 
you’ve got a short term which is the current save on the job, and long term 
which is the whole of life.” 
Several interviewees (n=8) indicated that project alliances often quantify lifecycle 
costs during project design to help the selection of the most desirable project solutions. 
First, the construction costs were estimated based on project design. Other costs such 
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as maintenance, operation, repair and financial costs were computed and expressed in 
dollar amounts based on the design or service life of the project. Then, the computed 
lifecycle costs were converted to present values so that design options could be 
compared. This approach not only supports project alliances to identify the relative 
optimal design by comparing different design alternatives, but it also helps project 
alliances find new solutions to minimize lifecycle costs. The adopted approach is very 
similar to the lifecycle cost analysis method by which the overall costs of design 
alternatives are estimated, and the design ensures that the project will provide the 
lowest lifecycle costs while meeting quality and functionality requirements (Fuller 
2008). However, interviewees pointed out that quantifying lifecycle costs is more 
likely to happen in non-price competitive alliances than in price competitive alliances 
because some of the competitive alliances have a very short project proposal 
development time, and it is very difficult to quantify all the related costs due to the 
time constraint. Further, interviewees suggested that to do a true lifecycle costing, the 
asset owner must know enough about the true cost of asset management, and provides 
relevant base data to support the development of target costs. However, this is not 
always the case. 
Seven interviewees (n=7) emphasized that the owner’s requirement for lifecycle cost 
consideration, which is clearly set out in the brief or value-for-money statement, had a 
very positive influence upon lifecycle costs. Such a requirement is often reflected and 
expressed as a KRA in the commercial framework of a project alliance. In practice, 
alliance participants’ commercial benefits usually are linked with KRAs, meaning that 
alliance participants either win or lose depending on the actual performance against 
pre-agreed KRAs (DTF Victoria 2010a). Once the requirement for lifecycle costs was 
put into KRAs, the potential commercial benefit or loss incentivises alliance 
participants to focus not only on construction but also maintenance and operation 
aspects, thus making lifecycle costs more efficient. In this regard, the commercial 
incentive is a powerful mechanism to balance the lifecycle costs and other 
performance requirements in project alliances. One alliance manager stated: 
“We were incentivised on a project basis, but also on the whole operational and 
maintenance the XXX networks during X years. So what I mean is, if we could 
save money on operation and maintenance, we were incentivised. There was 
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commercial benefit. We also measured the KRA which is the operation 
performance of the XXX network.” 
8.5 The Establishment of Target Cost: A Value Based Target Costing 
System 
The questionnaire survey conducted in the first-stage data collection identified a 
number of cost management practices and techniques used for developing target cost 
in the alliance. The interviews go a further step to explore the determinants for setting 
target cost in the alliance. Interviewees indicated that project alliances endeavour to 
reference against market rates to make target costs to be as accurate as a best 
representative of market as possible. As an alliance manager indicated, 
“We know the risks associated with it. We quantify the risk from the cost 
estimate perspective. Usually, we do 90% of benchmarking for materials, 
subcontract and also labour resource where appropriate within the market. We 
also use current market data for performance of our work on projects. ” 
They provided several commonly used measures to get the market testing prices for 
developing target costs, including subcontracting or tendering, consulting with 
specialist contractors, using alliance participants’ resource etc. An alliance manager 
introduced the price benchmarking process as follows: 
“We tendered. In some cases, we actually tendered. We actually had actual 
pricing based on drawings and scope. And alternately, we actually ring people 
and say we have, you know people we rang for example was very specialist 
trades in some instances, and some more broadly because the nature of the 
project we were working on has some quite unique pieces. So in fact, the best 
way to actually reference pricing, watch and go to someone, then give them the 
sort of scope, and say get some pricing. That was current and from the market 
in fact. So I think it’s a very good way for us being able get an accurate pricing. 
And how you do that, the issue about that is the alliance model allows you to 
tap into your constructors and whole of their contacts, and all is transparent. 
I’m able to say all tender prices come back, and verify that we getting market 
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pricing. All price come back from market testing. So it’s very transparent, and 
gives everyone a sense of we all were working together, we tap into all those 
contacts the constructor has, and even the designer might have. Where we 
might find someone who has the quality and experience to actually to fulfil the 
task and get potentially their pricing in the market-testing situation. So when 
actually tending to get the right quality people bidding for our projects, so I 
think the key element of the collaborative approach. You do you try to choose 
the best designer, the best available construction team, and follows there going 
to have great contacts and people they work with and have relationships with. 
It’s not easy we getting a price from someone too close, we got multiple 
pricing. So we were able to verify actually. ” 
As a tenet of target costing system, the target cost is determined by market price. In 
other words, the target cost is established only after the selling/market price has been 
determined and the desired profit has been subtracted from the selling/market price. 
However, when this notion was introduced and explained to interviewees, none of 
them thought it was relevant to project alliances. They provided two consistent reasons. 
First, alliance projects are normally quite unique or complex. Unlike other 
commodities, market price for an alliancing project or some unique elements of the 
project cannot be reliably determined because of the highly unique and complex nature 
of alliancing projects. Second, even though there were similar projects, the commercial 
situations between projects (such as the owner’s risk appetite, the state of market, the 
adopted contracting methods, the owner’s requirements and project objectives) were 
different. Each alliancing project has unique functional and performance requirements 
and project objectives, which will be balanced in developing the project proposal and 
eventually reflected in the target cost. Obviously, the target costs in project alliances 
are not determined by market prices. As interviewees suggested, the purpose of 
referencing and benchmarking against market price for some elements of alliancing 
project is to get the market test pricing to make the cost estimate more accurate and 
more aggressive. The strategies used for setting target costs in project alliances are 
different with those used in manufacturing environments. As the questionnaire survey 
conducted in the first-stage data collection confirmed, target cost in project alliance is 
developed concurrently with the development of project design and construction 
method. The owner’s value propositions and project objectives must be addressed and 
well reflected in the target cost by costing the project proposal (DTF Victoria 2010b). 
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Interviewees revealed that target cost of project alliance is driven by the owner’s 
functional and performance requirements, and project objectives. An alliance manager 
commented:  
“In terms of what determines for setting TOC (target-outturn cost), we are 
looking what the performance requirements on proposal are. What’s the 
functional intention of the works? What is the client trying to improve?” 
Usually, the project proposal of an alliancing project is developed in a collaborative 
manner by a multi-disciplinary team that may include design and construction 
engineering, operation, procurement, and estimator. All major parties in the alliance 
are involved in the proposal development. The proposal development process is 
iterative and concurrent in nature. In this process, information and strategies are shared 
between parties. Potential risks and opportunities are identified and assessed through 
joint intellectual effort. Some supporting techniques such as value management and 
multi-party value engineering are also used in this process for maximising value for 
money for the owner and optimizing the project proposal. Key elements of the 
proposal such as design, construction methods, cost estimation and commercial 
arrangements are overlapping and undertaken simultaneously, ensuring they can be 
well reflected on each other. Further, project design lies at the centre of proposal 
development, while target cost is the quantitative representation of the other elements 
of the proposal. DTF (2010b, p. 16) defines target cost of project alliances as “a formal 
offer by the proponent to the owner, for providing certain services and having 
exposure to certain risks (shared with the owner) based on the project deliverables and 
commercial arrangements set out in the project alliance agreement”. It is important that 
the project design and target cost are consistent with the owner’s functional and 
performance requirements. Actually, alliance participants usually reference and 
benchmark against market price for some elements of an alliancing project to get the 
market test pricing. However, its purpose is to estimate target cost rather than to set 
target cost. Interviewees indicated that the owner’s value proposition (i.e. functional 
specifications and performance requirements, instead of market price) is the major 
determinant for, and main consideration in setting target cost. The target cost is fixed 
once it is established. It can only change when the owner changes the project scope (i.e. 
the scope or size, and/or functional requirements of project. Interviewees mentioned 
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the change in legislation is the other issue that can lead to adjustment to target cost. 
However, the change in legislation is beyond the control of project alliance, and thus is 
not considered here). Thus, the joint project proposal development in a project alliance 
is a value-based target costing process instead of a price-based target costing process 
that has been commonly used in manufacturing sectors where competitive market price 
can be easily obtained for most products. Despite the fact that the two forms of target 
costing systems share the same purpose (i.e. reducing lifecycle costs while satisfying 
the requirements), the drivers for target costs in the two systems are different. In a 
price-based target costing system, target cost is market-driven, whereas functional and 
performance requirements are the determinants for target cost in project alliances. A 
price-based target costing process usually starts with market analysis to determine the 
market price for a new product. However, proposal development in project alliances 
begins by defining and analysing functional and performance requirements, and 
scoping the project, and thus entails value-led cost. For setting target cost, an alliance 
needs to know what the owner’s drivers and requirements are. Various key 
performance areas have to be considered, measured, quantified and balanced. 
Essentially, proposal development in project alliance is based on value-driven attitude 
combined with a joint effort to involve all the alliance participants in developing 
projects which provide the best achievable balance between costs and functional and 
performance requirements.  
Actually, the target cost of a project alliance is a realistic but aggressive cost objective 
that is agreed upon by both the owner and NOPs. The realistic objective means that 
target cost does not necessarily mean the lowest cost. It is an achievable cost objective. 
However, it must be consistent with the owner’s functional and performance 
requirements by costing the other elements of the project proposal. The aggressive 
objective means that target cost is tight and can be achieved only through an 
innovative way. An alliance manager commented: 
“So within the TOC, risk is the alliance’s. But what we were trying to do we 
say set a budget, and say let’s not exceed that budget, let’s work innovatively, 
let’s work together, to not exceed to the budget. This is so the alliance doesn’t 
throw risks back to the owner. But we give some confidence to the alliance that 
the common purpose is to work to those budget estimates. So it helps in terms 
 Page | 206 
of trying to set a TOC you can rely on. Everyone understands what we were 
trying to achieve. I’m wondering about the question as much as knowing, XXX 
has a view that some TOCs have been set very high, and team have been 
deliver for less and share the underrun. So I’m just thinking that in our case 
was not the case. It was realistic but aggressive, and the notion that people 
setting a soft TOC wasn’t true, and not our case.” 
8.6 Cost Management during the Project Delivery Phase 
As opposed to other IOCM research that often focuses on product design and process 
development in manufacturing environments, this research highlights cost 
management practices during the project delivery phase. Actually, a formal alliance 
relationship is established only when alliance participants have reached agreements on 
the project proposal and alliance agreement. This is followed by project delivery. 
Therefore, the alliancing project delivery phase can be viewed as a process in which 
the established target cost and non-cost performance requirements are achieved. 
Furthermore, alliance participants strive to realize the owner’s project objectives as 
well as their respective commercial benefits in this process. Thus, the question of how 
project alliances conduct cost management during the project delivery phase becomes 
relevant. By interviewing alliance managers, a number of IOCM practices and 
techniques were identified. Some of these are not used only for cost management 
purposes, although they are still presented as powerful tools for cost management in 
the context of alliancing.  
8.6.1 Commercial Incentive as the Primary Driver for Cost Reduction 
Due to the lock-in effect of target cost, alliance participants will still seek further cost 
reduction during the project delivery phase. Interviewees revealed that project alliances 
have made more efforts to reduce costs even though the actual cost was still lower than 
the target cost during the project delivery phase. The most important driver for cost 
reduction comes from the commercial incentives. In the context of project alliancing, 
the commercial incentives are usually expressed as ‘pain-share and gain-share’ which 
means that all the alliance participants will lose or benefit from the actual performance 
against the target cost and non-cost targets (DTF Victoria 2010a). The potential win or 
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loss incentivises alliance participants to commit to cost reduction activities. An 
alliance manager stated, 
“If you are pain for the cost overrun, then there is a motivation for you to try to 
reduce them because it is coming out of your money……. If the proponents get 
commercial/financial benefit, then they’ll continue to innovate, why don’t? If I 
said you get your share in savings, then you gonna work hard to try get as 
much as it. That’s basically the fundamental driver, isn’t it?”  
More importantly, this also suggested that alliance participants’ willingness to 
reduce cost is matched with how much benefit they can get from the cost savings. 
The commercial incentive plays a key role in encouraging alliance participants’ 
collaborative behaviours and driving innovation, which in turn reduce costs more 
aggressively. Normally, the cost underrun or overrun is shared equally between 
the owner and NOPs (DTF Victoria 2010a). However, it was found that the 
inequality in sharing profits between the owner and NOPs discouraged alliance 
participants, especially NOPs, from seeking further cost reduction. As an alliance 
manager illustrated, 
“Let’s just talk about one incentive scheme that alliances generally have in 
place for underrun. You are incentivised to deliver less than the target. My 
incentive is potentially 50% of the underrun I can share with my other NOPs. 
In this project, the share of underrun was 85% back to the client to reinvest, 
and only 15% to go back to the performance pool. So, not a lot of incentive to 
drive cost too low because it was going back into reinvestment. ” 
8.6.2 Continuous Improvement and Collaboration as the Primary Costing 
Methodology 
All interviewees indicated that cost management is a continuous process with 
improvements being made throughout the whole lifecycle of project alliances. The 
costing methodology of project alliances can be likened to the Kaizen costing approach 
that is sometimes used in manufacturing environments to reduce costs on a continual 
basis during the production process (Monden and Hamada 1991). Interviewees also 
 Page | 208 
emphasized that project alliances proactively manage risks and associated costs, and 
do their best to prevent costs from overrun during project delivery phase. Alliances 
employ a number of techniques to make continuous improvement and to manage risks 
proactively such as setting stretch targets, regular meeting, performance checking, 
Deming cycle, balanced scorecard and reporting. 
Alliancing projects are usually complex in nature and have multi-dimensional targets 
such as cost, time, quality, safety, environment, community, stakeholder, and 
maintenance and operation. To a great extent, the cost is the outcome of other 
performance areas. To achieve the various targets, and in turn reduce the consequential 
costs, alliances often set stretch targets which are more challenging than the original 
targets, and allocate respective stretch target to each management team. It is extremely 
difficult to hit stretch targets by continuing with business-as-usual approaches or by 
just working harder. Therefore, alliances have to reinvent new strategies to do the 
works. In alliances, a stretch target approach not only leads to the producing of 
innovative solutions but also is beneficial to learning between different management 
groups within an alliance. One of the consequences is that the effectiveness of alliance 
is maximised. An alliance manager stated: 
“We have always got stretch targets. We drive stretch targets in our team. In 
the same way, when we are going above in certainty areas, we try to work out 
why we are going above or losing money in this area. The same thing, when 
we are going below, we try to work out why we are doing well on what 
ingredients present. We can copy that across other areas. Because we are doing 
well in one area, it could be we got TOC wrong with high price or to we are 
doing something new or innovative or just really efficient. …… The target is 
not just cost. The cost is outcome of, typically, time and the project we dealt 
with. So we do something quicker or less something I think, or come up with 
new ideas to get rid of something that still meets the performance 
requirements.” 
Interviewees indicated that alliances usually regularly measure and check their 
performance in both cost and non-cost areas. The performance measurement and 
checking is constant throughout the whole process of alliance, and can be on a 
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daily or weekly basis. With regular performance checking, alliances can identify 
the potential problems and risks and take actions proactively. Techniques such as 
the Deming cycle and balanced scorecard provide powerful support for this 
purpose. Deming cycle is an iterative four-step management model that is used for 
continuous improvement. A basic Deming cycle can be expressed as plan 
(identify and analyse the problem) - do (develop and implement solutions) - check 
(evaluate the results) - act (standardize the solution) (Johnson 2002). By 
conducting the Deming cycle daily, alliances track performance in real time. 
Corrective actions can be undertaken if there are any deviations from the targets. 
Balanced scorecard is also management tool to continuously improve 
performance and results. In addition, regular meeting is another widely used 
approach for tracking performance and identifying new solutions. An alliance 
manager stated that  
“When we go through the delivery phase, we monitor that basically every day 
because the risks we’ve been aware of, risks emerged we won’t be aware of. I 
say we do every day. We have used a plan-do-check-action process called 
Deming cycle for continuous improvement. We measure our performance 
everyday across the KRAs. And we hold 30 minutes meeting every morning in 
the control room. You have safety, environment, community and other targets. 
We have a performing card, measure against with marker, and what the key 
actions are, what the key outputs are. So we know where we are travelling 
above or below, or wrong on target. And as risk emerges, so we might be say 
we’ve had safety incident, or something else. But typically, there is a raw cost 
analysis that needs to be done.” 
Some interviewees suggested that accurate reporting is also a very useful method to 
identify new problems and potential cost overrun. With accurate reporting, project 
alliances can track costs and performance all the time, and check whether actual costs 
potentially deviate from the target level. From this point, reporting can be viewed as a 
proactive mechanism to identify risks and problems that often lead to cost overrun. 
Reporting is also a continuous process. An alliance manager explained: 
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“Each month, we report progress and performance. We forecast the costs to 
completion of the project. It helped us track our costs and find problems that 
might cost more. So, we can take actions before it happens.” 
Interviewees further reiterated that collaboration among alliance participants covers 
every corner of cost management in project alliances. Actually, collaboration is the 
primary way of work in project alliances. Alliance participants create a seamless 
interface in the management of costs during the project delivery phase. Additional 
opportunities for cost reduction arise through collaborative efforts of alliance 
participants. This can be illustrated by an alliance manager’s statement: 
“What we can do is to collaboratively reduce the cost as opposed to contractors 
just go on. It was about trying to find elements you could have everyone 
collectively find a way for reducing the cost. Sometimes, it was even talking 
through alternative suppliers, alternative materials with outside. But with the 
client, they would have a brief. That brief said the level of quality etc. but 
within that, you might be able to discuss time, discuss alternative equipment or 
alternative material, so that we could find the savings. That’s what we did. The 
strategies were about targeting areas where we could find alternative and 
seeking alternative to reduce cost. That’s a matter of collaborative approach, 
bearing in mind performance requirements the client would have, and 
balancing the alternatives to make sure we don’t miss on delivering the quality 
outcome through a cost saving exercise.” 
8.6.3 Information Sharing and Open-Book Accounting 
Information sharing is a common cost management practice in interorganizational 
relationships. From a management accounting perspective, it not only enables 
organizations in the relationship to jointly learn new skills and identify cost 
reduction opportunities (Coad and Cullen 2006), but also facilitates more effective 
collaboration between organizations (Cooper and Slagmulder 2004). Similar 
merits of information sharing can also be found in project alliances. Furthermore, 
the interviews identified two forms of information sharing that are widely used in 
project alliances. One is the face-to-face communication of skill, knowledge and 
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real-time project information that can be used to identify risks and problems in 
delivering alliancing projects, and find cost reduction solutions to make 
continuous improvement. Interviewees believed that innovation could overcome 
risks and problems, which in turn reduce costs. However, such innovative 
solutions are difficult to be identified by one party in isolation, especially when 
specific information and knowledge was possessed by other parties. An alliance 
manager described the typical process of information sharing as follows 
“You’ve got contractor team sit in the same office, design team sit in the same 
office, services people can be in the same office. In the same room, we all talk 
in the same time with the client. So client understands what the implications 
are. Designers understand the limitations on the design. Contractor teams feed 
in limitations of access to areas because not all accessible, and also 
constructability, really a big issue.” 
The other form of information sharing is more formal and related to sharing detailed 
cost information. An alliance manager explained:  
“In most of alliances, at least three parties, they all have costs. The owner, 
designer and contractor, they track their own costs separately but report 
together monthly. That’s important. They report together. Yes. It’s everyone’s 
interest. Report to every party. They have to. Each party knows other parties’ 
costs.” 
This form of information sharing is usually known as open-book accounting. The 
openness and transparency of cost information can support alliance participants’ 
collaboration on cost management. Moreover, transparency of cost information is 
considered to be essential to identify cost reduction opportunities (Kajüter and 
Kulmala 2005). An alliance manager stated: 
“Within the alliance, all costs are transparent. No hidden agenda. We are 
confident with the relationship and happy to work together…….In our case, we 
are able to make best for project decisions with the cost information.”  
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8.6.4 Multi-Party Value Engineering 
Value engineering is an important technique aiming at achieving necessary function 
and performance requirements with the least cost through a collaborative and iterative 
activity of option identification, analysis and selection (Green 1994; Nicolini et al. 
2000). In interorganizational relationships, it is also a popular IOCM tool that is used 
for finding the optimal solutions at the lowest possible cost while maintaining the 
required functionality (Cooper and Slagmulder 2004). The interviews found that 
during the delivery phase of alliancing projects, the processes undertaken by alliance 
participants to identify innovative solutions to risks and problems, and to enhance the 
overall value delivered to the owners are typical value engineering approaches. An 
alliance manager stated: 
“It’s getting people, specialist, engineer, design team, contractor, all in the 
room. It’s the identification of problem in the first instance. That’s the kind of 
various brains to come to brainstorm solutions, and then test the solution 
through pricing. OK, this is what we need to do. Balance the cost and 
functionality. Of course, that’s the sort of best for project approach. So I think 
it’s really direct brainstorming, value engineering on the run.”   
8.6.5 Reducing Cost and Enhancing Value Simultaneously 
One may suspect that alliance participants might be obsessed with cost reduction 
because of the potential commercial benefits, and the cost reduction efforts made by 
alliance participants might be detrimental to other non-cost performance and 
functionality. However, the interviews found that this is not the case in project 
alliances. Despite the fact that potential commercial benefits from cost saving 
incentivise alliance participants to identify innovative solutions to cost reduction, the 
innovation usually leads to value enhancement. For example, value engineering is a 
process of value augmentation since the improved functionality and non-cost 
performance are achieved without increasing costs, or costs are reduced without 
affecting the functionality or performance requirements of projects (Nicolini et al. 
2000). All interviewees believed that cost management in project alliances not only led 
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to cost reduction but also added more value to the owner. An alliance manager 
commented, 
“How to address the cost reduce which is not business as usual. The business 
as usual approach might be cost cut as opposed to innovation and improvement 
as well as reducing cost.” 
It is almost impossible to reduce costs at the expense of compromising the 
performance requirements and functionality, even though project alliances are faced 
with cost overrun problems. Most interviewees (n=13) indicated that functionality and 
performance requirements cannot be relaxed when cost overrun problems occur. As an 
alliance manager emphasized: 
“I’ve never seen an alliance relax one or more functional or performance 
requirements of project to reduce cost. Never. I haven’t seen. Never. The 
owner set those. I would say client must strongly object that. The proponents 
have signed off to deliver the outcomes. If they could expect something less, 
then they shouldn’t be paid as much as they should pay.” 
To deal with cost overrun problems, alliance participants can redesign part of the 
project and find innovative solutions to save costs without affecting its functionality 
and performance requirements. An alliance manager explained, 
“You can redesign it so long as it meets the functional output. You can’t adjust 
the initial TOC. But what you can do is you can redesign and come up with a 
smart way to achieve the outcomes of the project.” 
However, not all cost overrun problems can be resolved with redesigning and 
innovation. Some interviewees (n=8) indicated that sometimes, redesigning might cost 
more than the overrun itself. In addition, it is difficult to make changes to deal with 
cost overrun problems in short-term projects because the time is very limited. In such 
situations, alliance participants have to share the “pain” from the cost overrun. An 
alliance manager stated, 
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“The difficulty in the project we have is that, again as I said was the fixed 
delivery time. You don’t have the luxury of resetting or changing the delivery 
date. So the notion of being able to take the time to go back redesign is less 
likely. …… you just got an overrun. That’s the reality. The alliance 
participants have to share the loss, 50:50.” 
Actually, alliance participants have to fully consider the functionality and performance 
requirements when they work out cost reduction solutions. If the functionality and 
performance requirements are relaxed, alliance participants will lose more because the 
commercial framework in project alliances has linked the commercial benefits with 
both cost and non-cost performance requirements. An alliance manager explained: 
“If you just drive the cost, the dangerous is you only get one outcome and you 
limit your thinking. You need to think around all the dimensions of the KRAs 
each time. …… All the decisions you must get back to KRAs on what you 
determined and not just do a cost mitigation strategy. And again you’ll get 
balance on your approach and your team to delivery.” 
8.7 Scope Change in Project Alliances 
Scope changes in project alliances are very limited because most of risks are assumed 
and shared by alliance participants. Interviewees indicated that scope change could 
only occur when the scope or size, and/or functional requirements of project changed 
significantly. Normally, there are two forms of scope change. One is that the alliance 
proposes a change, i.e. the alliance identifies a change and offers the proposal. The 
other one is that the owner directs a change. Though the procedure for a scope change 
is quite straightforward, the question is, as an alliance manager commented: 
“Is it really not in the scope?” 
Therefore, each project alliance has to develop the guideline that explains what 
constitutes a scope change and how a scope change is defined. Further, project 
alliances rigorously review and justify any proposed or potential scope changes. An 
alliance manager described the process as follows: 
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“The alliance put the proposal to the ALT. The ALT needs to agree with that. 
All been with the ALT. and it gets to put to the owner, and the owner directs it. 
If the owner does not agree, then it does not happen.” 
Normally, a scope change will lead to the adjustment to target cost, non-cost 
targets, even the functional requirements, and in turn the initial commercial 
arrangement. That may be the major reason why a proposed scope change should 
be justified in a more rigorous way and agreed upon by all alliance participants. In 
this respect, an alliance manager stated: 
“The ALT have to agree that. But fundamentally, if it is recognized this is the 
owner’s cost, he needs to find the funds. Because that’s the deal. You can’t 
expect alliance to bear all costs, all changes. That pertains to owner wanting to 
something in addition to. But equally, once it is in the TOC, the risk is shared, 
so something fails or something redone more than we anticipated. You have to 
bear that pain and share it. That’s the deal.” 
Since a scope change will trigger an adjustment to initial target cost, the change 
part of the project needs to be re-designed and the associated costs need to be re-
estimated. Actually, scope change is the one of the two opportunities to adjust the 
initial target cost (interviewees indicated that legislation change is the other 
opportunity that leads to adjustment to initial target cost.). Often, changes cause 
significant costs. Interviewees indicated that alliance participants still used a 
collaborative approach to deal with a scope change, and to develop a proposal for 
the change including project solutions and cost estimation. The development 
process for the scope change is reminiscent of the initial project proposal 
development, but not so comprehensive and complex. Alliance participants need 
to quantify benefits in terms of various KRAs, benefits to the alliance, 
quantification in term of cost, and identification of the impact on any of the KRAs. 
Only simple forms of IOCM techniques are used, such as information sharing, 
value engineering, functional analysis and simple form of value-based target 
costing.  
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8.8 Summary 
IOCM practices in alliances were further explored by interviewing alliance managers 
in the Australian construction industry. This chapter presents and reports the findings 
of the interviews. The results of the interviews provide deep insights into the 
application of IOCM in alliances. 
Regarding the lifecycle costs, results show that lifecycle is only one of the main 
considerations in determining the final proposal in alliances. Alliances have to make 
balanced decisions across a number of KRAs. For developing a cost-efficiency 
proposal, alliance participants normally interact and collaborate with the owners, 
maintainers and operators to make joint decisions on solutions. The owners, 
maintainers and operators’ information and knowledge are valuable. In some alliances, 
alliance participants’ commercial benefits have been linked with lifecycle performance 
with a view to incentivise alliance participants to focus on lifecycle cost efficiency.  
In terms of setting target costs, the results indicate that functional and performance 
requirements are the determinants for cost in alliances. Alliances need to clear on what 
the owners’ drivers and requirements are. Various KRAs have to be considered, 
measured, quantified and balanced. The cost is value driven, and thus value-based 
target costing (rather than price-based target costing) is commonly used in commodity 
manufacturing sectors.  
In the project delivery phase, alliances adopt continuous improvement costing 
methodology to undertake cost management in a collaborative way. A number of 
techniques are used to support continuous improvement such as setting stretch targets, 
regular meeting, performance checking, Deming cycle, balanced scorecard and 
reporting. Information sharing and open-book accounting are indispensible to cost 
management in alliances. It is worth mentioning that cost management in alliances 
leads to added value to the project owners.  
Scope changes are limited in alliances, and only happen when the scope or size, and/or 
functional requirements of project change significantly. Actually, a scope change is the 
only change that can lead to the adjustment to the initial target cost. Therefore, the 
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agreement regarding a proposed scope change should be achieved by all the alliance 
participants. The IOCM practices used for dealing with scope changes are similar to 
those used for developing initial project proposals.   
The interviews not only well answered the questions resulted from the questionnaire 
survey but also validated the findings of the questionnaire survey. By combining the 
findings from the interviews and the question survey conducted in the first-stage data 
collection, interorganizational cost management techniques and practices in project 
alliances are summarised and presented in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 IOCM Techniques and Practices in Project Alliances 
Alliance process IOCM techniques used Cost management practices 
Process: 
Project proposal development 
Purpose: 
- Work out project solution 
including project design and 
construction methods; 
- Estimate and establish target 
cost and other performance 
targets of the alliance such 
as time, quality and safety; 
- Finalize the commercial 
arrangements 
Value-based target costing - Establish a multi-disciplinary team that typically consists of designer and construction engineer, 
operator, procurer, and estimator to develop the project proposal; 
- Bring all major parties into the project proposal development; 
- Focus on design and design cost out before construction by brainstorming and identifying 
innovative solutions; 
- Undertake value management and optimization studies; 
- Identify solutions to minimize lifecycle costs during design by using owner’s information and 
knowledge, and interaction with maintainers or operators; 
- Lifecycle costs analysis: Quantify lifecycle costs to select the optimal solution from alternatives; 
- Balance lifecycle costs and other KRAs by adopting collaboration approach with all the major 
parties in alliance involved in decision-making process; 
- Incentivize alliance to address lifecycle costs by linking the operational performance of project 
with alliance participants’ commercial benefits; 
- Reference or benchmark against market price by tendering, subcontracting, inquiring with special 
contractors; 
- Cost is driven by the owner’s functional and performance requirements; 
- Develop project proposal by alliance participants in collaboration and interaction with the owner, 
ensuring the owner’s requirements are addressed and reflected in the project design and target 
cost; 
- Consider, measure, quantify and balance various key performance areas; 
- Once fixed, target cost can be adjusted only when project scope and legislation change.  
Multi-party value 
engineering 
- Conduct iterative multi-party value engineering; 
- Identify, compare, assess and select alternative options and innovative solutions based on the best 
balance between cost and functionality.  
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Alliance process IOCM techniques used Cost management practices 
Information sharing - Share information on basic costing elements, information and knowledge, helping to identify cost 
reduction solutions and ensuring transparency between parties. 
Concurrent engineering - Develop design, construction methods, cost estimation and commercial arrangements in a 
concurrent manner, i.e. various proposal development tasks and activities such as project design, 
construction methods and procurement strategies development, risk assessment, and cost estimate 
are overlapping and undertaken simultaneously. 
Process: 
Project delivery 
Purpose: 
- Achieve the pre-determined 
cost and non-cost objectives 
by delivering alliancing 
project; 
- For the owner, achieving 
project objectives at the 
target cost is a major 
concern; 
- For NOPs, their commercial 
benefits from alliances can 
be realized only when pre-
determined targets and the 
owner’s project objectives 
are achieved. 
Risk-reward regime 
(Commercial framework) 
- Link financial pain/gain with both cost and non-cost areas performance; 
- Alliance participants will lose or benefit from the actual performance depending on actual and 
target performance in both cost and non-cost areas; 
- Commercial incentive is the primary driver for cost reduction. The incentive can be either 
negative (failure to meet targets) or positive (achieving targets). 
Continuous improvement - Make improvements throughout the whole lifecycle of project alliance; 
- Continuous interaction and communication between alliance participants; 
- Manage risks and associated costs proactively to prevent costs from overrun; 
- Create seamless interface in cost management; 
- Alliance participants commit to collaboration in cost management; 
- Identify cost reduction opportunities through collaborative efforts; 
- Use accurate monthly reporting to identify risks and problems, and track costs; 
- Set and allocate stretch targets to management teams; 
- Hold regular meeting to check performance, identify risks and find solutions; 
- Use Deming cycle and balance scorecard approaches to measure performance and take proactive 
actions. 
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Alliance process IOCM techniques used Cost management practices 
Information sharing - Share skill, knowledge and real-time project information to facilitate the identification of cost 
reduction opportunities; 
Open-book accounting - Establish recordkeeping and accounting practices and procedures to support the open-book 
arrangement; 
- Share detailed cost information by reporting cost together to support alliance participants’ 
collaboration on cost management and identify cost reduction opportunities. 
Multi-party value 
engineering 
- Brainstorm solutions; 
- Conduct multi-party value engineering to identify innovative solutions to risks and problems, and 
enhance the overall value delivered to the owners. 
Process: 
Scope change 
Purpose: 
- Develop proposal for a 
scope change; 
- Adjustment to initial target 
cost; 
- Review and justify the 
proposed scope change. 
Information sharing; 
Value engineering,  
Functional analysis, and 
Simple form of value-
based target costing 
- A scope change can happen in two ways: 1) project alliance proposes a scope change, and 2) the 
owner can directs a scope change;  
- A proposed scope change should be agreed by all the alliance participants because it will lead to 
the adjustment to target cost, non-cost targets, even the functional requirements, and in turn the 
initial commercial arrangement; 
- Normally, scope changes happen during project delivery phase. Cost management practices used 
for dealing with scope changes are similar with those used in project delivery phase; 
- The development process for the scope change is reminiscent of the initial project proposal 
development, but not so comprehensive and complex. Simple form of value-based target costing 
system is the primary IOCM techniques adopted; 
- Information sharing, value engineering and functional analysis help to develop the proposal for 
the scope change; 
- Once approved by the owner, the change will become a part of the project. Alliance participants 
share the risks and opportunities associated the scope change. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Building on empirical findings and discussions presented in Chapter 7 and 8, this 
chapter describes the achievement of the research through the conclusions, 
contributions and implications of the research. Limitations of the research are also 
presented in this chapter. 
The conclusions of the research are summarized based on the research objectives in 
Section 9.2. Section 9.3 highlights the theoretical, methodological and practical 
contributions and implications. Section 9.4 addresses the limitations of the research in 
respect of research design, and proposes future research directions simultaneously.  
9.2 Conclusions 
This research aims to study the economics of alliancing and to explore management 
controls in alliances by drawing upon TCE and interorganizational management 
control theories. More specifically, the purposes of this research are (1) to examine the 
impact of transaction attributes of alliances on the transaction costs, (2) to test the 
governance performance and efficiency of alliancing in delivering projects with given 
characteristics, (3) to investigate the effects of control mechanisms of alliances on 
transaction costs and (4) to explore the IOCM practices and techniques used in 
alliances. To attain these objectives, information was collected from the senior 
alliancing professionals in the Australian construction industry by means of a 
questionnaire survey and interviews. The collected data were subsequently analysed by 
using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This section summarises the results 
of the research in light of the research objectives and questions based on the findings 
presented in Chapter 7 and 8.  
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9.2.1 Objective 1: The Impact of Transaction Attributes of Alliances on 
Transaction Costs 
TCE provides a more cogent and comprehensive perspective to address the issues of 
contractual variety, and study the economic problems of organizations. Drawing upon 
TCE theory and taking into account the nature of alliancing, this research decomposed 
transaction costs in alliances into three cost elements (i.e. set-up costs, monitoring 
costs and enforcement costs), discussed the transaction attributes of alliances, and 
proposed that transaction costs will increase along with the increasing asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency in alliances. Using multiple regression analysis on a sample 
of 88 Australian alliances, this research examined the differential impact of various 
project owners’ and NOPs’ individual dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency on different transaction cost elements in alliances.  
The results show that alliances exhibit a relatively high level of uncertainty, and 
uncertainty positively affects all three transaction cost elements, suggesting that 
transaction costs in alliances are higher when alliances encompass a higher level of 
uncertainty. This finding supports previous TCE studies (e.g. Artz and Brush 2000; 
Buvik 2002; White and Lui 2005), and reveals that uncertainty plays an important role 
in affecting transaction costs throughout the overall alliance process. Actually, all the 
alliance activities are increasingly difficult to be carried out as the level of uncertainty 
rises, and thus entail greater transaction costs in each stage of the alliance process. 
More specifically, the increased uncertainty in alliances makes it more difficult for 
contracting parties to establish alliance relationships, to manage the project delivery 
and to deal with problems that might arise during alliance relationships. 
Values of projects procured through alliancing method are relatively high. Project 
value (frequency) is positively related to set-up costs and monitoring costs. The costs 
and efforts associated with establishing alliances and managing projects process are 
more substantial in larger alliancing projects than in smaller alliancing projects. This 
finding is consistent with TCE’s argument (Williamson 1985), since the larger the 
project, the more significant the interactions are between contracting parties. However, 
enforcement costs do not rise with project value. One possible reason is that 
contracting parties commit themselves more to the transaction as the alliance 
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relationship develops over time in a larger project. Non-value-adding activities such as 
claims, disputes, conflicts and litigation are reduced with the development of the 
alliance relationship and the increased commitments of contracting parties. 
Furthermore, repeated transactions can promote cooperation between contracting 
parties (Dyer 1997). The cost and effort associated with problem solving is thus 
economized. 
With respect to specific investment, results show that both the owners and NOPs made 
substantial investments on human assets and reputation assets. Regarding the impact of 
asset specificity on transaction costs, the picture is much more complex than 
uncertainty and frequency presented. When combining the three transaction cost 
elements as a whole, the results, to a great extent, support TCE’s assertion that asset 
specificity increases transaction costs (Williamson 1991a). However, when 
differentiating contracting parties’ specific investments according to the particular 
specificity dimension examined, the results indicate that different asset specificity 
dimensions exhibit differential effects on individual transaction cost elements. For 
example, contracting parties’ dedicated asset specificity is positively related to 
monitoring costs, but has no positive relationships with set-up costs and enforcement 
costs. Human asset specificity positively affects set-up costs and monitoring costs, but 
does not affect enforcement costs. No positive relationships were found between 
reputational asset specificity and each of the three transaction cost elements. In 
particular, reputational asset specificity negatively affects enforcement costs. Such 
differential effects are explainable. Normally, contracting parties’ dedicated assets 
were committed after the establishment of alliances, and thus lack an effect on set-up 
costs. Further, contracting parties more tend to protect their specific investments, 
whilst simultaneously economize transaction costs associated with safeguarding 
against the hazards of opportunism when asset specificity rises. As alliance 
relationships develop over time, the shared organizational norms and values can be 
expected to emerge and to serve as guidelines to encourage desirable behaviours (Das 
and Teng 2001b; Håkansson 1982; Ouchi 1979). This will reduce the potential 
disputes and conflicts, and in turn economize enforcement costs. The impact of asset 
specificity on enforcement costs is expected to be reduced by the shared organizational 
norms and values in alliances. In addition, contracting parties’ reputational investments 
can be interpreted as commitments to alliance relationships. Such commitments are 
helpful in solving problems that might arise. 
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In summary, the results not only indicate that the impact of transaction attributes on 
different transaction cost elements varies, but also present a clear picture of how both 
the owners’ and NOPs’ different types of relationship-specific investments affect 
individual transaction cost elements (see Figure 9.1). This finding justifies the 
operationalization of transaction costs and asset specificity presented in Sections 4.3 
and 5.5 in which transaction costs in alliances were split into three cost elements rather 
than treated as a single construct, and asset specificity was disaggregated into six 
dimensions instead of one dimension. More importantly, the research design, which 
proposed that the impact of transaction attributes on different transaction cost element 
needs to be distinctively tested, also proved to be effective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
＋: Positive correlation; －: Negative correlation; ×: Insignificant relation. 
Figure 9.1 The Impact of Transaction Attributes on Transaction Costs in Alliances 
9.2.2 Objective 2: The Governance Performance and Efficiency of Alliancing 
Building on TCE, this research discussed the contracts and governance forms 
employed in construction transactions. Contracts spell out the relationships between 
contracting parties, whereas governance serves as a support institution of contracts that 
deal with the contracting problems caused by the interactions between human nature 
and transaction attributes. Governance is essential because contracts cannot plan and 
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specify all the future events and contingencies; therefore, governance mechanisms 
should be devised to forestall and attenuate contracting problems (Williamson 1985). 
In construction transactions, classical, neoclassical and relational contractual forms are 
three of the main alternatives. The matching governance modes (in order) are market, 
trilateral governance and bilateral governance. Specific to alliancing, it belongs to 
relational contracting paradigm, and employs bilateral governance supplemented by 
means of unified governance. Such arrangements have considerable coordination and 
incentive merits, and are most suitable for complex transactions with mixed or high 
specific investments. Another advantage for arrangements of this kind is that they are 
favoured by scope and scale economy considerations. The relationship is dissolved 
along with the completion of transactions, so as to preserve great flexibility.  
TCE assumes that the alignment between governance form and transaction attributes 
does promote governance performance and reduce transaction costs (Williamson 
1991a). Following TCE propositions, this research analysed the antecedents of 
transaction costs, and in particular explored whether alliancing is served as an effective 
approach to facilitate transactions and economize transaction costs by conceptualizing 
and measuring transaction attributes in alliances, and testing the reducing effect of 
alliancing on transaction costs by performing multiple regression analysis on the data 
collected through a questionnaire survey. TCE pays particular attention to the impacts 
of asset specificity on transaction costs and governance efficiency. When contracting 
parties commit specific assets to a relationship, bilateral dependency between parties is 
created with the following necessity for coordinated adaption and safeguarding against 
opportunism. This research argues that alliancing can allocate specific assets, 
coordinate activities, monitor behaviours and attenuate opportunism efficiently, and 
thereby reduce transaction costs. Such a reducing effect of alliancing on transaction 
costs is expected to be reinforced as investments in asset specificity deepen. The 
empirical findings not only support this argument but also are consistent with those by 
(Buvik 2002), who demonstrates that vertical coordination (hybrid governance) is 
more effective in reducing transaction costs under conditions of high asset specificity 
than under conditions of low asset specificity in industrial buyer-supplier relationships. 
This means that the governance performance of alliancing is improved when asset 
specificity rises. Uncertainty is also an important dimension in TCE. The roles of 
uncertainty are that it inhibits the ex-ante plan of future events and contingencies in an 
explicit, comprehensive and precise way, increases the difficulty in evaluating 
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performance and responding to changing circumstances, and leads to ex-post 
bargaining and negotiation. Alliancing is said to be an efficient approach to reduce the 
adverse effect of uncertainty and to economize the associated transaction costs in high-
uncertainty environments. The findings provide evidence that alliancing becomes more 
efficient in the presence of high levels of uncertainty. Regarding frequency, TCE-
based research has offered scant evidence of its effect on governance performance. 
Considering the fact that alliancing can significantly reduce non-value-adding 
transactions and enables repeated transactions much easier, this research hypothesizes 
that alliancing is more efficient in reducing transaction costs under conditions of high 
frequency. The results support this hypothesis. In summary, the empirical findings 
demonstrate that alliancing is more effective in reducing transaction costs under 
conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency than under conditions of 
low asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. The governance efficiency of 
alliancing becomes stronger as contracting parties’ investments in specific assets, 
uncertainty and frequency increase (see Figure 9.2). The findings presented have 
identified another significant advantage of alliancing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 An Illustration for the Governance Efficiency of Alliancing 
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previous TCE studies provide strong support for this prediction. This implies that 
transaction costs in alliances would be significant because alliancing involves intensive 
investments into assets and capabilities and complex uncertainties. Under such 
circumstances, alliancing, however, functions as an effective mechanism to forestall 
and attenuate contracting problems, and in turn facilitates transactions and economizes 
the ongoing transaction costs. Thus, transaction costs in alliances are not necessarily 
low, but rather are economized through the reducing effect of alliancing on transaction 
costs. Second, the reducing effect of alliancing on transaction costs may exist, but 
becomes significantly weak in transactions characterised by low asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. Contracting problems are not significant in such 
transactions. Alliancing is at a disadvantage for transactions of this kind because it 
incurs added ongoing transaction costs without added benefits. Moreover, excessive 
governance hinders transactions since it offers weak incentives and incurs the costs of 
additional administration (Leiblein 2003). In addition, bilateral governance, as used in 
alliancing, could induce significant set-up costs because the bilateral governance seeks 
to align goal and incentives ex-ante through a form of cultural initiation or 
socialization process (Heide 1994). The industry also has recognized that alliancing 
usually comes at high initial set-up costs (DTF Victoria 2010a). Such added ongoing 
transaction costs and high set-up costs are warranted only if these costs are more than 
offset by transaction costs savings. Hence, this research is not to suggest that alliancing 
are absolutely superior. It may be superior only under given conditions, i.e. higher 
levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. 
9.2.3 Objective 3: The Effects of Control Mechanisms of Alliances on Transaction 
Costs 
As this research demonstrated, the high asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
induce high transaction costs in alliances (see Section 9.2.1). TCE argues that 
governance and control mechanisms, when aligned with transaction attributes, can 
economize transaction costs and facilitate the transaction. The research confirmed that 
the governance performance and efficiency of alliancing is improved as the level of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency increases (see Section 9.2.2). Drawing 
upon TCE and interorganizational management control theories, this research further 
discussed fourteen unique control mechanisms used in alliances, categorized them into 
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three groups, i.e. outcome, behaviour and social controls, and proposed that the control 
mechanisms of alliancing are useful in managing transaction risks and reducing 
transaction costs. The impact of the control mechanisms of alliancing on individual 
transaction cost elements (i.e., set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs) 
was investigated by a questionnaire survey. Figures 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 group and 
illustrate the fourteen control mechanisms according to their relative effectiveness in 
reducing set-up costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs respectively. The results 
show that all the mechanisms contribute to reducing monitoring costs and enforcement 
costs. Only four mechanisms have the capability to reduce set-up costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Effectiveness of Control Mechanisms in Reducing Set-up Costs 
Figure 9.3 shows that three social control mechanisms (cooperation and collaboration; 
honest and open communication; and acting fairly and reasonably) are the most 
effective mechanisms that contribute to reducing set-up costs. Joint goal setting and 
planning is the only outcome control that contributes to reducing both set-up costs. The 
remaining outcome controls and social controls, and all the behaviour controls lack the 
capability to reduce set-up costs. As Figure 9.4 illustrates, the three social controls, 
which have the greatest effectiveness in reducing set-up costs, are also the most 
effective mechanisms to reduce monitoring costs. The four behaviour controls were 
found to have the second-greatest effectiveness on reducing monitoring costs. They are 
followed by the three outcome controls and the remaining three social controls. In 
Figure 9.5, the most effective mechanisms to reduce enforcement costs are made up of 
the four behaviour controls and one social control, i.e. cooperation and collaboration. 
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Two social controls (honest and open communication, and acting fairly and 
reasonably), and one outcome control (open-book arrangement) constitute the second 
most effective group to reduce enforcement costs. The third- and fourth-order 
mechanisms consist of the remaining three outcome controls and three social controls 
respectively, suggesting that they have relatively less effectiveness on reducing 
enforcement costs compared with the first and second order of mechanisms. In 
summary, the results suggest that social controls and behaviour controls are 
particularly relevant mechanisms when projects are complex and the outputs are too 
difficult to be measured. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 Effectiveness of Control Mechanisms in Reducing Monitoring Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.5 Effectiveness of Control Mechanisms in Reducing Enforcement Costs 
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The results also suggest that one particular control mechanism presents differential 
type and strength of effectiveness on different transaction cost elements. One may 
have the greatest effectiveness on reducing one form of transaction costs, but may lack 
the capability to reduce another form of transaction costs, e.g. commitment to no 
litigation and arbitration. Therefore, the effectiveness of one particular control 
mechanisms is different in different alliance processes. In the set-up phase of alliances, 
the major task for alliance participants is to develop the project proposal, set targets, 
and establish the alliance. Goal setting is often a challenging and critical task in 
alliances owing to the relatively high degrees of goal incongruence (Das and Teng 
1998b). As the results demonstrated, three social controls are more effective in 
reducing set-up costs than any other mechanisms. The three social controls are useful 
to mitigate the inherent transaction risks. More specifically, collaborative team effort, 
cooperation between participants, and honest and open communication not only 
discourage potential opportunism but also lead to sounder solutions to project. In fact, 
joint goal setting and planning—the only outcome control that contributes to reducing 
set-up costs—is also a collaborative process that contains social control elements. At 
the set-up stage of alliances, most of the behaviour control and outcome control 
mechanisms have not been fully established or come into effect. Further, neither the 
behaviour nor the outcome is specified in the beginning (Das and Teng 2001b). In such 
a situation, both behaviour and outcome controls are inappropriate. They therefore 
have no effectiveness in reducing set-up costs. Similarly, some social control 
mechanisms such as collective and “best for project” decision-making, and “no fault – 
no blame” culture are also rarely used in the set-up phase of alliances. Actually, these 
control mechanisms could potentially increase set-up costs to some degree since the 
establishment of behaviour control and outcome control mechanisms is a costly 
process. In addition, developing the alliance culture is also a time- and energy-
consuming process since different organizational cultures have to be blended and 
harmonized in the context of alliancing. 
In the project delivery phase, alliance participants work together to deliver the pre-
agreed targets. The research confirmed that both monitoring costs and enforcement 
costs are reduced more effectively by social and behaviour controls than by outcome 
controls, implying that alliances heavily rely on social and behaviour controls to 
manage the project delivery phase. This finding is consistent with previous arguments 
in interorganizational management control literature. Since alliances usually are 
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characterised by high asset specificity, high uncertainty and high frequency, the 
perceived relational risks and performance risks are high (Langfield-Smith 2008). 
Social controls have argued to be effective in managing both relational risks and 
performance risks through the establishment of shared culture and values (Das and 
Teng 2001b). Further, behaviour controls are very relevant for dealing with the low 
outcome measurability nature of alliances (Das and Teng 2001b). It is worth noting 
that social controls are perceived to be more effective in the day-to-day management of 
alliances, whereas formal behaviour controls are considered to be more effective in 
dealing with problems that might arise in alliances. It is also worth mentioning that 
three social controls, i.e. collective and best-for-project decision making, and ‘no fault-
no blame’ culture were found to be relatively less effective in reducing both 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs than any other mechanisms. Das and Teng 
(2001b) argue that the participatory decision-making process in alliances enables 
alliance participants’ preferences to be understood and incorporated into mutually 
acceptable goals and plans, thus increasing participants’ commitment. However, the 
decision making process itself is relatively time- and energy-consuming since the goal 
and preference incongruence of alliance participants requires considerable discussion 
and negotiation to reach agreement. The saving on transaction costs may be offset by 
the costly decision making process to some degree.  
9.2.4 Objective 4: Interorganizational Cost Management in Alliances 
The last objective of this research focuses on cost-based controls (IOCM practices) in 
alliances. IOCM has a strong effect on the interorganizational relationships in 
supporting the development of relationships (McIvor 2000; Munday 1992b). When 
looking at alliance as an interorganizational relationship in which both the owner and 
NOPs play important roles, IOCM is highly relevant. In this research, IOCM in 
alliances is defined as the owner and NOPs’ coordinated efforts to reduce the shared 
costs. The research identified and discussed three alliance processes where IOCM 
might be relevant, such as project proposal development, project delivery and scope 
change. Through a questionnaire survey and interviews with alliance managers, this 
research investigated IOCM practices and techniques regarding how alliances develop 
the project proposal, set target costs, make cost more effective during the delivery 
phase, and deal with scope changes. It should be noted that the investigation focused 
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purely on cost management practices that cover alliance relationships and all 
participants’ joint activities, and ignored those used for dealing with individual alliance 
participants’ internal activities. The research has identified a number of IOCM 
practices and techniques used in alliancing (The detailed results can be found in Table 
8.1). The results provide some interesting insights into the nature and application of 
IOCM in the context of project alliances.  
The intent of IOCM in project alliances is not only to deliver the project according to 
the owner’s functional and performance requirements in a more cost-effective manner 
but also to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of alliances. In alliances, the 
IOCM process is twofold. First, it is a project planning and designing activity to 
establish cost and non-cost objectives through the use of collaboration approach. 
Essentially, setting target cost in alliance is a value-based target costing process in 
which the owner’s functional and performance requirements are fully considered and 
reflected in project proposal. The nature of project proposal development can be 
described as follows: 
− Design focused. Project design lies at the centre of project proposal development. 
By brainstorming and identifying as many innovative solutions as possible, 
alliances design cost out before construction, and work out more cost-effective 
project proposals. Value engineering is widely used for identifying, assessing and 
selecting alternative options and innovative solutions based on the best balance 
between cost and functionality. 
− Multi-disciplinary team. Project proposal development is undertaken by a multi-
disciplinary team, which is typically made up of a designer, construction engineer, 
operator, maintainer, procurer and estimator. Key elements of the project proposal 
are developed in a concurrent way. 
− Involvement and collaboration of alliance participants. Project proposal is 
developed by alliance participants in collaboration and interaction with the owner, 
ensuring that the owner’s requirements are addressed and reflected in the project 
design and target cost. All major parties in the alliance are involved in this process. 
− Taking account of lifecycle costs. The proposal development considers the 
construction costs as well as the maintenance and operation costs.  
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− Information and knowledge sharing. Alliance participants share information on 
basic costing elements, information and knowledge, helping to identify cost 
reduction solutions and ensuring transparency between parties. Information and 
knowledge sharing supports the whole project proposal development process. 
− The target cost is value-driven. Cost is driven by the owner’s functional and 
performance requirements. Target cost is established by considering, measuring and 
balancing various functional and performance requirements, and quantifying the 
project solutions. 
Second, IOCM in project alliance involves collaboration, continuous improvement and 
the implementation of project-specific incentives to incentivise alliance participants to 
achieve the established cost and non-cost objectives. More specifically, IOCM in 
project delivery phase is characterized by: 
− Collaboration. Collaboration among alliance participants covers every corner of 
cost management in alliances. Alliance participants rely on collaborative efforts in 
the management of costs during project delivery phase. Actually, all the IOCM 
activities are undertaken in a collaborative manner.  
− Continuous improvement. Continuous improvement is the primary costing 
methodology in alliances. IOCM is a continuous process with improvements being 
made throughout the whole lifecycle of alliances. Alliances employ a number of 
techniques to make continuous improvement and manage risks proactively such as 
setting stretch targets, regular meeting, performance checking, Deming cycle, 
balanced scorecard and reporting.  
− Commercial incentive. The commercial incentive, usually described as ‘pain-share 
and gain-share’, provides the primary driver for cost reduction. The potential win or 
loss incentivises alliance participants to find solutions to reduce costs whilst 
realizing the performance levels.  
− Information sharing. Information sharing provides support for any other cost 
management practices and techniques. The information can be skill, knowledge, 
real-time project information shared through face-to-face communication and 
regular meeting, or detailed cost information shared by more formal open-book 
accounting.  
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− Value augmentation. IOCM in alliances is also a value enhancement process. First, 
the improved functionality and non-cost performance is achieved without increasing 
costs. Second, the costs are reduced without compromising the functionality or 
performance requirements of projects. 
Figure 9.6 summarises the research findings and presents an interorganizational cost 
management framework in project alliances. 
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Figure 9.6 An Interorganizational Cost Management Framework in Alliances 
• Fully cover project scope? 
• Best achieve project objectives? 
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• Agreed by participants? 
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9.3 Contributions to the Academic Knowledge Base 
This research tested the differential impact of various dimensions of owner and NOPs’ 
relationship-specific investments, uncertainty and frequency on the three individual 
transaction cost elements by directly measuring transaction attributes and transaction 
costs in alliances. Even though the lack of empirical studies that examine the 
relationship between transaction attributes and transaction costs in the construction 
industry makes the comparison with previous results difficult, this study contributes to 
TCE and construction management literature in a number of ways. Firstly, the findings 
generally support TCE’s predictions regarding the influence of transaction attributes 
on transaction costs, and thereby provide TCE with empirical evidence in the 
construction industry. Secondly, this research, building on TCE theory, has not only 
sufficiently addressed one significant gap in alliancing research through testing the 
impacts of the relationship-specific investments of contracting parties and project 
characteristics on transaction costs, but also extended TCE’s perspective to the 
construction management area. Thirdly, this study is the first attempt that sets out to 
empirically investigate the direct impact of various dimensions of owner and NOPs’ 
relationship-specific investments, uncertainty and frequency on three individual 
transaction cost elements in alliances. Compared with previous TCE studies that treat 
transaction cost as a single construct, the present study undoubtedly will enhance our 
understanding of transaction attributes, their forms, and their differential effects on 
different transaction cost elements. This approach is more suitable for construction 
sectors due to the complex, long-duration and high-value nature of construction 
project-based transactions.  
Previous alliancing research usually evaluated the performance of alliancing based 
solely on final project outcomes, and neglected the cost and competence of alliancing 
in dealing with contracting problems, and the impacts of transaction characteristics of 
alliancing. TCE submits that an organizational arrangement is chosen by transactors 
with the expectation for minimizing the costs of governing the transaction over the life 
of the relationship; therefore, appropriate assessment of the organizational arrangement 
could not be reached if transaction costs are ignored (Masten et al. 1991; Williamson 
1985). Drawing upon TCE, this research quantitatively examined the governance 
performance of alliancing, and demonstrated that the real strength of alliancing lies in 
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it being an effective procurement strategy to reduce transaction costs where there is 
high asset specificity, high uncertainty and high frequency. More importantly, such 
effectiveness is strengthened as the contracting parties’ investments in specific assets, 
uncertainty and frequency increase.  
Unlike previous alliancing studies that deem management control mechanisms of 
alliances as the success factors to alliances, this research treats those control 
mechanisms as the result of deliberate managerial choice and the integral processes of 
alliancing, and argues that they facilitate transactions and economize transaction costs. 
Actually, contracting parties employ these control mechanisms due to the transaction 
attributes of alliances (i.e. the high level of uncertainty, frequency and asset 
specificity), and the contracting problems resulted from the interaction between 
imperfect human nature and transaction attributes. These controls are process benefits 
of alliancing. They are suitable for alliance relationships but may not be suitable for 
other transaction relationships. The research also demonstrated that the effects of one 
particular control mechanism on different transaction cost elements are differential, 
implying that the control mechanism plays various roles in different alliance processes. 
This finding provides a clear vision on how various control mechanisms of alliances 
function differently in different alliance processes.  
IOCM in manufacturing environments has often been a research focus in the 
management accounting discipline. As one of the only several studies regarding IOCM 
in the construction management discipline, this research is the first attempt to explore 
IOCM in construction alliances. The results indicated that many of the IOCM practices 
and techniques could also be used in construction transaction relationships. However, 
it was found that the target costing system that has been commonly used in commodity 
manufacturing sectors is unsuitable for the construction industry. This finding is 
consistent with Nicolini et al. (2000)’s action research which demonstrated that there 
are a lot of difficulties and barriers to apply this form of target costing in the 
construction sector. Actually, this type of target costing is price-based which means the 
cost is market price driven (Ansari et al. 2006a). The research suggests that alliances 
employ a value-based target costing system in which cost is value driven. The concept 
of value-based target costing is rarely seen in the literature. The only application of 
value-based target costing is a new Department of Defense (USA) initiative called 
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“cost as independent variable” (Ansari et al. 2006a). This research provides evidence 
of the use of value-based target costing in the construction sector.  
In summary, this research not only has well addressed the shortcomings and 
knowledge gaps in the extant alliancing research but also extends TCE and 
interorganizational management control perspective to the construction management 
area. 
9.4 Managerial Implications: A Framework to Reduce Transaction Costs 
Despite the fact that the research is conducted based on a particular contracting 
method—project alliancing—its implications are not limited to alliancing practitioners 
in the construction industry. Transaction cost economizing lies at the centre of 
economic organizations (Williamson 1985).  The cogent discourse on TCE, theoretical 
framework and research findings may guide practitioners’ efforts to reduce transaction 
costs and improve efficiency in practice. Figure 9.7 depicts the framework that can be 
used by practitioners in the construction industry for choosing governance mode and 
designing control mechanisms when engaging in construction project-based 
transactions.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7 A Framework to Reduce Transaction Costs 
 Page | 239 
9.4.1 The Choice of Governance Mode in Organizing Construction Transactions 
The research provides practitioners with TCE perspectives and efficiency 
considerations in choosing the appropriate organizational arrangement in procuring 
construction projects. As a tenet, TCE subscribes that “the choice among alternative 
organizational arrangements turns on a comparison of the costs of transacting under 
each” (Masten et al. 1991, p. 1). However, such a comparison of transaction costs 
lacks operability, since transaction costs are unavailable for those unadopted 
organizational arrangements. A practical way is to assess and analyse the observable 
transaction attributes, i.e. asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  
− Asset specificity. First, the research shows that some dimensions of asset specificity 
can increase transaction costs in alliances. High asset specificity creates bilateral 
dependency between contracting parties, requires frequent and significant 
coordination, and entails considerable efforts to monitor behaviours. When 
organizing transactions with a high level of asset specificity, it is suggested to craft 
specialized organizational arrangements that can effectively coordinate activities, 
allocate specific assets, monitor behaviours and incentivise performance to govern 
the transaction relationships since simple governance modes are ineffective in this 
respect. Secondly, by examining the effects of asset specificity, this research can 
increase practitioners’ awareness of how their relationship-specific investments 
affect the governance performance. As this research demonstrated, both contracting 
parties in alliances have committed approximately equal specific investments to 
support the transactions, and the governance performance of alliancing has a 
positive correlation with contracting parties’ specific investments. Actually, this 
kind of investment made by contracting parties is reciprocal in nature. Reciprocal 
investments can increase commitment and the costs of unilateral defection, thereby 
economizing transaction costs and improving relationship performance (De Vita et 
al. 2010; Dyer 1997). Thus, every contracting party’s relationship-specific 
investments are important to transactions and cannot be neglected. Complex 
governance such as alliancing requires contracting parties to commit substantial 
specific investments to support the relationship. When choosing a sophisticated 
governance or engaging in a complex transaction relationship, managers in an 
organization need to understand whether they have enough resource to support the 
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complex governance, what relationship-specific investments they can make to the 
transaction, and what investments other parties can make to the transaction. Further, 
it is suggested that contracting parties’ specific investments should be symmetrical 
and well matched. If one party’s asset specificity is high but the other party’s is low, 
the party with higher asset specificity will be at a disadvantage in the transaction 
relationship. 
− Uncertainty. A high level of uncertainty usually not only results in difficulty in 
project planning and designing, performance evaluation, and the coordination of 
activities and tasks, but also leads to problems such as renegotiation and ex-post 
bargaining. As the research demonstrated, uncertainty positively affects all three 
transaction cost elements, implying that the overall transaction costs can be 
economized by minimizing uncertainty and the likely adverse effect of uncertainty. 
For the purpose of improving efficiency and economizing transaction costs, it is 
recommended that contracting parties analyse and understand the project 
characteristics, evaluate the unforeseeable issues associated with the transactions 
and unanticipated changes in the transactions beforehand, then choose the 
appropriate governance mode to organize the transactions from a set of alternatives 
based on the perceived level of uncertainty. For example, in delivering complex 
construction projects with a high level of uncertainty, it is desirable for contracting 
parties to employ a more collaborative approach that can contribute to integration 
between parties, thereby reducing information asymmetry, and enabling better 
utilization of all the parties’ knowledge, expertise, experience and intellectual 
efforts. Conversely, when procuring projects with low levels of uncertainty or 
standardized projects, mature and straightforward approaches are more pertinent.  
− Frequency. A transaction can be either a claim to profits or decision rights. Usually, 
a large construction project transaction is made up of a series of repeated 
transactions. Such kind of repeated transactions and interactions between parties are 
more significant in a large construction project than in a small project. High-
frequency transactions encourage contracting parties to craft specialized governance 
modes to organize transactions, since the cost of a specialized governance structure 
will be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring kind (Williamson 
1985). Therefore, frequency is one of the important indicators to justify the 
necessity of crafting specialized governance mechanisms. However, it is important 
that the specialized governance structure can be served as an effective approach to 
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suppress those non-value-added transactions such as claims, disputes, conflicts and 
litigation, and simplify repeated transactions.  
In summary, transaction attributes are powerful concepts in TCE. The efficient 
organization of economic activity entails matching governance structures with these 
transactional attributes in a discriminating way (Williamson 1979). As the research 
demonstrates, the governance performance of alliancing is significantly improved in 
organizing transactions characterized by high asset specificity, high uncertainty and 
high frequency. The alignment between governance form and transaction attributes can 
improve efficiency and reduce transaction costs. Therefore, it is recommended that 
managers should fully assess the transaction attributes when procuring construction 
projects or engaging in transaction relationships. Alternative governance forms rely on 
differential adaptability, incentive and management devices to control the needs of 
transitions, and thereby lead to differential costs and competencies. Generally, simple 
or straightforward governance forms are suitable for simple contractual relations. 
Complex or specialized governance structures are more pertinent to complex 
transactions. It will be very uneconomic to craft sophisticated organizational 
arrangements to govern simple transactions because specialized governance structures 
usually incur significant set-up costs. In addition, excessive governance for simple 
transactions not only incurs added ongoing transaction costs without added benefits 
but also reduces the efficiency. 
9.4.2 The Design of Control Mechanisms in Delivering Projects 
The research suggests that appropriate governance and control mechanisms can 
facilitate transactions and economize transaction costs under given conditions. This 
implies that the choice and design of control mechanisms can be very important in 
improving efficiency. In this regard, the research findings may guide practitioners’ 
efforts to proactively craft appropriate control mechanisms based on the assessment of 
project characteristics, the level of asset specificity, organizational objectives and the 
features of the chosen governance structure.  
Control problems are significant in complex transactions with high asset specificity. 
Companies in transactions usually resort to various control mechanisms to minimize 
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the likely adverse effects of these problems and to improve efficiency. The research 
demonstrates that some social control mechanisms are very effective in reducing set-
up costs and monitoring costs. Social controls play a very positive role in inhibiting 
opportunistic behaviours and improving transaction values by influencing behaviours. 
It was also found that behaviour controls are not only the most effective mechanisms 
to reduce enforcement costs, but also play important roles in reducing monitoring costs. 
Behaviour controls, by specifying and monitoring partners’ behaviour, ensure the 
transaction process is appropriate and turn appropriate behaviour into desirable 
outcomes. By comparison, outcome controls are less effective in reducing all three 
forms of transaction costs. Based on the findings, it is recommended that contracting 
parties pay more attention to creating shared value and culture to influence behaviours, 
and develop appropriate rules, programs, standard operating procedures and dispute 
resolution procedures to specify and monitor behaviours in construction project-based 
transactions, especially when projects are complex and the outputs are difficult to be 
measured. Appropriate behaviours can lead to desirable outcomes. However, it is 
worth mentioning that outcome controls are a good choice for simple transactions with 
low asset specificity, since the processes of simple transactions are straightforward and 
outputs of transactions are easy to be measured. Therefore, what controls are 
appropriate for a transaction relationship depends on the underlying transaction 
attributes? Managers should understand the characteristics of transactions being 
engaged in, consider the benefits and costs associated with alternative controls, and 
then make balanced decisions.  
Companies usually realize their organizational objectives and create values through 
transaction processes. Organizational objectives—which refer to the purposes, 
missions and goals of an individual organization—are important factors that have to be 
considered in choosing and designing control mechanisms. Control mechanisms 
should be structured to help organizations achieve their objectives, to maximise 
transaction value as well as to economize transaction costs. A typical example is that 
alliances usually put the owners’ objectives into the KRAs, enabling performance of 
these areas can be monitored. In addition, alliances always seek to align goals between 
parties through specialized risk/reward regimes because contracting parties have 
different objectives.   
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As an important outcome of the research, IOCM practices that are used in alliances 
were identified. It is hoped that the findings would increase alliance participants’ 
awareness of how they manage shared costs through joint efforts. However, it is 
unrealistic to apply these identified IOCM practices without the appropriate 
contractual, relational context and specific organizational arrangements. Therefore, 
managers should take account of the features of the chosen governance when 
designing control mechanisms.  
9.5 Methodological Implications 
This research disaggregates asset specificity into various dimensions according to the 
nature of relationship specific investment, and distinguishes between the project owner 
and non-owner-participants (NOPs)’ relationship investments. More importantly, 
transaction costs are decomposed into three cost elements. In contrast with most of 
previous TCE studies that treat transaction costs as a single construct, this research 
tests the differential impact of various project owner and NOPs’ individual dimensions 
of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency on different transaction cost elements in 
alliances. The innovation is expected to be able to provide a clear vision on how 
different transaction attributes affect different transaction cost elements, and how both 
the owner and NOPs’ different types of specific assets affect individual transaction 
cost elements.  
The measurement methods of transaction costs and transaction attributes presented in 
this research have directive implication for future empirical works in construction 
project-based transactions. Transaction attributes and transaction costs are the central 
constructs in TCE. This research is the first attempt to operationalize and directly 
measure the constructs in a particular transaction relationship in construction sector. 
Previous TCE-based studies in the construction management discipline are largely 
based on theoretical argument and lack of empirical evidence. None of the studies 
empirically measure the central constructs of TCE such as transaction costs and 
transaction attributes. This effort makes it possible to test the relationships between 
transaction costs and transaction attributes quantitatively. Currently, there is a wide 
range of contracting methods in use in the construction industry. This situation implies 
that the transaction relationships are diverse, and the underlying transaction attributes 
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may differ. Much remains to be done by focusing on various contracting methods and 
transaction relationships. Constructs such as asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency 
and transaction costs should be re-operationalized depending on the particular 
relationship examined in future research. The methodology reported in this research 
will be very useful in conducting these potential TCE-based empirical studies. 
9.6 Limitations and Further Research 
Notwithstanding the contributions and implications, the research is not without 
limitations. This section considers and explains several limitations of the research as 
well as proposes and articulates future research directions. 
First, this research focuses more on transaction costs and less on production costs in 
alliances. Service delivery costs normally include two components: transaction costs 
and production costs (Ferris and Graddy 1991). Compared with transaction costs, 
production costs that typically consist of the cost of labour, materials and plants, are 
more tangible and easier to be understood. This research pays particular attention to 
transaction costs because they were largely neglected in previous alliancing research. 
If production costs were taken account into consideration in this research, the findings 
and conclusions would be more comprehensive and robust. Therefore, further research 
is recommended to examine the influence of alliancing arrangements on production 
costs. 
Second, this research only investigates the effects of unique control mechanisms of 
alliances on transaction costs relying on a questionnaire survey. Actually, there are 
many other commonly used control mechanisms, not only in alliances but also in other 
forms of transaction relationships such as programs, rules, procedures, staffing and 
training (Gulati and Singh 1998). These mechanisms are also expected to be important 
in the control of alliance relationships, and are therefore worth examining. Compared 
with the questionnaire survey approach, a multi-case-study would be more productive 
and conducive to disclose the panoramic views of control mechanisms of alliances and 
provide a more comprehensive management control framework. In addition, as this 
research has identified a number of IOCM practices in project alliances, further 
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research is suggested to examine their effectiveness in reducing the shared costs, and 
improving the efficiency of alliances.  
Third, generalizing the findings should be caution as this research limits the data to 
alliance relationships in the Australian construction industry. Alliancing practice 
evolves from time to time. It is anticipated that alliancing practice may present 
different features in different countries. Therefore, this research encourages replication 
research across different countries and on different construction transaction 
relationships.  
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire 
Invitation Letter 
Dear Participants, 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
The survey involves investigating how the arrangements of project alliancing influence 
costs and cost management practices. The following questionnaire will take you 
approximately 90 minutes to complete, and is mainly to request your objective 
evaluation on: 
1) Project characteristics; 
2) The assets and resources inputted by the Owner and Non-Owner-Participants; 
3) The amount of efforts and costs associated with various alliance activities; 
4) The level of impact of alliance-related features on various cost elements; and 
5) Cost management practices in your Alliance. 
Please be assured that the information obtained from this survey will be kept strictly 
confidential and will only be used for research purposes. Individual data will not be 
made available to any third party or used in any published material, except as a 
component in aggregated statistics. In addition, you can come back at any time to edit 
or finish an incomplete survey after clicking the [Next] or [Done] button. When doing 
so, the survey link MUST be accessed on the same computer from which the cookies 
have not been cleared. 
Your time and effort will be greatly appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Gang Chen 
PhD candidate 
School of Civil, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, RMIT University 
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Section 1. General Information 
Please complete the following personal details for statistical purposes. 
1. 1 How long have you been working in the construction industry? _____years 
1. 2 How many alliance projects have you worked on? ____projects 
1. 3 How many alliance projects has your organization worked on? ____projects 
1. 4 What is your position in your organization? _________________________ 
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Section 2. Profile of Typical Alliance Project 
Please provide true and reliable information about an alliance project that you 
have appropriate involvement and/or knowledge in.  
2. 1 Project location:  
 ACT  NSW  NT  QLD  SA 
 TAS  VIC  WA  Other Countries 
2. 2 Type of the Project:  
 Building  Defence  Energy  Mining  Oil & Gas 
 Port  Rail  Road  Water  Other: _________ 
2. 3 Nature of the Project:  
 New build  Refurbishment 
2. 4 Your organization’s role in the Alliance:  
 Owner  Contractor  Designer 
 Consulting Service  Other (Please specify):   _____________ 
2. 5 The strategy applied in the selection of the Non-Owner-Participants (NOPs) 
in the Alliance: 
 Non-Price Selection  Price Selection 
2. 6 Duration of the Project: ___________Months 
2. 7 Value of the Project (Approx.): AUDs ___________ Million  
2. 8 Your position (Job Title) in the Alliance: ______________ 
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2. 9 Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements 
regarding issues contributing to the uncertainty of the Project. 
Statement 
Strongly                                                    Strongly 
Disagree                     Neutral                      Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The output specifications and/or scope of the Project 
cannot be clearly defined or finalised upfront        
The Project is particularly unique or rare, e.g. delivering 
new or emerging technology, etc.        
The Project itself is featured as very complex, e.g. complex 
stakeholder issues, technological challenge, high or 
undimensionable risks, etc. 
       
The Project is exposed to complex external threats, e.g. 
sensitive environmental issues, unforeseeable or adverse 
site conditions, etc. 
       
The Project is confronted with some special requirements, 
e.g. tight time constraint, high quality or innovation 
requirements, cost pressure, etc. 
       
 
2. 10 Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements with 
regard to the assets and resources input into the Alliance (including 
dedicated assets, human assets and reputation assets). 
Statement 
Strongly                                                                Strongly 
Disagree                     Neutral                       Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The Owner inputted substantial internal resources (e.g. 
storage facilities, meeting venues, etc.) into the Alliance, 
which were normally unnecessary in traditional 
contracting methods 
       
The Owner made extra investments in order to maintain a 
constructive  alliance relationship        
The Owner provided specialist equipment or materials at 
a better than market rate        
The Owner appointed staff with sufficient seniority, 
expertise and experience to provide active leadership and 
management in the Alliance 
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Statement 
Strongly                                                                Strongly 
Disagree                     Neutral                       Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The Owner trained its staff for gaining an appropriate 
level of knowledge to undertake their roles in the 
Alliance 
       
The Owner engaged facilitators, specialist advisers or 
other service providers to assist with various stages of the 
Alliance 
       
The Owner contributed valuable knowledge and expertise 
to facilitating the development of project proposal and its 
implementation 
       
Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in a 
highly negative effect on the Owner's reputation        
Any underperformance of the Alliance will lead to 
accountability issues for the Owner        
The NOPs made comprehensive investments in 
specialized machines, equipments, tools or fixtures to 
adapt to the technical standards of the Project 
       
The NOPs made additional investments in order to 
expand its production capacity to meet the requirements 
of the Project 
       
The NOPs introduced new technology or innovative 
solutions to cater to the needs of the Project        
The NOPs made a high degree of adaptation in terms of 
their own workflows and routines to the satisfaction of 
the Alliance 
       
The NOPs appointed staff with sufficient seniority, 
expertise and experience for the development and 
operation of the Alliance 
       
The NOPs will suffer serious damage to reputations if the 
performance of the Alliance is poor        
Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in a 
highly adverse impact on the NOPs' opportunities to bid 
for future alliancing projects 
       
Any underperformance of the Alliance will result in a 
negative impact on the NOPs' opportunities to work with 
any other projects from the same Owner in the future 
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Section 3. Cost Elements 
Please note that your answer must be based on the actual Project you specified in 
Section 2. 
3. 1 Please evaluate as objectively as possible the amount of efforts and costs 
associated with the following activities for setting up the project team in 
your Alliance compared with traditional contracting methods: 
■ Definition: Set-up Costs refer to the costs and efforts associated with 
evaluating and identifying the preferred participants, developing, negotiating and 
agreeing the agreement and project proposal, and establishing the project team 
finally, etc. 
Activity 
Very low                   Medium              Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Write the contract/agreement        
Design the selection method        
Prepare and release the tender documents        
Participate and manage the selection process        
Develop the project proposal        
Evaluate and select participants        
Negotiate and agree the project proposal & agreement        
The overall costs and efforts that were required to set up 
the project team        
 
3. 2 Please evaluate as objectively as possible the amount of efforts and costs 
associated with the following activities for managing the project in your 
Alliance compared with traditional contracting methods: 
■ Definition: Monitoring Costs refer to the costs and efforts associated with 
monitoring the project performance, the quality of services from partners and the 
behaviour of project teams, and allocating or coordinating resource to ensure that 
all pre-agreed targets can be achieved and all parties fulfil their responsibilities. 
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Activity 
Very low                   Medium              Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Manage cost (involves managing the consumption of all 
resources)        
Manage time         
Manage quality        
Manage other performance areas (e.g. safety etc.)        
Manage risks        
Manage project scope        
Manage the commitment of project stakeholders        
Manage the project team        
The overall costs and efforts that were required to 
manage the project         
 
3. 3 Please evaluate as objectively as possible the amount of efforts and costs 
associated with dealing with problems that might arise in your Alliance 
compared with traditional contracting methods: 
■ Definition: Enforcement Costs refer to the costs and efforts associated with 
ex post bargaining (e.g. variations and claims), resolving conflicts, disputes and 
litigation, and sanctioning a participant that does not perform according to the 
agreement. 
 
Activity 
Very low                   Medium              Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Solve problems raised during project delivery        
Deal with variation        
Deal with claim        
Resolve conflicts or disputes        
Deal with litigation or arbitration        
Sanction non-perform participants        
The overall costs and efforts that were required to deal 
with problems that might arise in the relationship        
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3. 4 To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
Statement 
Strongly                                                Strongly 
Disagree                   Neutral                    Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The alliance method reduces transaction costs  
(i.e. Set-up Costs + Monitoring Costs + Enforcement 
Costs) 
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Section 4. Cost Influence Factors 
Please indicate your response to the following statements regarding the impact of 
each alliance-related feature on various cost elements. 
 
4. 1 “Joint planning and goal setting” contributes 
to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 2 “Sharing risks and opportunities collectively 
and equitably” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 3 “Alignment of the achievement of project 
objectives with participants' commercial 
interests” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 4 “Collective and unanimous decision making 
mechanisms” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
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4. 5 “One integrated team approach” contributes 
to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 6 “Joint alliance management structure” 
contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 7 “Open-book arrangement in terms of cost 
data, documentation, information and 
knowledge” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 8 “Making decisions and acting in a ‘best for 
project’ manner” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 9 “Open, straight and honest communication 
among all participants” contributes to 
reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
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4. 10 “Cooperation and collaboration in delivering 
the project” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 11 “Acting fairly and reasonably instead of 
reaping self interests at the expense of other 
participants” contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 12 “‘No fault-no blame’ principle in relation to 
errors, mistakes or poor performance” 
contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 13 “Resolving conflicts and disputes internally” 
contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
 
4. 14 “Commitment to no litigation or arbitration” 
contributes to reducing…… 
Strongly                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                        Neutral                            Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Set-up Costs        
Monitoring Costs        
Enforcement Costs        
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Section 5. Interorganizational Cost Management Practices in Your Alliance 
In general, Interorganizational Cost Management comprises a range of 
techniques, tools and practices, and can be defined as the Owners’ and NOPs’ 
coordinated efforts to reduce costs. It is adopted to control interorganizational 
operations and improve interorganizational efficiency and effectiveness. 
5. 1 Which methods/tools/practices were used by your Alliance? (Multiple Choice) 
 Establish a multi-disciplinary team to develop the project proposal 
 Develop the project proposal by Participants with the Owner's continuous input, 
guide and interaction 
 Develop design, construction methods, cost estimation and commercial 
arrangements in a concurrent style 
 Undertake value management and optimisation studies 
 Encourage innovative solutions 
 Identify and assess risks and opportunities using advanced probability analysis 
 Conduct multi-party value engineering iteratively 
 Share information on basic costing elements and strategies during the project 
proposal development 
 Interact continually and intensively between functional teams during the project 
proposal development 
 Take life cycle cost into consideration when designing the project 
 Review and check Participants' TOC, the scope of work, quantities and the 
construction methods by the Owner’s Estimator 
 Check and validate the TOC against the Owner's Comparative TOC and relevant 
benchmarks 
 Develop and agree with guidelines for scope variation by participants during the 
selection process 
 Reimburse the NOPs 100% of direct costs and project specific overheads 
 Put the NOPs’ Profit and Corporate Overhead at risk 
 Cap risk for the NOPs' painshare 
 Share equitable pain/gain between the Owner and the NOPs 
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 Increase appropriately the shared proportions of risk/reward for 
designers/consultants 
 Link financial pain/gain with both cost and non-cost areas performance 
 Adjust the TOC only in the limited situations agreed by participants 
 Use web-based management program and electronic information exchange system 
 Disclose cost data, records, knowledge and other information among participants 
 Establish recordkeeping and accounting practices and procedures to support the 
open book arrangement 
 Build effective communication framework between the owner, the alliance and 
external stakeholders 
 Report regularly the progress, performance against the pre-agreed targets and 
corrective actions 
 Benchmark performance against the performance of other alliances or similar 
projects 
 Undertake periodic and independent measurements of the progress and 
performance 
 Carry out ongoing independent audits of financial transactions and progress claims 
throughout the project 
 Configure the project office for the co-location of all personnel involved in the 
project 
 Create and maintain seamless interfaces between various functional teams 
 Perform the alliance activities in co-ordinated and efficient manners 
 Work out solutions collectively as issues and risks emerge throughout the project 
life 
 Extend alliancing philosophy downward to major subcontractors and suppliers 
 Review and justify rigorously any proposed or potential scope variations 
 Other (please specify) 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your opinion will be highly 
regarded. If you would like a summary of the research findings, please tick "Yes" 
and provide your email address. 
 Yes  No 
Email Address: _________________________________________ 
 
If you would like to contribute to the next stage interview, please provide your 
contact details below: 
Name: _________________________________________ 
 
Phone: _________________________________________ 
 
Email: _________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Homogeneity Tests Results 
 
Results of Two-independent-samples T Test Performed between Organizational 
Role Groups for Variables 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Project Value 1 41 396.93 400.140 62.491 
2 47 371.23 297.230 43.355 
UN1 1 41 5.00 1.072 .167 
2 47 4.72 .994 .145 
UN2 1 41 4.05 1.224 .191 
2 47 3.89 1.068 .156 
UN3 1 41 5.66 .938 .147 
2 47 5.68 1.002 .146 
UN4 1 41 5.24 .888 .139 
2 47 5.34 .867 .126 
UN5 1 41 5.83 .771 .120 
2 47 5.66 .841 .123 
UN 1 41 5.16 .799 .125 
2 47 5.06 .742 .108 
ODA1 1 41 3.46 .745 .116 
2 47 3.57 .878 .128 
ODA2 1 41 4.90 .889 .139 
2 47 4.89 .866 .126 
ODA3 1 41 2.59 .774 .121 
2 47 2.51 .777 .113 
ODA 1 41 3.65 .636 .099 
2 47 3.66 .697 .102 
OHA1 1 41 5.41 1.072 .167 
2 47 5.43 1.037 .151 
OHA2 1 41 4.80 1.030 .161 
2 47 4.94 1.009 .147 
OHA3 1 41 5.76 .888 .139 
2 47 5.83 .842 .123 
OHA4 1 41 6.00 .975 .152 
2 47 5.98 .921 .134 
OHA 1 41 5.49 .913 .143 
2 47 5.54 .871 .127 
ORA1 1 41 5.85 1.108 .173 
2 47 5.91 1.380 .201 
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Group Statistics 
 
Role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ORA2 1 41 5.85 1.108 .173 
2 47 5.79 1.232 .180 
ORA 1 41 5.85 1.080 .169 
2 47 5.85 1.272 .186 
NDA1 1 41 4.41 1.466 .229 
2 47 4.28 1.455 .212 
NDA2 1 41 4.44 1.184 .185 
2 47 4.55 1.157 .169 
NDA 1 41 4.43 1.263 .197 
2 47 4.41 1.208 .176 
NHA1 1 41 5.49 .925 .145 
2 47 5.47 .776 .113 
NHA2 1 41 5.39 .771 .120 
2 47 5.62 .795 .116 
NHA3 1 41 6.17 .629 .098 
2 47 6.04 .833 .121 
NHA 1 41 5.68 .655 .102 
2 47 5.71 .679 .099 
NRA1 1 41 5.83 .803 .125 
2 47 5.98 1.294 .189 
NRA2 1 41 5.59 1.072 .167 
2 47 5.60 1.155 .168 
NRA3 1 41 5.49 1.121 .175 
2 47 5.51 .997 .145 
NRA 1 41 5.63 .913 .143 
2 47 5.69 1.042 .152 
SCs 1 41 4.98 1.440 .225 
2 47 4.96 1.560 .228 
MCs 1 41 4.41 1.360 .212 
2 47 4.38 1.376 .201 
ECs 1 41 2.73 1.484 .232 
2 47 2.36 1.223 .178 
RTCs 1 41 4.93 1.330 .208 
2 47 4.72 1.378 .201 
PV 1 41 5.68 .767 .120 
2 47 5.62 .809 .118 
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Two-independent-samples T Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Project 
Value 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.100 .753 .345 86 .731 25.695 74.557 -122.520 173.911 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.338 73.056 .736 25.695 76.058 -125.887 177.277 
UN1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.015 .902 1.255 86 .213 .277 .220 -.161 .715 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.249 82.235 .215 .277 .221 -.164 .717 
UN2 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.467 .229 .635 86 .527 .155 .244 -.330 .641 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.629 80.073 .531 .155 .247 -.336 .646 
UN3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.065 .799 -.107 86 .915 -.022 .208 -.436 .391 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.108 85.553 .914 -.022 .207 -.434 .389 
UN4 Equal variances 
assumed 
.002 .963 -.515 86 .608 -.097 .187 -.469 .276 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.514 83.780 .608 -.097 .188 -.470 .277 
UN5 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.300 .257 .981 86 .329 .170 .173 -.174 .514 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.987 85.772 .327 .170 .172 -.172 .512 
UN Equal variances 
assumed 
.127 .722 .587 86 .559 .097 .164 -.230 .423 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.584 82.315 .561 .097 .165 -.232 .425 
ODA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.501 .481 -.635 86 .527 -.111 .175 -.459 .237 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.642 85.940 .523 -.111 .173 -.455 .233 
ODA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.006 .937 .047 86 .963 .009 .187 -.364 .381 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.047 83.727 .963 .009 .188 -.364 .382 
ODA3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.006 .939 .451 86 .653 .075 .166 -.255 .404 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.451 84.468 .653 .075 .166 -.255 .404 
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Two-independent-samples T Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
ODA Equal variances 
assumed 
.454 .502 -.067 86 .947 -.010 .143 -.294 .275 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.068 85.807 .946 -.010 .142 -.292 .273 
OHA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.027 .871 -.048 86 .962 -.011 .225 -.458 .437 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.048 83.559 .962 -.011 .226 -.460 .438 
OHA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.138 .711 -.603 86 .548 -.131 .218 -.564 .301 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.602 83.877 .549 -.131 .218 -.565 .302 
OHA3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.597 .442 -.399 86 .691 -.074 .185 -.441 .293 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.398 82.972 .692 -.074 .185 -.442 .295 
OHA4 Equal variances 
assumed 
.211 .647 .105 86 .916 .021 .202 -.381 .423 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.105 82.848 .917 .021 .203 -.382 .425 
OHA Equal variances 
assumed 
.110 .741 -.256 86 .799 -.049 .190 -.427 .330 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.255 83.173 .800 -.049 .191 -.428 .331 
ORA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.534 .467 -.227 86 .821 -.061 .270 -.597 .475 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.231 85.444 .818 -.061 .266 -.589 .467 
ORA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.037 .847 .264 86 .792 .066 .251 -.433 .566 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.266 85.913 .791 .066 .250 -.430 .563 
ORA Equal variances 
assumed 
.317 .575 .010 86 .992 .003 .254 -.501 .507 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.010 85.942 .992 .003 .251 -.496 .501 
NDA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.001 .976 .442 86 .659 .138 .312 -.482 .758 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.442 84.215 .660 .138 .312 -.483 .759 
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Two-independent-samples T Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
NDA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.059 .809 -.457 86 .649 -.114 .250 -.611 .383 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.456 83.823 .650 -.114 .250 -.612 .384 
NDA Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 .997 .045 86 .964 .012 .264 -.512 .536 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.045 83.240 .964 .012 .264 -.514 .538 
NHA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.427 .235 .109 86 .914 .020 .181 -.341 .380 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.107 78.462 .915 .020 .184 -.346 .385 
NHA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.038 .845 -1.354 86 .179 -.227 .168 -.560 .106 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.357 85.033 .179 -.227 .167 -.559 .106 
NHA3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.597 .442 .805 86 .423 .128 .159 -.188 .445 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.821 84.333 .414 .128 .156 -.182 .439 
NHA Equal variances 
assumed 
.069 .794 -.189 86 .851 -.027 .143 -.311 .257 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.189 85.123 .850 -.027 .142 -.310 .256 
NRA1 Equal variances 
assumed 
2.521 .116 -.640 86 .524 -.149 .234 -.614 .315 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.660 78.100 .511 -.149 .227 -.601 .302 
NRA2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.001 .970 -.043 86 .965 -.010 .239 -.485 .464 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.044 85.651 .965 -.010 .237 -.482 .462 
NRA3 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.488 .226 -.101 86 .920 -.023 .226 -.472 .426 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.100 80.812 .920 -.023 .228 -.476 .430 
NRA Equal variances 
assumed 
.080 .778 -.292 86 .771 -.061 .210 -.480 .357 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.295 85.997 .769 -.061 .208 -.476 .353 
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Two-independent-samples T Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
SCs Equal variances 
assumed 
.231 .632 .056 86 .955 .018 .322 -.621 .658 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.057 85.707 .955 .018 .320 -.618 .654 
MCs Equal variances 
assumed 
.010 .919 .108 86 .914 .032 .292 -.550 .613 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.108 84.649 .914 .032 .292 -.549 .613 
ECs Equal variances 
assumed 
2.310 .132 1.282 86 .203 .370 .289 -.204 .944 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.265 77.742 .210 .370 .292 -.212 .952 
RTCs Equal variances 
assumed 
.462 .498 .702 86 .485 .203 .290 -.373 .780 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.704 85.102 .484 .203 .289 -.371 .778 
PV Equal variances 
assumed 
.285 .595 .329 86 .743 .056 .169 -.280 .391 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.330 85.372 .742 .056 .168 -.279 .390 
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Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.307 .581 -1.759 86 .082 -.367 .209 -.783 .048 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.759 84.280 .082 -.367 .209 -.783 .048 
F2 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.109 .295 -.076 86 .940 -.010 .137 -.282 .262 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.077 85.999 .939 -.010 .136 -.280 .259 
F3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.015 .904 -1.440 86 .154 -.297 .206 -.707 .113 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.450 85.888 .151 -.297 .205 -.704 .110 
F4 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.289 .259 -.312 86 .756 -.058 .186 -.428 .312 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.319 83.279 .750 -.058 .182 -.420 .304 
F5 Equal variances 
assumed 
.001 .979 -1.795 86 .076 -.435 .243 -.918 .047 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.808 85.931 .074 -.435 .241 -.914 .043 
F6 Equal variances 
assumed 
.207 .650 -1.683 86 .096 -.320 .190 -.698 .058 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.720 83.176 .089 -.320 .186 -.691 .050 
F7 Equal variances 
assumed 
2.251 .137 -.430 86 .668 -.050 .117 -.283 .183 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.434 85.983 .665 -.050 .116 -.281 .180 
F8 Equal variances 
assumed 
2.463 .120 -1.436 86 .155 -.350 .244 -.835 .135 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.459 85.255 .148 -.350 .240 -.828 .127 
F9 Equal variances 
assumed 
.027 .871 -.659 86 .512 -.214 .325 -.859 .432 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.657 83.650 .513 -.214 .325 -.861 .433 
F10 Equal variances 
assumed 
.755 .387 .021 86 .983 .006 .266 -.524 .535 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.022 85.966 .983 .006 .264 -.520 .531 
F11 Equal variances 
assumed 
.145 .704 -.404 86 .687 -.114 .281 -.673 .446 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.404 84.850 .687 -.114 .281 -.672 .445 
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Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F12 Equal variances 
assumed 
.178 .674 -1.167 86 .246 -.211 .180 -.569 .148 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.183 85.773 .240 -.211 .178 -.565 .144 
F13 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.807 .182 .064 86 .950 .011 .172 -.330 .352 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.064 85.999 .949 .011 .170 -.327 .349 
F14 Equal variances 
assumed 
2.047 .156 .465 86 .643 .062 .134 -.204 .328 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.457 74.177 .649 .062 .136 -.209 .334 
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Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Monitoring Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.062 .804 -.540 86 .591 -.103 .190 -.481 .276 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.537 82.155 .593 -.103 .191 -.484 .278 
F2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.062 .804 -.396 86 .693 -.081 .206 -.491 .328 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.393 82.020 .695 -.081 .207 -.493 .330 
F3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.372 .544 .651 86 .517 .138 .211 -.282 .557 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.655 85.757 .514 .138 .210 -.280 .555 
F4 Equal variances 
assumed 
.413 .522 .508 86 .612 .106 .209 -.310 .522 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.510 85.446 .611 .106 .208 -.308 .521 
F5 Equal variances 
assumed 
.937 .336 -.360 86 .720 -.084 .234 -.548 .380 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.357 81.201 .722 -.084 .235 -.552 .384 
F6 Equal variances 
assumed 
.782 .379 -.107 86 .915 -.023 .218 -.457 .410 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.106 80.756 .916 -.023 .220 -.460 .414 
F7 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.208 .275 1.164 86 .248 .275 .236 -.194 .743 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.157 82.146 .250 .275 .237 -.197 .746 
F8 Equal variances 
assumed 
.039 .844 1.177 86 .242 .231 .197 -.159 .622 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.183 85.668 .240 .231 .196 -.157 .620 
F9 Equal variances 
assumed 
.359 .551 -.655 86 .514 -.117 .178 -.471 .237 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.652 82.382 .516 -.117 .179 -.473 .239 
F10 Equal variances 
assumed 
.022 .881 -1.062 86 .291 -.238 .224 -.684 .208 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-1.060 83.620 .292 -.238 .225 -.685 .209 
F11 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.141 .288 .098 86 .922 .023 .239 -.451 .498 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.099 84.885 .921 .023 .235 -.443 .490 
 Page | 289 
 
Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Monitoring Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F12 Equal variances 
assumed 
.003 .958 1.634 86 .106 .383 .235 -.083 .850 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.644 85.770 .104 .383 .233 -.080 .847 
F13 Equal variances 
assumed 
.070 .792 .242 86 .810 .056 .232 -.405 .517 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.243 85.468 .809 .056 .231 -.403 .515 
F14 Equal variances 
assumed 
.355 .553 .384 86 .702 .087 .225 -.362 .535 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.387 85.807 .700 .087 .224 -.359 .532 
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Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F1 Equal variances 
assumed 
.078 .780 .944 86 .348 .248 .262 -.274 .769 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.944 84.413 .348 .248 .262 -.274 .769 
F2 Equal variances 
assumed 
.164 .687 .481 86 .632 .114 .236 -.356 .583 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.478 81.697 .634 .114 .238 -.359 .587 
F3 Equal variances 
assumed 
.192 .663 1.080 86 .283 .236 .218 -.198 .669 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.082 85.051 .282 .236 .218 -.197 .668 
F4 Equal variances 
assumed 
.041 .840 .385 86 .701 .086 .224 -.358 .531 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.386 84.655 .701 .086 .223 -.358 .530 
F5 Equal variances 
assumed 
.003 .960 .025 86 .980 .005 .204 -.400 .411 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.026 85.335 .980 .005 .203 -.399 .409 
F6 Equal variances 
assumed 
.542 .464 .639 86 .525 .136 .213 -.287 .559 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.642 85.774 .522 .136 .212 -.285 .557 
F7 Equal variances 
assumed 
.049 .825 1.488 86 .140 .321 .216 -.108 .750 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
1.488 84.347 .140 .321 .216 -.108 .750 
F8 Equal variances 
assumed 
.326 .569 .614 86 .541 .098 .159 -.219 .414 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.611 82.708 .543 .098 .160 -.220 .415 
F9 Equal variances 
assumed 
.694 .407 .216 86 .829 .047 .219 -.387 .482 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.214 79.854 .831 .047 .221 -.392 .486 
F10 Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 .997 .626 86 .533 .127 .203 -.276 .531 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.627 84.562 .533 .127 .203 -.276 .531 
F11 Equal variances 
assumed 
.044 .834 -.065 86 .948 -.013 .208 -.427 .400 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
-.065 82.981 .949 -.013 .209 -.429 .402 
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Two-independent-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement Costs (F1 – F14) 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    
  
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
F Sig. t df Sig.(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
F12 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.086 .300 .040 86 .968 .009 .219 -.426 .444 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.040 76.698 .968 .009 .222 -.433 .451 
F13 Equal variances 
assumed 
.170 .681 .735 86 .464 .170 .231 -.289 .629 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.738 85.447 .463 .170 .230 -.287 .627 
F14 Equal variances 
assumed 
1.032 .313 .902 86 .370 .207 .229 -.249 .662 
Equal variances 
not assumed     
.917 84.874 .362 .207 .225 -.241 .654 
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Appendix C: Paired-samples T Test Results 
 
The First Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F10 - F9 .102 1.269 .135 -.167 .371 .756 87 .452 
Pair 2 F10 - F11 .205 1.233 .131 -.057 .466 1.556 87 .123 
Pair 3 F10 - F1 .557 1.183 .126 .306 .807 4.416 87 .000 
Pair 4 F10 - F5 .886 1.308 .139 .609 1.164 6.357 87 .000 
Pair 5 F10 - F8 .932 1.354 .144 .645 1.219 6.454 87 .000 
Pair 6 F10 - F4 .966 1.119 .119 .729 1.203 8.099 87 .000 
Pair 7 F10 - F6 1.045 1.222 .130 .787 1.304 8.029 87 .000 
Pair 8 F10 - F12 1.080 1.315 .140 .801 1.358 7.701 87 .000 
Pair 9 F10 - F2 1.284 1.144 .122 1.042 1.527 10.528 87 .000 
Pair 10 F10 - F13 1.295 1.095 .117 1.063 1.527 11.098 87 .000 
Pair 11 F10 - F3 1.375 1.333 .142 1.093 1.657 9.675 87 .000 
Pair 12 F10 - F7 1.409 1.200 .128 1.155 1.663 11.016 87 .000 
Pair 13 F10 - F14 1.420 1.337 .142 1.137 1.704 9.969 87 .000 
 
The Second Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
     
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F1 - F5 .330 1.142 .122 .088 .571 2.707 87 .008 
Pair 2 F1 - F8 .375 1.138 .121 .134 .616 3.092 87 .003 
Pair 3 F1 - F4 .409 1.100 .117 .176 .642 3.489 87 .001 
Pair 4 F1 - F6 .489 1.039 .111 .268 .709 4.410 87 .000 
Pair 5 F1 - F12 .523 1.154 .123 .278 .767 4.247 87 .000 
Pair 6 F1 - F2 .727 .991 .106 .517 .937 6.884 87 .000 
Pair 7 F1 - F13 .739 .953 .102 .537 .941 7.272 87 .000 
Pair 8 F1 - F3 .818 1.199 .128 .564 1.072 6.401 87 .000 
Pair 9 F1 - F7 .852 .941 .100 .653 1.052 8.494 87 .000 
Pair 10 F1 - F14 .864 1.063 .113 .638 1.089 7.619 87 .000 
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The Third Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
     
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F5 - F8 .045 .896 .095 -.144 .235 .476 87 .635 
Pair 2 F5 - F4 .080 1.116 .119 -.157 .316 .668 87 .506 
Pair 3 F5 - F6 .159 .883 .094 -.028 .346 1.691 87 .094 
Pair 4 F5 - F12 .193 .981 .105 -.015 .401 1.847 87 .068 
Pair 5 F5 - F2 .398 .977 .104 .191 .605 3.818 87 .000 
Pair 6 F5 - F13 .409 .967 .103 .204 .614 3.971 87 .000 
Pair 7 F5 - F3 .489 1.114 .119 .253 .725 4.114 87 .000 
Pair 8 F5 - F7 .523 1.005 .107 .310 .736 4.877 87 .000 
Pair 9 F5 - F14 .534 1.174 .125 .285 .783 4.268 87 .000 
 
 
The Fourth Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Set-up Costs 
     
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F2 - F13 .011 .735 .078 -.144 .167 .145 87 .885 
Pair 2 F2 - F3 .091 1.013 .108 -.124 .306 .842 87 .402 
Pair 3 F2 - F7 .125 .740 .079 -.032 .282 1.585 87 .117 
Pair 4 F2 - F14 .136 .790 .084 -.031 .304 1.618 87 .109 
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The First Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement 
Costs 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F14 - F10 .080 .834 .089 -.097 .256 .895 87 .373 
Pair 2 F14 - F13 .102 .526 .056 -.009 .214 1.824 87 .072 
Pair 3 F14 - F5 .136 1.019 .109 -.080 .352 1.255 87 .213 
Pair 4 F14 - F6 .182 .929 .099 -.015 .379 1.836 87 .070 
Pair 5 F14 - F11 .273 .968 .103 .068 .478 2.644 87 .010 
Pair 6 F14 - F9 .330 1.162 .124 .083 .576 2.661 87 .009 
Pair 7 F14 - F7 .330 .906 .097 .138 .522 3.411 87 .001 
Pair 8 F14 - F3 .455 .970 .103 .249 .660 4.397 87 .000 
Pair 9 F14 - F2 .511 1.104 .118 .278 .745 4.346 87 .000 
Pair 10 F14 - F1 .534 .909 .097 .341 .727 5.511 87 .000 
Pair 11 F14 - F4 .545 .993 .106 .335 .756 5.152 87 .000 
Pair 12 F14 - F8 .795 .924 .099 .600 .991 8.074 87 .000 
Pair 13 F14 - F12 .943 1.158 .123 .698 1.189 7.639 87 .000 
 
 
The Second Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement 
Costs 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F11 - F9 .057 .951 .101 -.145 .258 .560 87 .577 
Pair 2 F11 - F7 .057 .975 .104 -.150 .263 .547 87 .586 
Pair 3 F11 - F3 .182 .781 .083 .016 .347 2.183 87 .032 
Pair 4 F11 - F2 .193 .828 .088 .018 .369 2.187 87 .031 
Pair 5 F11 - F1 .261 1.034 .110 .042 .480 2.372 87 .020 
Pair 6 F11 - F4 .409 1.100 .117 .176 .642 3.489 87 .001 
Pair 7 F11 - F8 .420 .880 .094 .234 .607 4.480 87 .000 
Pair 8 F11 - F12 .670 1.036 .110 .451 .890 6.069 87 .000 
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The Third Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement 
Costs 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F3 - F2 .011 .780 .083 -.154 .177 .137 87 .892 
Pair 2 F3 - F1 .080 .962 .103 -.124 .283 .776 87 .440 
Pair 3 F3 - F4 .227 1.266 .135 -.041 .496 1.684 87 .046 
Pair 4 F3 - F8 .239 .884 .094 .051 .426 2.532 87 .013 
Pair 5 F3 - F12 .489 1.165 .124 .242 .735 3.936 87 .000 
 
The Fourth Round Paired-samples T Test: Mechanisms Affecting Enforcement 
Costs 
    
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed)     Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
    
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 F4 - F8 .011 .953 .102 -.191 .213 .112 87 .911 
Pair 2 F4 - F12 .205 .996 .106 -.007 .416 1.926 87 .057 
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Appendix D: Major Questions Asked in Interviews 
Q 1. Would you please tell me about your experience with alliancing briefly? What is 
your position in the current or the most recent alliance?   
Lifecycle Consideration in Project Alliances 
Q 2. Most of alliances are only responsible for delivering the capital phase of projects 
rather than maintenance and operation of projects. In such situations, do alliances 
focus more on construction costs and less consider maintenance and operation 
costs? In other words, is it possible for alliances to reduce the construction costs 
but at the expense of increased maintenance costs? 
Q 3. How did alliance take account of lifecycle costs during TOC development? What 
measures were taken to address lifecycle costs?  
Q 4. Is it possible to quantify lifecycle costs during TOC development? How to 
quantify? 
The Establishment of Target Cost 
Q 5. Do you think that TOC is best representing the market price? Why do you think 
so? 
Q 6. How did the cost estimate be referenced against market rates during the 
development of TOC? 
Q 7. Do you think TOC is a realistic but aggressive cost objective? What makes you 
think so? 
Q 8. What are the determinants for setting TOC? In other words, what factors drive 
the TOC?  
Q 9. What roles does the owner’s comparative TOC play in determining final TOC? 
If the owner’s comparative TOC was higher than proponents’ proposed TOC, 
then what to do? 
IOCM in Project Delivery Phase 
Q 10. During delivery phase, if the actual cost was still lower than the target cost, 
would alliance participants make more efforts to reduce costs? If so, what 
 Page | 297 
measures would alliances take to reduce costs more aggressively? How alliances 
manage costs more efficiently?  
Q 11. As we all know, alliancing encourages the participants to find solutions to 
problems, and risks are collectively managed to minimize their impact. If any 
risks emerge or problems arise, what specific measures would alliance 
participants take to reduce their adverse effects on costs? How did/In what ways 
would alliance participants work out solutions to risks or problems and estimate 
the related costs? Would you please describe the process?  
Q 12. If a minor cost overrun problem occurs, what specific measures would alliance 
participants take to reduce costs to the target level? Can the alliance relax one or 
more functional or performance requirements of projects upon the owner’s 
acceptance to reduce costs?  
Q 13. If the initial TOC was very difficult to be achieved or cost overrun problems 
were very significant, in such a situation, can the alliance redesign the project or 
part of the project, redevelop the construction methods, or adjust initial TOC? 
Can functional or performance requirements of projects be relaxed? What 
specific measures would alliance participants take to fill the gap between TOC 
and actual cost?  
Scope Change in Project Alliances 
Q 14. What issues can lead to adjustment to initial TOC? 
Q 15. Project scope changes are very limited in alliances. Normally, who has the right 
to initiate or propose a scope change, the owner, the alliance or any alliance 
participants? Only the owner has the final say? 
Q 16. If a scope change occurs, what the basic procedures will the alliance follow to 
resolve issues regarding the scope change?  
Q 17. Would you please explain the procedures for designing the change part of the 
project, and how the alliance re-estimate and adjust initial TOC correspondingly 
(or how to determine the cost for the change part)? Is it a similar process to the 
development of initial TOC? How to develop the proposal for a scope change?  
